moments of solitude, and bodying forth itself in symbols which are the nearest possible representations of the exact shape in which it exists in the poet's mind. Eloquence is feeling pouring itself forth to other minds, courting their sympathy, or endeavoring to influence their belief, or move them to passion or to action." Accordingly it is only in partial truth that we can say mere verse is poetry;" as we can

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an idiot is a man," since reason,

So,

only in partial truth say which the idiot lacks, is the essential attribute of man. on the other hand, it is only in partial truth that we can say "the peculiar poetic spirit without the proper poetic form makes discourse poetry." It is only as we may call a disembodied spirit a man; it has the essential nature, not the form. As a human spirit and a human body unite in our conception of a man, so the poetic spirit and the poetic form must unite in any just conception of poetry.

§ 27. Different kinds of poetical composition may be distinguished on two different leading principles of division, according as we regard the character of the subject or the particular mode or means of representation, the represented idea or the form representing.

Distributed in reference to the subject or idea represented, as the three species are truth, sentiment, and action, we have the generic division of Poetry into

I. DIDACTIC; II. LYRIC; III. EPIC and DRA

MATIC.

Didactic Poetry includes what is sometimes called the Descriptive, the Pastoral, the Satirical, and the like.

Lyric Poetry includes divers subordinate forms of poetical composition, variously modified, and known under the familiar names of the Ode, the Psalm, and the Hymn, implying representation in music, and also the Sonnet and the Elegy.

The third class embraces the two leading forms of the Epic, in which the representation is by means of narration and description, and the Dramatic, in which the representation is by means of proper action and scenery which take the place of narration and description in the Epic. Subordinate divisions of these leading species are of the Epic into the Heroic and the Burlesque or Mock-heroic, and of the Dramatic into Tragedy and Comedy.

$28. REPRESENTATIVE DISCOURSE, so far as it diverges from proper oratory in dropping the opposition of speaker and hearer, has for its special law the representation of its theme for its own sake.

All Representative Discourse, as such, accordingly, has for its controlling principle the following, namely: That the thought be represented in its utmost clearness, accuracy, and completeness.

§ 29. Representative Discourse is either PURE or MIXED.

It is pure when its theme is represented irrespectively of personal modifications, and, accordingly, in its own proper character.

It is mixed when it is represented as modified by the peculiarities of personal apprehensions and convictions.

The Epicurean, by Moore, is an exemplification of the mixed form of representative discourse, in which but one mind is introduced by whose personal characteristics the representation is modified. Ancient life is in it represented through the experience of another, not from the direct observations of the author.

Where two or more persons are introduced, the discourse

is called a Dialogue. The Dialogues of Plato, of Fontenelle, of Berkeley, are exemplifications of this variety.

§ 30. The special Law of Mixed Representative Discourse is, that the personal characteristics of the speakers introduced, so far as modifying the theme, be carefully exhibited throughout the representation.

The Dialogues of Plato are the most perfectly constructed specimens of the Dialogue, perhaps, that exist, so far as this first law of the discourse is regarded.

If the representation be for the sake of the form, the discourse becomes Poetry. We have, then, the Monologue, when but one person is introduced; and the poetic Dialogue, when more than one are exhibited. If the representation exhibits an action, it becomes Dramatic.

§ 31. Of the Pure Representative Discourse, two general classes, each embracing subordinate varieties, are distinguished according to the character of the subject. We have thus:

I. HISTORY, the subject of which is some fact or event, single or continuous, in nature, as Natural History, or among men, as History Proper. Under History is included Biography, the subject of which is facts in individual experience; and Travels, which is but a more specific department of biography, having facts of a specific character in individual experience for its subject.

II. SCIENTIFIC TREATISES, including the ESSAY or DISSERTATION, the subject of which is some truth, not mere fact, as is the case in History.

It is to be remarked respecting the Pure Representative Discourse, that it easily admits the proper distinguishing characteristic of pure oratory- the opposition of speaker and hearer. Just so far as it does this, the full form of

oratory appears; so far, at least, as address to a locally absent mind will allow. It is not unnatural, thus, that the historian begins his history as an addressing mind, and uses the forms of address. Thus Macaulay begins his history: "I propose to write the history of England." As, however, the idea of representing the facts of history for their own sake and not for the sake of the moral effect on other minds begins to rule in his mind, the oratorical forms, as those of the first person, of time instead of space, fall away, and the discourse approaches to the character of the pure representative.

§ 32. PROPER ORATORICAL DISCOURSE may be distributed into different kinds on either of two different principles, giving rise thus to two distinct sets or classes.

One principle of distribution is found in the specific character of the ultimate end of discourse.

The other is found in the specific character of the immediate end of discourse.

§ 33. Oratorical Discourse may be distributed, in respect to its ultimate end, into two departments, according as that end lies wholly in the mind addressed or beyond it; in other words, according as the final object of the discourse is attained in the effect produced on the mind addressed or only in some ulterior object through such effect.

In proper pulpit discourse, thus, the preacher seeks, as his final and controlling end, the personal character of his hearer, looking to nothing beyond as more controlling and predominant. In forensic oratory, on the contrary, the advocate seeks to influence the judge only that he may secure a favorable determination through him of some interest of his client. He pleads not to enlighten or convince the judge as his ulterior motive; but to win his case through the decision of the judge.

The fields of oratory are not marked off by very definite boundaries on this principle of distribution. But we have departments of eloquence which are very conveniently distinguished from one another by this characteristic, of the end of the discourse lying wholly within or beyond the effect on the mind addressed.

In the first department, in which the final object of the discourse is found in the mind addressed, the leading branch is that of Sacred Oratory, the ultimate end of which is the highest moral or religious elevation and improvement of the hearer.

Here, also, lies all that Philosophical or Didactic Oratory, which seeks to enlighten or instruct the hearer, embracing the Lecture, the Scientific Discourse, and the like.

Here, too, lies that department classed by the ancients as one of the three leading branches of oratory, called the Demonstrative or Epideictic, embracing the Panegyric or Eulogy, the object in which is to awaken the sentiment of approbation or of censure in the hearer.

Here, moreover, lies all that oratory so common in modern times, the object of which is specially Moral Reform.

In the second department, characterized by its end lying beyond the hearer and to be attained through him, are, prominently, the two great departments of secular eloquence, the Judicial and the Deliberative. These differ from each other in respect to the governing idea, and also in respect to the field proper to them. Judicial oratory has the idea of the right for its governing idea, and its chief province is in the proceedings of civil judicature. Deliberative oratory has the idea of the good, the useful, the expedient, for its governing idea, and is chiefly found in legislative assemblies.

§ 34. Discourse, distributed in reference to the specific character of its immediate end, comprehends the four kinds of Explanatory, Confirmatory or Argumentative, Pathetic, and Persuasive Discourse.