De legitimatione.

gatio. Imperio magistratûs adoptamus eos easye, qui quæve in potestate parentum sunt; sive primum gradum liberorum obtineant, qualis est filius, filia; sive inferiorem, qualis est nepos, neptis, pronepos, proneptis.

Qui possunt adoptare

ý II. Sed hodiè, ex nostrâ constitutione, cum filius-familias à patre naturali extraneæ personæ in adoptionem datur, jura patris naturaiis minimè dissolvuntur; nec quicquam ad patrem adoptivum transit, nec in potestate ejus est: licet ab intestato jura successionis ei à nobis tributa sint. Si verò pater naturalis non extraneo, sed avo filii sui materno; vel si ipse pater naturalis fuerit emancipatus, etiam avo vel proavo simili modo paterno vel materno filium suum dederit in adoptionem; in hoc casu, quia concurrunt in unam personam et naturalia et adoptionis jura, manet stabile jus patris adoptivi, et naturali vinculo copulatum, et legitimo adoptionis modo constitutum, ut et in familiâ et in potestate hujusmodi patris adoptivi sit.

of adoption is called arrogation. But it is by the authority of the magistrate, that we adopt persons actually under the power of their parents, whether they are in the first degree, as sons and daughters; or in an inferior degree, as grand-children or great grand-children. filium-familias, vel non.

§ 2. But now, by our constitution; when the son of a family is given in adoption by his natural father to a stranger, the power of the natural father is not dissolved, neither does any thing pass to the adoptive father, nor is the adopted son in his power, although we allow such son, the right of succession to his adoptive father dying intestate. But if a natural father should give his son in adoption, not to a stranger, but to the maternal grandfather of such son; or if a natural father, who has been emancipated, should give his son, begotten after emancipation to his paternal or maternal grandfather or great-grandfather, in this case, the rights of nature and adoption concurring, the power of the adoptive father is established both by natural ties and legal adoption, so that the adopted son would be not only in the family, but under the power of his adoptive father.

De arrogatione

6 III. Cum autem impubes per principale rescriptum arrogatur, causâ cognitâ, arrogatio fieri permittitur et exquiritur causa arrogationis, an honesta sit, expediatque

impuberis.

§ 3. When any one, not arrived at puberty, is arrogated by the im perial rescript, inquiry is first made, whether the arrogation be justly founded, and expedient for the pupil:

De ætate adoptantis et adoptati. IV. Minorem natu majorem non posse adoptare placet: adoptio enim naturam imitatur; et pro monstro est, ut major sit filius, quam pater. Debet itaque is, qui sibi filium per adoptionem aut arrogationem facit, plenà pubertate [id est, decem et octo annis] præcedere.

De adoptione in locum nepotis vel neptis, vel deinceps. V. Licet autem et in locum nepotis vel neptis, pronepotis vel proneptis, vel deinceps, adoptare, quamvis filium quis non habeat.

§ 5. It is lawful to adopt a person either as a grand-son or granddaughter, great grand-son or great grand-daughter, or in a more distant degree, although the adoptor hath no

§ VIII. In plurimis autem causis assimulatur is, qui adoptatus vel arrogatus est, ei, qui ex legitimo matrimonio natus est; et ideò, si quis per imperatorem, vel apud prætorem, vel præsidem provinciæ, non extraneum adoptaverit, potest eundem in adoptionem alii dari.

§ 8. He who is either adopted or arrogated, bears similitude in many things to a son born in lawful matrimony; and therefore, if a person not a stranger is adopted either by rescript, or before a prætor, or the governor of a province, he may be given in adoption to another.

Si is, qui gencrare non potest, adoptet. IX. Sed et illud utriusque adoptionis commune est, quod et ii, qui generare non possunt, quales sunt spadones, adoptare possunt: castrati autem non possunt.

§ 9. It is common to both kinds of adoption, that such as are impotent [Spadones] may, but those who are castrated, can not adopt.

Si fœmina adoptet.

6X. Fœminæ quoque arrogare non possunt, quia nec naturales liberos in sua potestate habent: sed, ex indulgentiâ principis, ad solatium

10. Nor can women adopt ; fjor the law does not place even their own children, under their power: but, when death hath deprived them

liberorum amissorum adoptare pos- of their children, they may, by the

sunt.

De liberis

XI. Illud proprium est adoptionis illius, quæ per sacrum oraculum fit, quod is, qui liberos in potestate habet, si se arrogandum dederit, non solum ipse potestati arrogatoris subjicitur, sed etiam liberi ejus fiunt in ejusdem potestate, tanquam nepotes. Sic etenim divus Augustus non ante Tiberium adoptavit, quam is Germanicum adoptasset ; ut protinus arrogatione factâ inciperet Germanicus Augusti nepos esse.

It was

11. It is peculiar to adoption by rescript, that, if a person, having children under his power, should give himself in arrogation, bath he, as a son, and his children, as grandchildren, would become subject to the power of the arrogator. for this reason, that Augustus did not adopt Tiberius, 'till Tiberius had adopted Germanicus; so that Tiberius became the son, and Germa nicus the grandson of Augustus, at the same instant, by arrogation.

De servo adoptato, vel filio nominato, à domino. § XII. Apud Catonem benè scriptum refert antiquitas, servos, si à domino adoptati sint, ex hoc ipso posse liberari. Unde et nos eruditi, in nostrà constitutione, etiam eum servum, quem dominus, actis intervenientibus, filium suum nominaverit, liberum esse constituimus: licet hoc ad jus filii accipiendum non sufficiat.

12. The following answer of Cato was approved of by the ancient lawyers, viz. that slaves, adopted by their masters, obtain freedom by the adoption. Thus instructed, we have ordained, that a slave ruhom any mas ter nominates to be his son, in the presence of a magistrate, becomes free by such nomination, although it does not convey to him any filial right.