CHAPTER V.

OF THE ARRANGEMENT OF ARGUMENTS.

§ 158. THE importance of attention to arrangement in confirmation depends mainly on two principles.

The first respects the state of the mind addressed. The method suited to a mind favorably disposed will generally be unsuitable to a mind opposed to conviction, and vice versa.

The second principle respects the dependence of the proofs on one another. Some proofs are explained by others, which must be previously exhibited in order to the full effect of the reasoning. Some proofs presuppose others. Some, once more, have great weight if preceded by certain others, and are of little moment unless preceded by them.

The force and effect of reasoning depend, indeed, hardly less on the order than on the matter of the proofs. Arguments perfectly conclusive when presented in the proper order may lose all their force if advanced in a different order.

§ 159. If the reasoning embrace arguments of distinct classes, the principle of arrangement is to be sought, first, in the state of the mind addressed.

If there be already a state of belief, and the object of the discourse is to confirm and strengthen it, then the weaker arguments will generally need to be placed first, and the stronger ones last. In this way the deepest and strongest impression will be the last.

If there be an opposing belief to be set aside, it will be better to advance the stronger first, in order to overthrow opposition at once. The weaker may follow, which will serve to confirm when they would be of no avail in the first assault. In order to leave, however, a strong impression, some of the stronger should be reserved to the close; or, what is equivalent, the arguments may be recapitulated in the reverse order.

Although this principle of arrangement, derived from a consideration of the state of the mind addressed, is not the higher and more controlling one, but must generally give way to the next to be named, still the state of the mind addressed must be first consulted, for that will often determine what kind of arguments are to be employed, as well as the order of arrangement.

This principle, it will be observed, respects only the comparative strength of the arguments.

§ 160. The second principle to be regarded in the arrangement of proofs respects the dependence of the arguments on one another.

This principle requires, in the first place, that the analytic proofs precede all others.

The reason of this rule is obvious. As in exhibiting a proof of this class, the proposition itself must necessarily be explained, the relevance and force of every other proof will be more clearly seen after such an explanation. In a judicial question, for example, whether certain specified acts constitute legal murder, after the definition of murder has been given, the arguments from authority or "legal precedents" will obviously be more intelligible and also of more force as confirmatory.

§ 161. This principle requires, in the second place,

that antecedent-probability arguments precede examples and signs.

The example, introduced after the antecedent-probability argument, will serve both to illustrate and also to confirm it. Indeed, in this order, they reflect light on each other. Mr. Burke, in his speech on the Nabob of Arcot's debts, in endeavoring to prove that India had been reduced to a condition of extreme want and wretchedness, first presents the causes in operation to produce it; then, examples of the operation of those causes; and finally particular signs of the fact. The mind very readily receives the whole statement, because, from the view of the cause, the effects are naturally anticipated.

In Dr. Barrow's discourse on the Divine Impartiality, the a priori arguments are with obvious propriety presented first; and then the a posteriori arguments. If the order had been reversed the force of the reasoning would have been greatly weakened.

A charge of fraud against a man generally reputed to be of upright character would need a strong array of proof from signs, as testimony and the like, to substantiate it. But let a spirit of covetousness be first proved in him, and especially if a single example be adduced in which that spirit has led aside from what was upright and manly, and a very small amount of proof will suffice to establish the charge.

In like manner the proof of the divine authenticity of the Bible is conclusive when sufficient cause is first shown for such an interposition from God, and then the arguments from testimony and the internal evidence are presented. But without such cause being first shown, scarcely any amount of testimony will be sufficient to overcome the repugnance of the mind to believe that a miracle has been wrought.

CHAPTER VI.

OF PRESUMPTION; OR, THE BURDEN OF PROOF.

§ 162. Ir is of great importance in argumentation to determine at the outset both in reference to the main proposition, and also in reference to the particular facts or truths assumed as proofs, whether they may be fairly presumed or taken for granted until disproved. This is called determining on which side the PRESUMPTION is, or on which the BURDEN OF PROOF onus probandi lies; the burden of proof always resting on the side opposite to that in favor of which the presumption exists.

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The importance of determining this point consists not merely in the fact that thereby the labor of proof may often be saved, but still more in the fact, that the mere undertaking to prove what ought to be presumed, will often throw doubt upon what was clear and unquestionable. The veracity of a witness is ever to be taken for granted until it is impeached. If one were to volunteer a defense of the character of a witness before it had been questioned, the very attempt would excite a suspicion that the character needed some bolstering, and that the advocate was influenced by his own distrust to make the attempt. So, likewise, if a man, who had been slandered, were to undertake a defense against the slanderer, instead of throwing the whole burden of proof on the slanderer, and putting him to the task of making out a case, even perfect innocence, and that which

otherwise would appear so to all, might be blackened by suspicion.

The great advantage that the side on which the presumption lies has over the opposite, consists in this, that it must triumph unless a decisive case is made out against it :— it has all the benefit of a doubtful result. If the course of procedure were reversed, and the criminal were required to prove his innocence instead of the government being required to establish his guilt, few that are accused would probably escape condemnation. As it is, a slight shade of doubt as to the guilt, even although the probability is altogether against him, results for the benefit of the accused.

The discussions that have arisen on the laws providing for the imprisonment of debtors, have exhibited most forcibly of how great advantage it is to be relieved from the onus probandi. It has been strenuously insisted by some that the creditor should take all the burden of proof on himself, and make out a clear case of fraud, before compulsory process against the person of the debtor shall be issued. The extreme difficulty of proving fraud in many cases has led others to take the ground that a failure to pay an honest debt raises a presumption of fraud which the debtor may reasonably be held to remove by oath or evidence. It is obvious that the adoption of the one or the other of these principles would greatly affect the facility of enforcing the payment of debts. Here not only will the creditor or the debtor have the advantage of a doubtful case according as the presumption is on one side or the other, but the decision of this point will determine to a great extent on what kind of evidence the question of fraud shall turn - upon that which is in the possession of the creditor, or upon that in possession of the debtor. It will not unfrequently occur thus that the decision of the question will go one way or the other according as the evidence or proof is derived from this side or from that side; and this is determined by the question, Where lies the presumption in the case?