prounouns, "we," "our," etc. It is otherwise in public prayer; it is otherwise, also, with the essayist. The essayist merely expresses or utters forth, without the controlling idea of a listener, thoughts or sentiments which he regards as common to himself and the reader. The distinct personality being dropped, the use of the plural becomes easy and natural. Hence, probably, the "we" of editors and critics. They express not individual but common convictions and sentiments.

§ 23. Of the derived species of Discourse, and more immediately subordinate to Oratory, a variety is distinguishable which drops from Oratory only the idea of a present hearer. It is Epistolary Composition.

As it differs from proper Oratory only in the circumstance that it addresses an absent mind, Epistolary Composition conforms more closely than other derived species to the principles of Rhetoric. Its chief peculiarity lies in its not contemplating vocal delivery.

It will be remarked that while epistolary composition more frequently respects a single mind, proper oratory respects more commonly a multitude. At least, oratory rises to its highest perfection when addressed to a large assembly; for then the moral elevation, which is the proper soul of oratory, is highest. But epistolary composition, when addressed to multitudes, rises to high degrees of eloquence; as is seen in the epistles of the Apostle Paul.

When the epistolary form is adopted for the form's sake, it then falls into the rank of mere Representative Discourse.

§ 24. The two leading forms of discourse, coördinate with Oratory and differing from that in the circumstance that they drop the idea of a mind addressed as the ruling idea in the representation of thought, are Poetry and Representative Discourse. In Poetry, the end of the discourse is not characteristically to affect

another mind, but to express the idea in its most perfect form and for the sake of the form. In Representative Discourse, even the form becomes subordinate, as well as the effect on another mind; and the idea is presented for its own sake.

§ 25. We have, thus, the characteristics of the three great divisions of Discourse:

Oratory represents for the sake of the effect on another mind;

Representative Discourse represents for the sake of the theme itself;

Poetry represents for the sake of the form.

In Oratory, accordingly, the exterior aim rules; in Representative Discourse, the matter; in Poetry, the

form.

The intimacy and relationship between these several forms of representation in language are in this view clearly indicated. The intrinsic dependence of the form on the matter, the common attributes of the mind that addresses and of the mind that is addressed, and their common relationship to truth as the matter of discourse, show at once how large a field is common to all these arts. Particularly, is it seen how slight are the modifications of the principles of proper oratory which an art of representative discourse requires. Indeed, as already observed, these modifications are, in the main, such as cannot well be set forth in distinct forms of language.

The great truth that underlies this whole matter is that in all discourse, as, indeed, in every proper movement of man's spirit, his whole nature, as intelligent, feeling, willing, — logical, æsthetic, and ethical or moral, is concerned. He never utterly sinks or lays aside his feeling or moral nature when he thinks; much less does he drop his intelligent nature when he feels or wills. In other words, his thought is

ever penetrated by sentiment and purpose; as his sentiments and purposes are ever in intelligence. But one or another of these departments of mind may be, relatively, more or less prominent; one may so predominate as to cast the others into the shade. As the intellectual element prevails, man appears as philosopher; as the æsthetic, he is recognized as poet; and as the ethical, he becomes an orator. Or, to present the same truth in the terms of the proper matter of discourse, idea, which is ever the proper content of all discourse, may be presented in itself irrespectively of all outward relations; it is, then, the True; and where that rules we have proper representative discourse. But idea may be presented as in outward relation, yet without distinct respect to any special end or object, simply as idea expressed, idea formed, and then it becomes the Beautiful or proper Form, and when that rules we have poetical discourse. And, still further, idea may be presented as in movement toward some outward object or end; then it becomes the Good in the larger sense, that is, the Moral; and when that rules we have proper oratory contemplating an end, an effect in

another mind.

Inasmuch as the moral in man involves and presupposes feeling and intelligence, this view of the distinctive characteristics and relations of the different forms of discourse corroborates the position before taken that oratory is the highest form of discourse. In oratory the whole man, intellectual, æsthetic, and moral, moves predominantly and characteristically outward and to an end. It is, therefore, more distinctively moral in its proper nature. In a higher sense than in respect to the poet or the philosopher, the maxim so emphatically recognized by the ancient rhetoricians holds of the orator, that he must be a good man in order to his highest

success.

The question has been much agitated whether oratory is to be regarded as a proper æsthetic art. It has been raised and discussed in the light of what must be deemed to be a

narrow and defective classification of the arts. This classification recognizes two classes, one of which is denominated the class of the Esthetic, Free, Liberal, Fine, or Elegant arts; the other, that of the Mechanical or Useful arts. This classification excludes every third class; and necessitates the rejection of oratory from the arts, unless it be either a free art, like poetry and painting, or mechanical, like carpentry or agriculture. Dr. Campbell, however, accepting as the proper distinction of the two classes, that “ use is the direct and avowed purpose" in the useful arts, "whereas it is more latently and indirectly" so in the elegant arts, considers eloquence with architecture “ as of a mixed nature, wherein utility and beauty have almost equal influence." The source of the confusion and error is in opposing beauty and utility, as if in necessary contradiction to each other. And to attain the truth in the matter, we have only to apply the logical principle of strict contradictory opposition. We may thus classify all arts in reference to beauty as those in which it is free, and those in which it is not free, that is, those in which it is dependent or subservient to another end than mere form. Discourse must be recognized, under this classification, as characteristically free in poetry; but as dependent in oratory, as also in all representative discourse. But as poetry itself may modify its freedom when it enlists in the service of philosophy, as we find to be the case in that species of poetry called Didactic, so oratory and philosophical discourse may, as in the loftier flights of eloquent or imaginative discourse, rise to the aesthetic freedom of true poetry. In a true sense, however, true oratory is ever æsthetic in its character, as has been already indicated; for it expresses and proceeds from an æsthetic nature; effects its end, also, in its addresses to another like æsthetic nature; and as the very essence of oratorical art consists in the embodiment of thought in language, in other words, of idea in form, oratory must be accepted as a true æsthetic procedure. Rhetoric, like architecture, is something more than a decorative art which

adds ornament to something that is not of itself æsthetic, or that may be perfectly adapted to its end without being in taste. It is of its own nature and essentially an æsthetic art, although not lying in the department of free beauty. Oratory must be beautiful in its form in order to its very perfection. This cannot be said of a tool, a machine, a product of any mechanical or any merely useful art. Oratory, therefore, cannot in any truth be classed among the mechanical arts.

§ 26. POETRY is that kind of discourse in which the idea is expressed for the sake of the form. It is one of the arts of Free Beauty.

The special Law of Poetry is, accordingly, that the selection and treatment of the idea to be expressed, of the imagery, and likewise of the diction, all be governed by the principle of Form or Beauty.

This is the proper Law of poetical composition. In the different species there is admissible in different degrees the depression of this as the relatively predominant principle, and the elevation of the principle of exterior aim or effect, so that it approximates so far to proper oratory. But it is ever this characteristic that makes discourse poetical, - that it more or less drops the principle of exterior aim and deviates from the method imposed by such foreign aim in order to be led by the principle of form.

The control of this principle, as has just been remarked, reaches to the idea expressed, as well as to the exterior embodiment of it in imagery and diction. Poetry has an inner essence of its own, a proper spirit and life, as well as a proper body. "Verse," it has been justly observed, "is not synonymous with poetry, but is the incarnation of it; and prose may be emotive-poetical, but never poetry." Both may express feeling. But "eloquence supposes an audience; the peculiarity of poetry lies in the poet's utter unconsciousness of a listener. Poetry is feeling confessing itself to itself in