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our ideas are such as we know are capable of having an existence in nature which in substances we cannot know, but by knowing that such have existed!uoining Falsehood is 9.Truth is the markingsuitsq the joining the agreement or disagreement of ideas as it of names is Falsehood is the marking down in words the agreement or disagreement of ideas otherwise than it is. And so far as these

otherwise

than their

ideas agree. ideas, thus marked by sounds, agree to their archetypes, so far only is the truth real. The knowledge of this truth consists in knowing what ideas the words stand for, and the perception of the agreement or disagreement of those ideas, according as it is marked by those words.

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$. 10. But because words are looked on Generalproknowpositions to as the great conduits of truth an be treated of ledge, and that in conveying and receiving more at of truth, and commonly in reasoning about large, it, we make use of words and propositions; I shall more at large inquire, wherein the certainty of real truths, contained in propositions, consists," and where it is to be had; and endeavour to show in what Ysort of universal propositions we are capable of being certain of their real truth or falsehood. Red zado

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I shall begin with general propositions, as those which most employ our thoughts, and exercise our contemplation. General truths are most looked after by the mind, as those that most enlarge our knowledge; and by their comprehensiveness, satisfying us at once of many particulars, enlarge our view, and shorten Sour way to knowledge. hood to vidiy Moral and §. 11. Besides truth taken in the strict metaphysi- sense before mentioned, there are other sorts cab of truth as, 1. Moral truth; which is speaking of things according to the persuasion of our own minds, though the proposition we speak agree not to the reality of things. 2. Metaphysical truth, which is nothing but the real existence of things, conformable to the ideas to which we have annexed their names. This, though it seems to consist in the very beings of things, song lokvoving to vidietro bas

yet, when considered a little nearly, willsappear (to include a tacit proposition, whereby the mind joins that particular thing to the idea it had before settled with a name to its b But these considerations of truth, either having been before taken notice of, or not being much to our present purpose, it may suffice here only to have ementioned them.ib 10 Com99726 ilt

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no habol ets, chrow aeneand, tak Of Universal Propositions, their Truth and Certainty. gnivissa bas quiуovno ni tit bas pbol to botsorted S. THOUGH the examining and judg- Treating of ing of ideas by themselves, their names be- words ne ing quite laid aside, be the best and surest cessary to knowledge. way to clear and distinct knowledge yet age through the prevailing custom of using sounds for ideas, I think it is very seldom practised. Every one may observe how common it is for names to be made use of, instead of the ideas themselves, even when men think and reason, within their own breasts, especially if the ideas be very complex, and made up of a great collection of simple ones. This makes the consideration of words and propositions so necessary a part of the treatise of knowledge, that it is very hard to speak intelligibly of the one, without explaining the other, of you 32178 2. All the knowledge we have, being General only of particular or general truthis, it is truths hard-evident, that whatever may be done in the ly to be unformer of these, the latter, which is that derstood, butin verbal which with reason is most sought after, can propositions. never be well made known, and is very seles d odom apprehended, but as conceived and expressed in words. It is not therefore out of our way, in the exa mination of our knowledge, to inquire into the truth and certainty of universal propositions,

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Certainty §. 3. But that we may not be misted in two-fold, of this case, by that which is the danger every truth, and of where, I inean by the doubtfulness of terms, Knowledge.it is fit to observe, that certainty is twofold certainty of truth, and certainty of knowledge! Certainty of truth is, when words are so put together in propositions as exactly to express the agreement or disagreement of the ideas they stand for, as really it is. Certainty of knowledge is to perceive the agreement or disagreement of ideas, as expressed in any proposition. This we usually call knowing, or being certain of the truth of any proposition.

