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however I may miss my aim, will justify myself in my obedience to you, and some others of my ingenious friends.
I am exceedingly obliged to capt. Monk, for his kind remembrance, and to you for sending it me, and letting me know he is alive. I have, as I ought, all the esteem for him, that you know so modest and good a man deserves. Pray, when you see him, present my humble service to him, and let him know that I am extremely glad to hear that he is well, and that he has not forgot me, and should be much more so, to see him here again in England. Pray give my humble service to your brother. I am,
Mr. Molyneux to Mr. Locke.
Dublin, Feb. 17, 1693-4. I am so very sensible of the great caution, and deep consideration you use, before you write
any thing, that I wonder at my own hardiness, when I venture
to object any thing against your positions. And when I read your answers to any such of my objections, I much more admire at my own weakness in making them. I have a new instance of this in your last of January 18th, which came not to this place before yesterday. This has most abundantly satisfied me, in the doubt I lay under concerning the case of a drunken man; which you have cleared
up to me, in three words, most convincingly. So that I think you have no reason in the least to alter that paragraph, unless you may think it convenient to express that matter a little plainer ; which, I think, indeed, your last letter to me does better than your twenty-second section of that chapter. That section runs thus :
22. “ But is not a man, drunk and sober, the same person? Wny else is he punished for the fact he commits when drunk, though he be never afterwards conscious of it? Just as much the same person as a man that walks and does other things in his sleep, is the sam.e person, and is answerable for any mischief he shall do in it. Human laws punish both with a justice suitable to their way of knowledge; because, in these cases, they cannot distinguish certainly what is real, what counterfeit. And so the ignorance in drunkenness or sleep is not admitted as a plea,” &c.
Now I conceive that which makes the expression herein not so very clear, is,“ suitable to their way of knowledge;" some will be apt to mistake the word their, to refer to the drunken or sleeping man, whereas it refers to the laws, as if you had said, “ suitable to that way of knowledge or information which the laws have established to proceed by.”
This, in your letter, is very manifest in a few words. There you say “punishment is annexed to personality, personality to consciousness. How then can a drunkard be punished for what he did, whereof he is not conscious ? To this I answer, human judicatures justly punish him, because the fact is proved against him, but want of consciousness cannot be proved for him.” This, sir, is most full in the case you are there treating of. So I have nothing more to offer in that matter.
Only give me leave to propose one question more to you, though it be foreign to the business you are upon, in your chapter of identity. How comes it to pass, that want of consciousness cannot be proved for a drunkard as well as for a frantic? One, methinks, is as manifest as the other; and if drunkenness may be counterfeit, so may a frenzy. Wherefore to me it seems, that the law has made a difference in these two cases, on this account, viz. “ that drunkenness is commonly incurred voluntarily and premeditately; whereas a frenzy is
commonly without our consent, or impossible to be prevented.” But enough of this.
I should not have troubled you with this, but that, according to your usual candour and goodness, you seemed to desire my farther thoughts thereon, as speedily as I could.
Most worthy Sir,
Mr. Locke to Mr. Molyneux.
London, May 26, 1694. The slowness of the press has so long retarded my answer to your last obliging letter, that my book, which is now printed and bound, and ready to be sent to you, must be an excuse for my long silence. By the obedience I have paid to you in the index and summaries, ordered according to your desires, you will see it is not want of deference to you, or esteem of you, that has caused this neglect. And the profit I have made by your reflections, on several passages of my book, will, I hope, encourage you to the continuance of that freedom, to a man who can distinguish between the censures of a judicious friend, and the wrangling of a peevish critic. There is nothing more acceptable to me than the one, nor more, I think, to be slighted than the other. If, therefore, as you seem to resolve, you shall throw away any more of your time in a perusal of my essay; judge, I beseech you, as severely as you can, of what
you read. I know you will not forsake truth to quarrel with me; and, whilst you follow her, you will always oblige me, by showing me my mistakes, or what seems to you
to be so. You will find, in this second edition, that
your advice, at any time, has not been thrown away upon me. And you will see, by the errata, that, though your last came a little too late, yet that could not hinder me from following what you so kindly, and with so much reason, suggested. I agree with
you, that drunkenness being a voluntary defect, want of consciousness ought not to be presumed in favour of the drunkard. But frenzy being involuntary, and a misfortune, not a fault, has a right to that excuse, which certainly is a just one, where it is truly a frenzy. And all that lies upon human justice is to distinguish carefully between what is real, and what counterfeit in the case.
My book, which I desire you to accept from me, is put into Mr. Churchill the bookseller's hand, who has told me he will send it in a bale of books, the next week, to Mr. Dobson, a bookseller in Castle-street, Dublin ; and I have ordered him to send with it a copy of the additions and alterations which are printed by themselves, and will help to make your former book useful to any young man. as you will see (is designed) by the conclusion of the epistle to the reader. I am,
Mr. Molyneux to Mr. Locke.
Dublin, June 2, 1694. I am highly obliged to you for the favour of your last, of May 26, which I received yesterday. It brought me the welcome news of the second edition of your Essay being published; and that you have favoured me with a copy, which I shall expect with some impatience; and when I have perused it, I shall, with all freedom, give you my thoughts of it.
And now that you have cleared your hands of your second edition, I hope you may have leisure to turn your thoughts to the subject I have so often proposed to you ; but this, you will say, is a cruelty in me,
that no sooner you are rid of one trouble, but I set you on another. Truly, sir, were I sensible it could be a trouble to you, I should hardly presume so far on your goodness; but I know those things are so easy and naa tural to your mind, that they give you no pain in the production. And I know also, such is your universal love of mankind, that you count nothing troublesome that tends to their good, in a matter of so great concernment as morality.
I have formerly told you what care I proposed to take in the education of my only child. I must now beg your pardon, if I trouble you in a matter wherein I shall be at a loss without
assistance. He is now five years old, of a most towardly and promising disposition ; bred exactly, as far as his age permits, to the rules
you prescribe, I mean as to forining his mind, and mastering his passions. He reads very well, and I think it time now to put him forward to some other learning. In order to this, I shall want a tutor for him, and indeed this place can hardly afford me one to my mind. If, therefore, you know any ingenious man that
my purpose, you would highly oblige me by procuring him for me. I confess the encouragement I can propose to such an one is but moderate, , yet, perhaps, there may be some found that may not despise it." He should eat at my own table, and have his lodging, washing, firing, and candlelight, in my house, in a good handsome apartment; and besides this, I should allow him 201. per annum. His work for this should be only to instruct three or four boys in Latin, and such other learning as you recommend in your book; I say three or four boys, because, perhaps, I may
have a relation's child or two; one, who is my sister's son, I have always, and do intend to keep, as a companion to my own son; and of more I am uncertain. But if there be one or two, that will be no great addition to his trouble, considering that perhaps their