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$. 28. Secondly, what a small part of the Secondly,
substantial beings that are in the universe, want of a discoverable the want of ideas leaves open to our knowconnexion ledge, we have seen. In the next place, anbetween other cause of ignorance, of no less moideas we
ment, is a want of a discoverable connexion bave.
between those ideas we have. For wherever we want that, we are utterly incapable of universal and certain knowledge; and are, in the former case, left only to observation and experiment: which, how narrow and confined it is, how far from general knowledge, we need not be told. I shall give some few instances of this cause of our ignorance, and so leave it. It is evident that the bulk, figure, and motion of several bodies about us, produce in us several sensations, as of colours, sounds, tastes, smells, pleasure and pain, &c. These mechanical affections of bodies having no affinity at all with those ideas they produce in us (there being no conceivable connexion between any impulse of any sort of body and any perception of a colour or smell, which we find in our minds) we can have no distinct knowledge of such operations beyond our experience; and can reason no otherwise about them, than as effects produced by the appointment of an infinitely wise agent, which perfectly surpass our comprehensions. As the ideas of sensible secondary qualities which we have in our minds, can by us be no way deduced from bodily causes, nor any correspondence or connexion be found between them and those primary qualities which (experience shows us) produce them in us; so on the other side, the operation of our minds upon our bodies is as inconceivable. How any thought should produce a motion in body is as remote from the nature of our ideas, as how any body should produce any thought in the mind. That it is so, it experience did not convince us, the consideration of the things themselves would never be able in the least to discover to us. These, and the like, though they liave a constant and regular connexion, in the ordinary course of things; yet that connexion being not discoverable in the ideas themselves, which appearing to have no necessary dependence one on another, we
can attribute their connexion to nothing else but the arbitrary determination of that all-wise agent, who has made them to be, and to operate as they do, in a way wholly above our weak understandings to conceive. $. 29. In some of our ideas there are cer
Instances. tain relations, habitudes, and connexions, 40 visibly included in the nature of the ideas themselves, that we cannot conceive them separable from them by any power whatsoever.
And in these only we are capable of certain and universal knowledge. Thus the idea of a right-lined triangle necessarily carries with it an equality of its angles to two right ones.
Nor can we conceive this relation, this connexion of these two ideas, to be possibly mutable, or to depend on any arbitrary power, which of choice made it thus, or could make it otherwise. But the coherence and continuity of the parts of matter; the production of sensation in us of colours and sounds, &c. by impulse and motion ; nay, the original rules and communication of motion being such, wherein we can discover no natural connexion with any ideas we have; we cannot but ascribe them to the arbitrary will and good pleasure of the wise architect. I need not, I think, here mention the resurrection of the dead, the future state of this globe of earth, and such other things, which are by every one acknowledged to depend wholly on the determination of a free agent. The things that, as far as our observation reaches, we constantly find to proceed regularly, we may conclude do act by a law set them; but yet by a law, that we know not: whereby, though causes work steadily, and effects constantly flow from them, yet their connexions and dependencies being not discoverable in our ideas, we can have but an experimental knowledge of them. From all which it is easy to perceive what a darkness we are involved in, how little it is of being, and the things that are, that we are capable to know. And therefore we shall do no injury to our knowledge, when we modestly think with ourselves, that we are so far from being able to comprehend the whole nature of the universe, and all the things contained in it, that we are uot capable of a philosophical knowledge of the
bodies that are about us, and make a part of us : concerning their secondary qualities, powers, and operations, we can have no universal certainty. Several effects come every day within the notice of our senses, of which we have so far sensitive knowledge; but the causes, manner, and certainty of their production, for the two foregoing reasons, we must be content to be very ignorant of. In these we can go no farther than particular experience informs us of matter of fact, and by analogy to guess what effects the like bodies are, upon other trials, like to produce. But as to a perfect science of natural bodies (not to mention spiritual beings) we are, I think, so far from being capable of any such thing,
, that I conclude it lost labour to seek after it.