No proposition can be known to be

true, where

the essence of each species mentioned is

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§. 4. Now because we cannot be certain of the truth of any general proposition, unless we know the precise bounds and extent of the species its terms stand for, it is neCessary we should know the essence of each species, which is that which constitutes and not known, bounds it. This, in all simple ideas and modes," is not hard to do. For in these, the real and nominal essence being the same; or, which is all one, the abstract idea which the general term stands for, be ing the sole essence and boundary that is or can be supposed of the species; there can be no doubt, how far the species extends, or what things are comprehended under each term: which, it is evident, are all that have an exact conformity with the idea it stands for, and no other. But in substances wherein a real essence distinct from the nominal is supposed to constitute, determine, and bound the species, the extent of the general word is very uncertain: because not knowing this real essence, we cannot know what is, or what is not of that species; and consequently what may, or may not with certainty be affirmed of it. And thus speaking of a man, or goldy or any other species of natural substances, as supposed constituted by a precise and real essefice, which nature regularly imparts to every individual of that kind, whereby it is made to be of that species, we cannot be certain of the truth of any affirmation or negation made of it. For man, or gold, taken in this sense, aud used

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for species of things constituted by real essences, different from the complex idea in the mind of the speaker; stand for we know not what and the extent of these * species, with such boundaries, are so unknown and undetermined, that it is impossible with any certainty to affirm, that all men are rational, or that all gold is yelhow. But where the nominal essence is kept to, as the boundary of each species, and men extend the applica tion of any general term no farther than to the particular things, in which the complex idea it stands for is tó be found, there they are in no danger to mistake the bounds of each species, nor can be in doubt, on this account, whether any proposition be true or no. I have chosen to explain this uncertainty of propositions in this scholastic way, and have made use of the terms of essence and species, on purpose to show the absurdity and inconvenience there is to think of them, as of any other sort of realities, than barely abstract ideas with names to them. To suppose that the species of things are any thing but the sorting of them under general names, according as they agree to several abstract ideas, of which we make those names the signs, is to confound truth, and introduce uncertainty into all general propositions that can be made about them. Though therefore these things might, to people not possessed with scholastic learning, be treated of in a better and clearer way yet those wrong notions of essences or species having got root in most people's minds, who have received any tincture from the learning which has pre vailed in this part of the world, are to be discovered and removed, to make way for that use of words which should convey certainty with it. as venu paard for pen so §. 5. The names of substances then, This more

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whenever made to stand for species, which

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particularly

substances.

are supposed to be constituted by real es- concerns sences, which we know not, are not capable to convey certainty to the understanding of the truth of general propositions made up of such terms, we cannot be sure. The reason whereof is plain: for how can we be sure that this or that quality is in gold, when

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we know not what is or is not gold? Since in this way of speaking nothing is gold, but what partakes of an essence, which we not knowing, cannot know where it is or is not, and so cannot be sure that any parcel of matter in the world is or is not in this sense gold; being incurably ignorant, whether it has or has not that which makes any thing to be called gold, i, e. that real essence of gold whereof we have no idea at all: this being as impossible for us to know, as it is for a blind man to tell in what flower the colour of a pansie is, or is not to be found, whilst he has no idea of the colour of a pansie at all. Or if we could (which is impossible) certainly know where a real essence, which we know not, is; v. g. in what parcels of matter the real essence of gold is; yet could we not be sure, that this or that quality could with truth be affirmed of gold: since it is impossible for us to know, that this or that quality or idea has a necessary connexion with a real essence, of which we have no idea at all, whatever species that supposed real essence may be imagined to constitute.vd tre föz zenidt *The truth ofisini§6. On the other side, the names of few universul: substances, when made use of as they should propositionsbe, for the ideas men have in their minds, concerning though they carry a clear and determinate to be known signification with them, will not yet serve aldolls wous to make many universal propositions, of whose truth we can be certain. Not because in this use of them we are uncertain what things are signified by them, but because the complex ideas they stand for are such combinations of simple ones, as carry not with them any discoverable connexion or repugnancy, but with a very few other ideas.29 Iamuga tetiner Because cow§. 7. The complex ideas, that our names lexistence of of the species of substances properly stand ideas in few for, are collections of such qualities as, have cases is to be been observed to co-exist in an unknown known. b substratum, which we call substance ; but what other qualities necessarily co-exist with such combinations, we cannot certainly know, unless we can discover their natural dependence; which in their primary „vidgow suszub, pidiail Color zbog a blog to sobi xolą

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