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at all of their own rectitude : crooked things may be
as stiff and inflexible as straight: and men may be as
positive and peremptory in error as in truth.' How
come else the untractable zealots in different and op-
posite parties ! For if the light, which every one thinks
he has in his mind, which in this case is nothing but
the strength of his own persuasion, be an evidence
that it is from God, contrary opinions have the same
title to inspirations; and God will be not only the
father of lights, but of opposite and contradictory
lights, leading men contrary ways; and contradictory
propositions will be divine truths, if an ungrounded
strength of assurance be an evidence that any pro-
position is a divine revelation.
$ 12. This cannot be otherwise, whilst

Firmness of firmness of persuasion is made the cause

persuasion of believing, and confidence of being in no proof the right is made an argument of truth. that any St. Paul himself believed he did well, and proposition

is from God. that he had a call to it when he

persecuted the Christians, whom he confidently thought in the wrong: but yet it was he, and not they, who were mistaken. Good men are men still, liable to mistakes; and are sometimes warmly engaged in errors, which they take for divine truths, shining in their minds with the clearest light.

$ 13. Light, true light, in the mind is or can be nothing else but the evidence of Light in the

mind, what. the truth of any proposition; and if it be not a self-evident proposition, all the light it has, or can have, is from the clearness and validity of those proofs upon which it is received.

To talk of any other light in the understanding, is to put ourselves in the dark, or in the power of the Prince of darkness, and by our own consent to give ourselves up to delusion, to believe a lie. For if strength of persuasion be the light, which must guide us; I ask how shall any one distinguish between the delusions of Satan

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and the inspirations of the Holy Ghost ? He can trans-
form himself into an angel of light. And they who
are led by this son of the morning are as fully satis-
fied of the illumination, i. e. are as strongly per-
suaded that they are enlightened by the spirit of
God, as any one who is so: they acquiesce and rejoice
in it, are acted by it: and nobody can be more sure,
nor more in the right (if their own strong belief may
be judge) than they.
Revelation

§ 14. He therefore that will not give

himself up to all the extravagancies of dejudged of

lusion and error, must bring this guide of by reason.

his light within to the trial. God, when he makes the prophet, does not unmake the man. He leaves all his faculties in the natural state, to enable him to judge of his inspirations, whether they be of divine original or no. When he illuminates the mind with supernatural light, he does not extinguish that which is natural. If he would have us, assent to the truth of any proposition, he either evidences that truth by the usual methods of natural reason, or else makes it known to be a truth which he would have us assent to, by his authority; and convinces us that it is from him, by some marks which reason cannot be mistaken in. Reason must be our last judge and guide in every thing. I do not mean that we must consult reason, and examine whether a proposition revealed from God can be made out by natural principles, and if it cannot, that then we may reject it: but consult it we must, and by it examine whether it be a revelation from God or no. And if reason finds it to be revealed from God, reason then declares for it as much as for any other truth, and makes it one of her dictates. Every conceit that thoroughly warms our fancies must pass for an inspiration, if there be nothing but the strength of our persuasions, whereby to judge of our persuasions: if reason must not examine their truth by something extrinsical to the

persuasions themselves, inspirations and delusions, truth and falsehood, will have the same measure, and will not be possible to be distinguished. $ 15. If this internal light, or any pro

Belief no position which under that title we take

proof of refor inspired, be conformable to the prin-velation. ciples of reason, or to the word of God, which is attested revelation, reason warrants it, and we may safely receive it for true, and be guided by it in our belief and actions: if it receive no testimony nor evidence from either of these rules, we cannot take it for a revelation, or so much as for true, till we have some other mark that it is a revelation besides our believing that it is so. Thus we see the holy men of old, who had revelations from God, had something else besides that internal light of assurance in their own minds, to testify to them that it was from God. They were not left to their own persuasions alone, that those persuasions were from God; but had outward signs to convince them of the author of those revelations. And when they were to convince others, they had a power given them to justify the truth of their commission from heaven, and by visible signs to assert the divine authority of a message they were sent with, Moses saw the bush burn without being consumed, and heard a voice out of it. This was something besides finding an impulse upon his mind to go to Pharaoh, that he might bring his brethren out of Egypt: and yet he thought not this enough to authorise him to go with that message, till God, by another miracle of his rod turned into a serpent, had assured him of a power to testify his mission, by the same miracle repeated before them, whom he was sent to. Gideon was sent by an angel to deliver Israel from the Midianites, and yet he desired a sign to convince him that this commission was from God. These, and several the like instances to be found among the prophets of old, are enough to show that they thought not an inward seeing or per

suasion of their own minds, without any other proof, a sufficient evidence that it was from God; though the scripture does not every where mention their demanding or having such proofs.

§ 16. In what I have said I am far from denying that God can or doth sometimes enlighten men's minds in the apprehending of certain truths, or excite them to good actions by the immediate influence and assistance of the Holy Spirit, without any extraordinary signs accompanying it. But in such cases, too, we have reason and scripture, unerring rules to know whether it be from God or no. Where the truth embraced is consonant to the revelation in the written word of God, or the action conformable to the dictates of right reason or holy writ, we may be assured that we run no risk in entertaining it as such; because though perhaps it be not an immediate revelation from God, extraordinarily operating on our minds, yet we are sure it is warranted by that revelation which he has given us of truth. But it is not the strength of our private persuasion within ourselves that can warrant it to be a light or motion from heaven; nothing can do that but the written word of God without us, or that standard of reason which is common to us with all men. Where reason or scripture is express for any opinion or action, we may receive it as of divine authority; but it is not the strength of our own persuasions which can by itself give it that stamp. The bent of our own minds may favour it as much as we please; that may show it to be a fondling of our own, but will by no means prove it to be an offspring of heaven, and of divine original.

CHAPTER XX.

Of Wrong Assent, or Error.

error.

$ 1. KNOWLEDGE being to be had only

Causes of of visible and certain truth, error is not a fault of our knowledge, but a mistake of our judgment, giving assent to that which is not true.

But if assent be grounded on likelihood, if the proper object and motive of our assent be probability, and that probability consists in what is laid down in the foregoing chapters, it will be demanded how men come to give their assents contrary to probability. For there is nothing more common than contrariety of opinions; nothing more obvious than that one man wholly disbelieves what another only doubts of, and a third stedfastly believes and firmly adheres to. The reasons whereof, though they may be very various, yet I suppose may all be reduced to these four:

1. Want of proofs.
2. Want of ability to use them.
3. Want of will to use them.
4. Wrong measures of probability.
§ 2. First, by want of proofs, I do not

1. Want of mean only the want of those proofs which

proofs. are nowhere extant, and so are nowhere to be had; but the want even of those proofs which are in being, or might be procured. And thus men want proofs who have not the convenience or opportunity to make experiments and observations themselves tending to the proof of any proposition; nor likewise the convenience to inquire into and collect the testimonies of others : and in this state are the greatest part of mankind, who are given up to labour, and enslaved to the necessity of their mean condition, whose lives are worn out only in the provisions for

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