quædam videntur esse perfecta; singulas enim res stipulari, et ad singulas respondere, debemus. De pœnâ adjectâ § XVIII. Alteri stipulari (ut suprà dictum est) nemo potest. Inventæ enim sunt hujusmodi stipulationes vel obligationes ad hoc, ut unusquisque acquirat sibi, quod sua interest; cæterùm, si-alii detur, nihil interest stipulatoris. Planè, si quis velit hoc facere, pœnam stipulari conveniet, ut, nisi ita factum sit, ut est comprehensum, committatur pœnæ stipulatio etiam ei, cujus nihil interest. Pœnam enim cum stipulatur quis, non illud inspicitur, quod intersit ejus, sed quæ sit quantitas in conditione stipulationis. Ergò, si quis ita stipuletur, Titio dari, nihil agit; sed, si adjecerit pœnam, nisi dederis, tot aureos dare spondes? tunc committitur stipulatio. be made perfect by a separate answer ; and strictly we ought to stipulate for every thing severally, and to answer severally. stipulationi, alii dari. 18. No man can stipulate for another, as we have already observed; for stipulations and obligations have been invented, that every per son may acquire for his own advantage; and, if this be given to another, the stipulator has no interest. But, if a man would effectually stipulate for another, he should bind the obligor to perform the covenants under a penalty, payable to him, who otherwise would receive no advan tage from the obligation: for, when a penalty is stipulated, the interest of the stipulator is not so much regarded, as the quantum of penalty. Therefore, if a man should stipulate, that a certain thing shall be given to TITIUS it will not avail; but, if he add a penalty as, do you promise to give me so many AUREI, if you do not give the thing stipulated to TITIUS? the penalty stipulated is put in jeopardy. Si intersit ejus, qui alii stipulatur. § XIX. Sed et, si quis stipuletur alii, cum ejus interesset, placu it stipulationem valere. Nam, si is, qui pupilli tutelam administrare cœperat, cesserit administrationem contutori suo, et stipuletur rem pupilli salvam fore, quoniam interest stipulatoris fieri, quod stipulatus § 19. But, if any man should stipulate for the benefit not merely of another, but of himself also, it is valid. Thus if he, who hath begun to administer the tutelage of a pupil, should afterwards give up the administration to his co-tutor, and stipulate for the security of the estate of est ; cum obligatus futurus sit pupillo, si malè res gesserit, tenet obligatio. Ergo et, si quis procuratori suo dari stipulatus sit, habebit vires stipulatio. Et, si creditori suo quis stipulatus sit quod sua interest, ne fortè vel pœna committatur, vel prædia distrahantur, quæ pignori data erant, valet stipulatio. his pupil, in this case, (inasmuch as such a stipulation is for the interest of the stipulator, who is liable for damages to the pupil, if the co-tutor should make default,) the obligation would bind. So if a man stipulate, that a thing shall be given to his proctor, it will bind. A stipulation made by a debtor for the use of his creditor is good, because it is the interest of the debtor, either that the penalty, upon which he borrowed, should not be exacted from him, or that his goods, which are pledged should not be sold. De pœnâ adjectâ promissioni facti alieni, XX. Vice versâ, qui alium facturum promisit, videtur in eâ esse causâ, ut non teneatur, nisi penam ipse promiserit. § 20. On the contrary, he, who undertakes for the performance of another, is not bound unless he promises under a penalty. PRO eo, qui promittit, solent Sometimes others bind themselves alii obligari, qui fidejussores appellantur; quos homines accipere so for the promissor. Such sureties are called fide-jussors, and are gene lent, dum curant, ut diligentius si- rally required by creditors for their bi cautum sit. greater security. In quibus obligationibus. § I. In omnibus autem obligationibus assumi possunt ; id est, sivè re sivè verbis, sivè literis, sivè consensu, contractæ fuerint: ac nec illud quidem interest, utrum civilis, an naturalis sit obligatio, cui adjicitur fidejussor; adeo quidem, ut pro servo quoque obligetur, sivè extraneus sit, qui fidejussorem à servo accipiat, sivè ipse dominus, in id, quod sibi naturalitèr debe tur. § 1. Fide-jussors may be received in all obligations, whether contracted by the delivery of the thing itself, by words, by writing, or the mere consent of parties: nor is it material, whether the obligation be civil or natural; for a man may intervene, and oblige himself, as a fide-jussor or surety, even on the behalf of a slave; and this may be done, whether the person, who accepts the fide-jussor, be a stranger or the master of the slave, when the thing due is a natural debt or obligation. In quam summam obligatur fide-jussor. V. Fidejussores ita obligari non possunt, ut plus debeant, quam debet is, pro quo obligantur: nam eorum obligatio accessio est principalis obligationis; nec plus in accessione potest esse, quam in principali re; at ex diverso, ut minus debeant, obligari possunt. Itaque, si reus decem aureos promiserit, fidejussor in quinque rectè obligatur; contra verò obligari non potest. Item, si ille purè promiserit, fidejussor sub conditione promittere potest; contra verò non potest. Non solùm autem in quantitate, sed etiam in tempore, minus aut plus intelligitur: plus enim est statim aliquid dare, minus est post tempus dare. § 5. Fide-jussors ought not to be bound in a greater sum, than the debtor owes; for their obligation is an accession to the principal obligation; and an accessary debt cannot be greater than the principal, though it may be less. Therefore, if the principal obligor promises ten aurei, the fide-jussor may be bound in five; but the fide-jussor cannot be bound in ten, when the principal obligor is bound only in five. Also, when the obligor promises simply, the surety may promise conditionally; but, if the surety is bound simply, when the principal is bound conditionally, the obligation is void. And the terms greater and less take place, not only in quantity but also in time; for an obligation to deliver a thing instantly is greater; than to deliver it after a time. |