"The exertions of Lieutenant-Colone! Murray, Quarter-MasterGeneral, and the other Officers of the General Staff, during the action, were unremitted, and deserve every degree of approbation.

"The illness of Brigadier-General Clinton, Adjutant-General, unfortunately deprived the army of the benefit of his services.

"The Lieutenant-General hopes the loss, in point of numbers, is not so considerable as might have been expected. He laments, however, the fall of the gallant soldiers and valuable officers who have suffered.

"He knows that it is impossible, in any language he can use, to enhance the esteem, or diminish the regret, that the army feels in common with him for its late commander. His career has been unfortunately too limited for his country, but has been sufficient for bis own fame. Beloved by the army, honoured by his Sovereign, and respected by his country, he has terminated a life devoted to her service by a glorious death, leaving his name as a memorial, an example, and an incitement to those who shall follow him in the path of honour; and it is from his country alone, that his memory can receive the tribute which is its due."

LETTER LV.

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APOLOGY FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE SOLDIERY TOWARDS THE SPANIARDS. -HUMANITY OF BRITISH SOLDIERS EXEMPLIFIED AT THE BATTLE OF VIMIERA.—BRITISH AND FRENCH ARMIES CONTRASTED. -IMPERIAL GEOGRAPHERS.—IGNORANCE OF MINUTE GEOGRAPHICAL DETAILS OFTEN SEVERELY FELT IN CONDUCTING THE OPERATIONS OF ARMIES. THE FORCE OF OPINION. -CHANGE NECESSARY IN THE ARMY OF AUSTRIA: AND IN THE CONDUCT OF AFFAIRS IN SPAIN.

Gosport, January, 1809.

wold

FEARFUL, from some expressions in your letter of this day, that you have received a false impression of the conduct of the British troops towards the Spaniards, I could wish to lay before you the real state of facts, premising that every possible allowance ought to be made for the irritation of our men's minds, produced by the retreat. Indeed, during the whole campaign, they evinced as much humanity and generosity, as of bravery and heroism. va

But reciprocal ignorance of language, and diversity of religious customs and local prejudices, were perpetually interposing to frustrate the endeavours of the officers to

preserve amity between the soldiery and the Spaniards. Besides, as in Gallicia, and the north of Spain, there is more specie than real property, our soldiers were frequently incensed at finding that the offer of a dollar would not induce a peasant to part with a morsel of rusty bacon, a few garlic sausages, or a bit of bread, which often, in fact, were not intrinsically worth one-third of the sum. On arriving of an evening at their villages, after a most fatiguing march wet to the skin, yet expiring with thirst, these unfeeling mortals often refused, when requested by our men, to run to the adjoining fountain for a pitcher of water, or to procure a few heath-roots to make a fire. Hence frequent bickerings ensued, and sometimes a few blows, which the Spaniards generally deserved. That the breast of the British soldier is incapable of wanton cruelty, and is warmed by the best affections, I could convince you by several anecdotes; but you may judge of his character by the following: AP Lon

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At the battle of Vimiera, our men who belonged to the pickets, and who had fallen down wounded, were passed over by the French in their advance, but were inhumanly stabbed by them in the limbs or trunk afterwards. How did the British behave towards them under the same circumstances?Their first act, on coming up with a wounded Frenchman, was to unsling the canteen from

their shoulders, and pour a portion of its contents into his quivering lips. This happened in innumerable instances. I will then go on and ask, what such men may effect, if properly managed and ably led on?Do you not recog nize in them the real descendants of that handful of brave men who, conducted by a Black Prince, in two succeeding summers chased, from shore to shore of their extensive realm, the forefathers of the myrmidons whol are now ra vaging and depopulating Europe? Can you have any difficulty in believing that our army might soon, with a little management; be made equal to that of vain-glorious France? It is already equal, and more than equalsin everything but numbers. Consider the facility with which, upon all occasions, we vanquish the foeswhen not absolutely overpowered by numbers of VIL 129991

Our battalion-officers are at present, and have long been esteemed the best in Europe. Our artillery is at length much superior to that of France; and inferior as our com+ missariat must always be to that of a continental army; yet, with a little attention, it might soon be rendered nearly as effective. As to the French generals of the present day! they are mostly ignorant and uneducated men, and in and in every respect inferior to the generals of the English army. How then, you will naturally ask, has it happened that they have overrun the greater part of Europe? Partly from

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the general corruption of their opponents, and their weak, bigoted policy; but chiefly from the force of opinion, which has done more for them than all other causes. The opinion of every nation, our own alone excepted, seems to be, that the French, especially with Bonaparte at their head, are invincible. And I must add that, by the most minute attention to geographical and topographical details, they have acquired a method of combining a series of complicated movements with a degree of mathematical certainty a thing never before attempted. With each corps d'armee are two or three men, named imperial geographers, who, with the largest and best maps of Europe under their eyes, direct the march of every detachment, and compute the half hours, nay minutes, which will be necessary to effect each movement.

Hence their attacks are characterized by a simultaneous impulse and rapidity which, at first sight, appears astonishing. How much have we not lost from a defect in this species of knowledge. Consider the failure of our first attempt on Seringapatam, and our late march to attack Buenos Ayres."

Nay, during our late retreat in Spain, should it not have been known that it was impossible for the enemy to get between us and the sea by any lateral road on our left,