ficulty of conceiving how a Being can operate where he is not; but if we admit the hypothesis now proposed, we can readily believe that the Deity operates every where; for, according to it, he is every where.

fact neither does nor ought to bring any doubt upon our belief of the fact itself, because our comprehension of every subject whatever is equally obscure and imperfect. We understand nothing of the mode of the existence of any being. We know that we ourselves ex- In whatever manner, however, we may ist, but we have no conception of the manner conceive of the omnipresence of the Deity, we in which the wonderful phenomena of life are must all admit the fact itself, that by the neproduced and continued. Of the existence of cessity of his nature he is every where, and the Deity, it is impossible to doubt. We see that by the necessity he knows every his works we feel his power; but in what thing. And no other admission is requisite, manner he exists we do not know, because to establish, in the most satisfactory manner, we have no data upon which to form even a his universal and perfect government. His conjecture respecting the mode of his exist-benevolent eye is upon me his almighty arm ence. The reason that we do not know how he is every where present, is because we do not know how he is present any where; that is, because we do not at all comprehend the mode of his existence.

We see that man is bound to a spot of earth, and that his presence at one time is restricted to that spot. This being the only kind of existence with which our senses have made us acquainted, it is natural that we should find it difficult to conceive how a Being can at the same moment be here, and in the most distant part of the globe, and in the most distant planet. But, whatever be the mode of the existence of the Deity, we must necessarily conceive of it as different from our own. For at all events he has been present in this globe -in the planets which form our system, in the sun which is its centre, in every fixed star -in a word, wherever we behold a planet or a star. Whatever these bodies are, they are something; some of them are of immense magnitude, and are placed at such distances from each other, as to be beyond our power of calculation; and no one will contend that they placed themselves where they are. Now he who could place them there-he, the constitution of whose nature admits of his ever having been present at these inconceivable distances, must possess a nature so essentially different from ours, that we ought to have no difficulty in supposing that it may allow of his being present at them at one and the same time, as easily as at successive periods. As our mode of existence confines our presence to one spot at one time, his may be such as necessarily makes him present in every part of the uni

verse.

Many writers on this subject appear needlessly to have magnified the difficulty which attends our conception of it. They seem in general to think that the Deity bears no relation whatever to space-that, in fact, he is actually present no where, and that of course it is only in a figurative sense that he is omnipresent. But surely it is more just to conceive of him as really pervading all space-as actually present in every part of the universe. This idea is at least distinct, and enables us to conceive, in a satisfactory manner, of his universal operation, while the view commonly entertained is extremely confused; for, do what we will, we can form no idea of a Being who bears no relation to space; and, if we could, we should still be pressed with the dif

is beneath me; with the situation in which I am placed, he is infinitely better acquainted in all its parts, than I am with any single circumstance in it. He knows that a certain event is about to befal me; he understands its nature; he foresees its consequences; he is perfectly wise; he is infinitely good. Would he then permit it to happen, did he not foresee it would answer some wise and benevolent purpose? Can we conceive that he is every where present without acting? that he knows every thing. without availing himself of the power he possesses, to prevent what is wrong, and to accomplish what is right? that, though he is perfectly acquainted with every evil which is about to arise, and perfectly able to prevent it, he will not stretch out his hand to do so? that the original source of all activity is the only inactive Being in the universe, and the source of all energy the only Being who does not exert his power?

If this opinion be absurd in itself, and unsupported by the shadow of reason, there is but one other conclusion which can be adopted, namely, that every event, which happens to every creature, takes place according to the appointment of the Deity. Nothing can be more frivolous than the objection, that the watchfulness which this supposes over the most trifling concerns of the most insignificant creature is unworthy of the Sovereign of the universe. Whatever it was not beneath him to create, it cannot be beneath him to provide for and to protect; and whatever is of any importance, either to the present or the future comfort of any being, is worthy of care in the degree in which it may be the means of enjoyment or the cause of suffering. Its minuteness cannot render it unworthy of notice, if it be of any consequence; and what would detract from the dignity and greatness of the Governor of the universe would be, not his taking care of the minute concerns, but his neglecting them.

A great part of animal enjoyment depends upon what we are accustomed to consider as little things. A great number of little things particularly if they often recur, become of greater importance than any single event, however vast or momentous; they produce, taken together, a large sum of enjoyment, and there seems no possible way of taking care of this collective sum, but by taking care of particular events. And, indeed, the superintendence of minute events implies as

much dignity as the superintendence of great events; and our admiration is never more excited, than when we contemplate an intelligence, which, while it directs the most grand and mighty movements, overlooks not the most insignificant concern capable of affecting the ultimate result. That superintendence which extends its care to the feast obvious circumstances, no less than to the most striking, is certainly more perfect than that which regards only such events as no intelligent being could possibly overlook. The apprehension, that this constant superintendence of events, from the minutest circumstance which is capable of exciting sensation, up to those mighty movements which affect the condition of worlds, must be attended with perplexity to the Deity, originates in conceptions equally unenlightened and imperfect. He is at all times present every where, and every where is capable of exerting his power. The superintendence of all the events in the universe, therefore, can be attended with no more trouble to him than the superintendence of any single event. The whole of possibility must all times be equally easy to the Being who possesses infinite power.