§. 30. Thirdly, where we have adequate Thirdly,
ideas, and where there is a certain and diswant of tracing our ideas. coverable connexion between them, yet we
are often ignorant, for want of tracing those ideas which we have, or may have; and for want of finding out those intermediate ideas, which may show us what habitude of agreement or disagreement they have one with another. And thus many are ignorant of mathematical truths, not out of any imperfection of their faculties, or uncertainty in the things themselves; but for want of application in acquiring, examining, and by due ways comparing those ideas. That which has most contributed to hinder the due tracing of our ideas, and finding out their relations, and agreements or disagreements one with another, has been, I suppose, the ill use of words. It is impossible that men should ever truly seek, or certainly discover the agreement or disagreement of ideas themselves, whilst their thoughts flutter about, or stick only in sounds of doubtful and uncertain significations. Mathematicians abstracting their thoughts from names, and accustoming themselves to set before their minds the ideas themselves that they would consider, and not sounds instead of them, have avoided thereby a great part of that perplexity, puddering, and confusion, which has so much hindered men's progress in other parts of knowledge. For whilst they stick in words of undetermined and uncertain signification, they are unable to distinguish true from false, certain from probable, consistent from inconsistent, in their own opinions. This having been the fate or misfortune of a great part of men of letters, the increase brought into the stock of real knowledge, has been very little, in proportion to the schools, disputes, and writings, the world has been filled with; whilst students being lost in the great wood of words, knew not whereabout they were, how far their discoveries were advanced, or what was wanting in their own or the general stock of knowledge. Had men, in the discoveries of the material, done as they have in those of the intellectual world, in. volved all in the obscurity of uncertain and doubtful ways of talking, volumes writ of navigation and voyages, theories and stories of zones and tides, multiplied and disputed; nay, ships built, and fleets sent out, would never have taught us the way beyond the line; and the Antipodes would be still as much unknown, as when it was declared heresy to hold there were any. But having spoken sufficiently of words, and the ill or careless use that is commonly made of them, I shall not say any thing more of it here.
g. 31. Hitherto we have examined the Extent in reextent of our knowledge, in respect of the spect to uni. several sorts of beings that are. There is versality. another extent of it, in respect of universality, which will also deserve to be considered; and in this regard, our knowledge follows the nature of our ideas. If the ideas are abstract, whose agreement or disagreement we perceive, our knowledge is universal. For what is known of such general ideas, will be true of every particular thing, in whom that essence, i. e. that abstract idea is to be found; and what is once known of such ideas, will be perpetually and for ever true. So that as to all general knowledge, we must search and find it only in our minds, and it is only the examining of our own ideas, that furnisheth us with that. Truths belonging to essences of things, (that is, to abstract ideas) are eternal, and are to be found out by the contemplation only of those essences : as the existences of things are to be known only from experience, But having
, VOL. II. Aa
more to say of this in the chapters where I shall speak of general and real knowledge, this may here suffice as to the universality of our knowledge in general.
be all bare vision.
DOUBT not but my reader by Knowledge
this time may be apt to think, that placed in I have been all this while only building a
castle in the air; and be ready to say to me, “ To what purpose all this stir? Know
“ ledge, say you, is only the perception of “ the agrcement or disagreement of our own ideas: but “ who knows what those ideas may be? Is there any
thing so extravagant, as the imaginations of men's “ brains ? Where is the head that has no chimeras in " it? Or if there be a sober and a wise man, what dif“ ference will there he, by your rules, between his “ knowledge and that of the most extravagant fancy in " the world? They both have their ideas, and perceive " their agreement and disagreement one with another, “ If there be any difference between them, the advan“ tage will be on the warm-headed man's side, as hav
ing the more ideas, and the more lively: and so, by your rules, he will be the more knowing. If it be
true, that all knowledge lies only in the perception “ of the agreement or disagreement of our own ideas, " the visions of an enthusiast, and the reasonings of a " sober man, will be equally certain. It is no matter “ how things are; so a man observe but the agreement “ of his own imaginations, and talk conformably, it is “ all truth, all certainty. Such castles in the air will “ be as strong holds of truth, as the demonstrations of “ Euclid. That an harpy is not a centaur is by this “way as certain knowledge, and as much a truth, as “ that a square is not a circle,