The Works of George Berkeley, D.D., Bishop of Cloyne, المجلد 1G. Bell and Sons, 1897 - 1440 من الصفحات Ex libris Rev Patrick O' Reilly. |
المحتوى
| xii | |
| 1 | |
| 2 | |
| 3 | |
| 4 | |
| 5 | |
| 6 | |
| 7 | |
| 20 | |
| 21 | |
| 22 | |
| 23 | |
| 24 | |
| 25 | |
| 26 | |
| 27 | |
| 8 | |
| 9 | |
| 10 | |
| 11 | |
| 12 | |
| 13 | |
| 14 | |
| 15 | |
| 16 | |
| 17 | |
| 18 | |
| 19 | |
| 28 | |
| 29 | |
| 30 | |
| 31 | |
| 39 | |
| 69 | |
| 81 | |
| 147 | |
| 155 | |
| 253 | |
| 291 | |
طبعات أخرى - عرض جميع المقتطفات
عبارات ومصطلحات مألوفة
abstract idea absurd angles answer apparent magnitude appear Berkeley bodies cause ceived colour common conceive consequently consider corporeal substance cube demonstrated denominator difficulty distance distinct dividend divisor doctrine doth earth edition effect equal evident exist extension external farther figure finite extension follows fraction geometrical progression geometry GEORGE BERKELEY greater hath Hence Hylas ideas of sight imagine immediate objects immediately perceived infinite infinitely divisible instance laws of nature magnitude mankind manner Matter mean mind moral motion multiplied non-resistance objects of sight observed occasion opinion particular perceived by sense perceived by sight Phil Philonous philosophers plain principles produced quotient reason rectangle retina root rules Scepticism secondly sect seems sensations sensible qualities sensible things shew shewn signify spirit square substance substratum subtracted suggest suppose supreme power surd tangible term thought tion truth unperceived unthinking visible vision wherein whereof words
مقاطع مشهورة
الصفحة 179 - ... that houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible objects, have an existence natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding. But with how great an assurance and acquiescence soever this principle may be entertained in the world, yet whoever shall find in his heart to call it in question, may, if I mistake not, perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction. For what are the forementioned objects but the things we perceive by sense? and what do we perceive...
الصفحة 187 - But, say you, surely there is nothing easier than for me to imagine trees, for instance, in a park, or books existing in a closet, and nobody by to perceive them. I answer, you may so, there is no difficulty in it ; but what is all this, I beseech you, more than framing in your mind certain ideas which you call books and trees, and at the same time omitting to frame the idea of any one that may perceive them...
الصفحة 186 - Suppose — what no one can deny possible — an intelligence without the help of external bodies, to be affected with the same train of sensations or ideas that you are, imprinted in the same order and with like vividness in his mind. I ask whether that intelligence hath not all the reason to believe the existence of corporeal substances, represented by his ideas, and exciting them in his mind, that you can possibly have for believing the same thing?
الصفحة 134 - Suppose a man born blind, and now adult, and taught by his touch to distinguish between a cube and a sphere of the same metal, and nighly of the same bigness, so as to tell, when he felt one and the other, which is the cube, which the sphere. Suppose then the cube and sphere placed on a table, and the blind man to be made to see; quaere, Whether by his sight, before he touched them, he could now distinguish and tell which is the globe, which the cube?
الصفحة 189 - When in broad daylight I open my eyes, it is not in my power to choose whether I shall see or no, or to determine what particular objects shall present themselves to my view; and so likewise as to the hearing and other senses; the ideas imprinted on them are not creatures of my will. There is therefore some other Will or Spirit that produces them.
الصفحة 188 - A spirit is one simple, undivided, active being: as it perceives ideas it is called the understanding, and as it produces or otherwise operates about them it is called the will.
الصفحة 238 - ... ideas, no reason can be assigned why that which is signified by the name spirit or soul may not partake in the same appellation. I answer, all the unthinking objects of the mind agree in that they are entirely passive, and their existence consists only in being perceived; whereas a soul or spirit is an active being, whose existence consists, not in being perceived, but in perceiving ideas and thinking.
الصفحة 243 - Ye who turn judgment to wormwood, and leave off righteousness in the earth, seek him that maketh the seven stars and Orion, and turneth the shadow of death into the morning, and maketh the day dark with night: that calleth for the waters of the sea, and poureth them out upon the face of the earth: The Lord is his name: that strengtheneth the spoiled against the strong, so that the spoiled shall come against the fortress.
الصفحة 239 - Nothing can be plainer than that the motions, changes, decays, and dissolutions which we hourly see befall natural bodies (and which is what we mean by the course of nature) cannot possibly affect an active, simple, uncompounded substance; such a being therefore is indissoluble by the force of nature; that is to say, the soul of man is naturally immortal.
الصفحة 180 - ... whether those supposed originals or external things, of which our ideas are the pictures or representations, be themselves perceivable or no? If they are, then they are ideas, and we have gained our point: but if you say they are not, I appeal to any one whether it be sense to assert a colour is like something which is invisible; hard or soft, like something which is intangible; and so of the rest.