No other consideration surely can be necessary, to make every intelligent being satisfied with his lot, and resigned to the dispensations which befal him. Many of the events of life, it is true, are deeply afflictive. Often our enjoyments seem given us but to be removed, and even the most secure we hold by an uncertain tenure. The inequalities in health, in the duration of life, in the distribution of property-the prevalence of natural and moral evil in their thousand shapes sometimes press with such severity upon the mind, as to create, even in the most pious and confiding, a doubt whether a Being of perfect benevolence be indeed seated at the helm of affairs. Our very hearts die within us when sickness and death assail our beloved friends.

When the heart on which our image was engraven, and, which beats with generous affection for us, is insensible and cold-when, in that dark and narrow bed, from which they cannot arise, sleep a father, a wife, a child, a friend, we feel a sorrow which refuses to be comforted. We dwell upon their excellences with a mournful pleasure. We think of the happy hours we have spent in their societyhours never to return-with a feeling which We have, therefore, abundant reason to rest nearly approaches to despair. That they are in the delightful assurance, that, of every event no more-that they have ceased to think, to which takes place, all the care is taken which feel, to act, at least for us-that the eye which perfect wisdom can dictate, and infinite good- used to gladden at our approach is dark, and ness require that all its consequences are can no more beam upon us with tenderness foreseen and considered-that its time, its and love-that those lips which have enlightplace, its measure, its duration, are all appoint- ened us with the counsels of wisdom, or soothed by him who first set in motion the compli- ed our souls with the accents of hallowed and cated and mighty wheels which bring it round. virtuous affection, are silent for ever-no more Of this sublime truth, which nothing but to solace us in sorrow, no more to excite or to its great and cheering consequences can lead heighten our pleasure-while these thoughts us to doubt, we may be further assured, by the press upon the mind, (and on the loss of our dear consideration of the relation which the Creator and virtuous friends they do incessantly press necessarily bears to his creatures. He is not upon it, sinking it to the dust,) the universe merely their Creator; by the very act of crea- is a blank to us. No longer do we discover tion he unites himself to them by a tie, but any traces of that supreme and unchanging feebly represented by that which binds a pa- goodness which we have been accustomed to rent to his child. He is their Father, in a contemplate with delight. But even in these much more near and real sense than any hu- moments of sadness we must be unjust to curman parent is the father of his offspring; and selves, and to the Author of our mercies, if the best feelings of earthly parents must be we are not soon revived by the consciousness exceeded by his, in the degree in which he is of benevolence, to which the severity of anmore perfect than they. Yet a good father guish may for a while have made us insensilives but to labour for the welfare of his family. ble. The privation of our friends, afflictive A tender mother, while she presses her child as it is, is never without benefit to us. It is to her bosom, anxiously considers how she then we feel that we are born for immortality may best avail herself of the situation in which-that the world is not our home-that we are she is placed, to advance its happiness- travelling to a fairer clime. It is then that wishes she had the command of circumstances, we enter into religion, and feel its genuine and could prevent the occurrence of every event spirit. The same happy effects are often procapable of endangering its virtue and enjoy-duced by sickness; and, to the natural and

ment.

This power, so vainly desired by human parents, is possessed by the Universal Parent. And is it possible to believe that he will not exert it for the welfare of his offspring? With unerring wisdom and unbounded goodness, must he not feel towards them in the best manner? And, since no power in the universe is capable of controlling his will, must he not at all times act towards them as these feelings dictate?

moral disorders which prevail, we owe the production and the growth of the highest excellences of our nature. In a word, an attentive consideration of what are termed the evils of life, enables us to discover so much of the truest benevolence in many of them, as may well induce us to bear with resignation those whose design we cannot so fully comprehend, until it shall please our heavenly Father to give us clearer light and stronger vision.

