mortal," may be stated in the form of "the immortality of the soul."

§ 119. Confirmation in rhetorical invention agrees with the process of Investigation in the particulars that both processes properly respect a judgment, and that both are controlled by the same logical principles. It differs from Investigation in the respect that the judgment is already known in Confirmation both in its matter and in its truth, while in Investigation either the truth or both the matter and the truth of the judgment are unknown.

In undertaking the work of confirmation or convincing, the speaker must of course know the matter of the judgment which he is to establish. He must be regarded, also, as believing it himself and of course as knowing the evidence on which it rests. He professes this in undertaking to convince. He must know, thus, both the matter of the proposition and its truth.

In investigation, on the other hand, it may be wholly unknown whether there is such a truth as the process of investigation may lead to as its proper result. Known truths may be taken, and by the application to them of various principles of reasoning entirely new truths may be ascertained and proved in the very process of investigation, The mathematical analyst, thus, applies to an assumed formula certain processes by which its members are changed in their form, and comes thus to new truths—to truths, perhaps, of which he had never dreamed until they stood out proved before his eye.

More commonly, however, in investigation the truth is at least guessed at, or conceived as possible. The matter of the judgment is before the mind, and the process of investigation consists in the discovery of the proof on which the truth of it rests.

Confirmation employs the results of this discovery for the

conviction of another mind. This latter species of investigation, therefore, which respects the proof on which an assumed or conjectural truth rests, coincides to a certain degree with invention in confirmation. For it is the proper office of invention here to furnish the proof for a given asserted judgment. It differs from this process of investigation only in the circumstance that it directs all its operations with a view to an effect on another mind. Investigation might rest satisfied with any adequate proof; invention seeks the best. Invention explores the whole field of proof and then selects; investigation is content to take what is at hand, provided it be sufficient to establish the truth proposed. Investigation implies a candid mind, ready to be convinced by the proof discovered; invention in rhetoric regards a mind possibly prejudiced against the truth, and struggling against every fresh charge of proof.

$120. The mind addressed in Confirmation may be regarded as in either one of three different states; either without any belief in regard to the proposition to be confirmed, or in weak faith, or in positive disbelief. The processes in Confirmation, although in the main alike, will yet vary in some slight respects in the differ

ent cases.

The speaker will need ever to have a distinct regard to this diversity of mental state in his hearers, and always to know whether he is to produce an entirely new conviction or to strengthen or remove one already existing. Different kinds of arguments often, or a different arrangement of them even when the same in kind, will be requisite in the different

cases.

§ 121. Belief admits of degrees; and may vary from a faint probability to absolute certainty. The degree of belief in regard to a given proposition will be affected both by the character of the evidence on which

it is perceived to rest and by the state of the mind in which it is entertained, both as it respects its feelings, and its opinions on other related subjects.

The distribution of proofs in regard to their respective power in commanding belief will be exhibited in Chap. IV.

§ 122. As in Explanation, so still more in Confirmation it is requisite that the speaker regard the taste, the opinions, and the feelings of his hearers; not merely in the exordium and the peroration, but also in the general conduct of the discourse.

CHAPTER II.

OF THE THEME IN CONFIRMATION.

§ 123. As the Theme in this species of discourse is ever a judgment, it will always admit of being expressed in a logical proposition (§ 118).

The ancient rhetoricians carefully distinguished between the general subject or theme of the discourse, the particular question discussed arising out of the theme, and the point on which the question turned. Quintilian, thus, in his work De Institutione Oratoria, Book Third, distinguishes the thesis or causa from the quæstio and both from the status cause. Common language recognizes a like distinction. We speak of the subject of discussion, the question raised, and the point at issue. The subject of a given discussion, we might thus say, was " The right of suffrage." The question raised was," Ought suffrage to be universal?" The point at issue, on which the question was made to turn, was, " Ought property to be made a test in the extension of this privilege ?” These terms are not, however, used with great precision. Notwithstanding this looseness, it may be correct to say that the subject indicates nothing in regard to the object of the discourse, whether it be to explain, confirm, excite, or persuade; the question, while it indicates the object of the discourse, does not determine necessarily the one point on which the decision shall turn; the point at issue determines all these.

Confirmation, so far as it is concerned in the exhibition of proof, looks directly at the point at issue. And this may al

ways be expressed in a logical proposition with its subject, copula, and predicate; as, " Property ought, or ought not to be, made a test in the extension of the right of suffrage."

§ 124. While the proposition to be proved should always be formally stated at the outset in the mind of the speaker himself, it will depend on several different principles, whether and how it should be stated to the hearer.

If no reason appear to the contrary, both facility of apprehension and the increase of interest felt in knowing exactly what is under discussion require that the proposition be stated to the hearers at the outset.

When, however, the proposition is complex, embracing several parts, both clearness and interest may be promoted by the successive statement of the several parts.

If there be a repugnance to any discussion of the subject on the part of the hearers, the statement of the general subject may, in some cases, be postponed till an interest is awakened by such considerations as may bear on the proposition but are general in their

nature.

If there be a prejudice against the truth to be established, likewise, it is sometimes better to postpone the direct formal statement of the proposition, and merely indicate at first the subject, or propose the question for investigation.