It is true that the evil we suffer, and, indeed,

a revelation of his will-if he have altered the course of nature, in attestation of its truthif, to prove the divinity of the mission of the great personage whom he raised up to communicate it, he endowed him with the power of performing such stupendous works as no being, unassisted by him, could possibly accomplish-if mankind were in want of a revelation-if the revelation actually given be in every respect suited to supply it-if it be calculated to rectify their errors, to purify their hearts, to exalt their hopes, to dignify their pursuits, to promote their truest welfare here, and to prepare them for pure and ever-increasing happiness hereafter-if all the circumstances of time, place, and method, were admirably adapted to give it effect, and to secure the most important objects it is designed to accomplish, then is the doctrine of providence established on a new basis. Every Christian must believe that the affairs of mankind are under the direction of the Deity—that he has not cut himself off from all interference with the wants and happiness of his creaturesthat he does interpose for their welfare as he sees occasion; for the Christian system is one of the most illustrious and delightful instances of that interposition.

that the general train of events, is the result acknowledged to possess, and their truth must of laws which we cannot without absurdity be admitted by every consistent theist. But suppose the Deity to be continually changing if God have given to his intelligent offspring and suspending, for the benefit of individuals. Neither does any rational believer in a Providence maintain such an opinion. It is not Lecessary to his argument, to suppose that these general laws have ever once been suspended. From a conviction, that he has evidence of the fact, he may believe that on some occasions of supreme importance they have been suspended; but the great argument for the doctrine of a Providence would remain just the same, even though it could be demonstrated, that the laws by which the universe is governed have operated with undeviating regularity from the beginning. For whoever believes that these general laws were appointed by a Being of infinite wisdom and goodness, must admit that he foresaw all the consequences which would result from their operation in every instant of time, and to every individual. If, therefore, when he appointed them, he foresaw that they would give rise to any event inconsistent with perfect benevolence, he would have so modified them, as effectually to have prevented its occurrence, or he would have provided for its counteraction, by the operation of secondary causes. Whether the Deity govern the universe by such an original adjustment as secures, with undeviating order, the occurrence of every thing in its proper season, place, and manner, according to the plan which his wisdom and goodness have ordained, or whether he govern it by a continual superintendence of events, every thing, on either supposition, is entirely in his hands. It is possible that the first is his plan; he may have adopted the second; both must be alike easy to him. But, since both were equally in his power, he can have been induced to choose the one rather than the other, only because the one is better adapted than the other to accomplish the purposes of benevolence; and it seems scarcely possible for us not to conclude, that these purposes may be better effected by the second than by the first, and therefore that this is the plan which he has adopted.

To sum up the whole argument, if of every event all the care is not taken which it is right should be taken, the administration of the world is imperfect; but the wisdom, power, and goodness, which are spent on the minutest and meanest object we can contemplate, necessarily lead to the conclusion, that their Author possesses these attributes in a perfect measure; and, since they have been exerted in the production of particular objects, they must be employed in the government of the whole. We have therefore the most solid ground to adopt the sublime and cheering conclusion, that nothing can happen without the knowledge and permission of unerring wisdom and perfect goodness, and that all the vast affairs of the universe, in every particular circumstance, and in every instant of time, are under the wisest and the best direction.

The preceding arguments are founded on the perfections which the Deity is universally

If, from the fact itself of a divine revelation, we descend to the particular doctrines which it contains, we shall find the most decisive evidence of this truth. It is recognised in every page-it is affirmed on innumerable occasions, and in every variety of form. God is there represented as the Sovereign Arbiter of events as the Great Being who sitteth on the circle of the earth, Judging among the nations. It is he who causeth the sun to shine, and the rain to descend; it is he who giveth healthful and fruitful seasons; it is he who rideth on the wings of the wind, and it is his voice which thunders in the storm. By him kings reign and princes decree justice. He exalteth one and abaseth another. He turneth round the mighty wheel of events, retaining every individual in the situation which he judges fit. He hath made of one blood all nations of men to dwell on the face of the earth; he hath determined their appointed times, and the place of their habitation.'

Our reverend Master assures us, that not even a sparrow falleth to the ground without the will of our heavenly Father, and that the very hairs of our head are all numbered; meaning, it is evident, that our most trifling concerns are appointed by him. Behold, says he, the fowls of the air; for they sow not, neither do they reap, nor gather into barns; yet your heavenly Father feedeth them. Are ye not much better than they? And why are ye anxious about raiment? Consider the lilies of the field, how they grow; they toil not, neither do they spin; and yet Solomon, in all his glory, was not arrayed like one of these. Wherefore, if God so clothe the grass of the field, which flourisheth to-day, and to-morrow is cast into the furnace, will he not much more

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Of the Manner in which the Divine Government is Ad- be exercised over the material and animal

mediately previous to the actions which are called voluntary; but that state is not induced by the mind itself, but by objects operating upon it. The circumstances in which a percipient being is placed excite sensations, and sensations ideas. Sensations and ideas induce that peculiar condition of the mind which is termed pleasurable, or its opposite, which is termed painful. The feeling of pleasure excites desire; that of pain, aversion. Will is the result of this state of the mind. Prove to the mind, that an object is desirable—that is, that it will induce pleasure-and you immediately excite in it the volition to possess it. Prove to it, that an object will occasion pain, and you excite the volition to avoid it. Volition, then, it is manifest, depends on the object, whatever it be, which the mind contemplates as desirable or otherwise. Take away the object, there is no volition; satisfy it that the object can affect it neither with pleasure nor pain, there is no volition; so that volition does not spring up in the mind of its own accord, and without cause, but is entirely dependent upon objects perceived to be, or supposed to be, desirable. In a word, and to repeat what has already been said, sensations and ideas are attended with the feelings of pleasure or of pain; these induce desire or aversion, and these volition, with as much certainty and steadiness as the law of gravitation produces the phenomena which are dependent upon it.*

mal-with a consciousness that he has acted Volition cannot arise, as is often imagined, well or ill-with a feeling of approbation or at the pleasure of the mind. The term volition of disapprobation-with a sensation of happi-expresses that state of the mind which is imness or misery, arising purely from the action itself. This train of sensation becomes itself a new source of action; but it arises according to certain fixed laws, and operates as steadily as any other principle of his nature, or as any law of the material world. He, therefore, who perfectly understands this nature, who knows how every circumstance will affect this moral agent, and who has a sovereign control over events, can govern him with the same steadiness with which he regulates the animal or the material world-can make him at all times feel, and think, and act, as may be necessary to carry on the great designs of his administration, without violating any principle of his nature. By adapting the particular situation in which he is placed to the particular state of his mind, he can excite whatever volition, and secure whatever action, he pleases. What is maintained, then, is, that, with respect to every individual in the world, there is this exact adaptation of circumstances to his temper, his habits, his wants; so that, while he is left to the full and free exercise of every faculty he possesses, he can feel and act only as the Sovereign of the Universe appoints; because the circumstances which excite his sensations and volitions are determined by him. It is not just to suppose that the Deity exercises any such control over his creatures, as to force them to act contrary to their will, or to violate any principle of their nature. They always act, and must act, according to their will, and in conformity to their nature; but at the same time he secures his own purpose, by placing them in circumstances which so operate upon their nature, as certainly to induce the conduct he requires.*

every intelligent and moral agent he has given a certain part of his administration to carry

Volition being thus dependent on the circumstances in which an individual is placed, any given volition may be excited in him by a certain modification of his circumstances. We find that the tempers of different men are infinitely various. The Deity has made a corresponding variety in the situations in It has been argued, by almost all who have which he has placed them. To every indihitherto written on the origin of evil, that its exist-vidual he has assigned his allotted work; to ence could not have been prevented, unless an absolute restraint had been placed upon the will. This is not true; for there might have been given to mankind a knowledge of their welfare so clear and strong, as effectually to have secured their choice of it. In other words, they might have been brought under the influence of motives so powerfully determining them to the choice of good, that it would not have been possible for them, their circumstances remaining the same, to have chosen evil. This has been distinctly admitted by a late writer, who, though he has laboured to reconcile, and sometimes very successfully, the evil which actually exists, with the wisdom and goodness of the Deity, yet has carefully avoided opposing or even alluding to those theological opinions which involve this subject in great and insurmountable difficulty. It is a position wholly untenable, that, according to our view of the subject, the degree of moral evil must necessarily have been as great as it is, unless an absolute restraint had been laid upon the will of man. Without entering into metaphysical discussions, it may be safely assumed, that the will is determined by the greater apparent good, and that when it makes a bad election, in defiance of reason and judgment, the dismission of some present uneasiness, or the possession of some present gratification, is the greatest apparent good for the time being. Had,

then, their real interest, upon a full view of their present and future condition, been placed before all mankind, with a clear distinctness which we can certainly conceive, because we have examples of it on record, freewill, though exposed to less chance of error, would not have been annihilated; and yet it would have been as morally impossible for man to choose evil in opposition to good, as we imagine it to be for the glorified inheritors of a future state, as it proved to be for Jesus Christ, during his adoption of human nature, with its temptations and infirmities, or, to go no farther, as it appears to be for good men, when they approach the termination of their course, after a long perseverance in the habits and practice of virtue.' Treatise on the Records of the Creation By JOHN BIRD SUMNER, M. A., vol. ii. p. 228.

*This is merely an attempt to explain the manner in which volition arises. There can be no doubt that the will is invariably determined by the greater apparent good-or, to state the fact more generally, the will is invariably determined by motive, and with a steadiness and strength always in proportion to the uniformity and vigour of the motive.

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