to man, and contents itself with abiding in huts that were never built for kings, never honored by their presence, never worthy of their notice.

5. Finally, upon a theistic basis faith in a supernatural that is not always intelligible to human reason is eminently rational. Rationalism sometimes divorces faith from reason, and then gives it a dishonorable burial. Faith is either supreme or it is entirely superseded; and it will not do for reason to offer, with show of magnanimity, a subordinate office to faith. It ought not to require very protracted inquiry to discover the relation faith sustains to the other faculties of the mind. Faith bottoms all human thought, if that be faith that accepts as veracions certain things as beyond proof. For instance, to what supreme court can we appeal with the question of consciousness of being One is forever at a loss to prove it. I must have implicit trust in the primary operations of my faculties; if I cannot have it, that which is called a process of thought is made an utter impossibility. Faith stands by the hid premises of every syllogism, and it mounts to the highest reaches of the revealed will of God. This holds fast in the devotions of the saint, and not less so in the researches of the scientist. Coleridge is at one with the trend of our thought when he says, in Aids to Reflection:

There are, indeed, mysteries in evidence of which no reasons can be brought. But it has been my endeavor to show that the solution of the problem is, that these mysteries are reason, reason in its highest form of self-affirmation.

Allow an immortal picture to take the place of any further argument. Dante, who was at once theologian, poet, metaphysician, satirist, and patriot, shows in that medieval miracle of song, The Divine Comedy, the limits beyond which reason may not venture. The poet starts forth in his search through regions in, under, and above earth. He needs a guide. He finds him in Virgil. By him led he moves through the “Inferno"-and partly through "Purgatorio." But Virgil cannot scale the higher mysteries that envelop the summits of the mountain of Purgatorio, nor on into the threefold divisions of Paradise. He is transferred to Beatrice, his love upon earth, now a glorified associate of saints and angels. The deep significance of this typical picture of progress will be caught when

we remember that in the popular thought of the Middle Ages Virgil was held in rare veneration as a mighty magician, as the impersonation of human reason. In keeping with this idea Dante lays claim to his leadership till he is left near the top of the mountain, dazed and trembling before the splendor which ushers in another guide, even his own Beatrice. In his fright the poet looks about him, and cries as if in pain :

But us Virgilius, of himself deprived,

Had left, sweetest of all fathers,

Virgilius, to whom I for safety gave me.

His patron was gone, but in the light of the eyes of Beatrice Dante found lifting power, and rose aloft to levels untrod by the failing feet of Mantua's bard. He rose, hardly knowing how, just as the waters of earth rise paying tribute to the sun that transfers the yielding drops from the river bed to the bosom of the clouds. You hear Virgil's voice as they ascend the mount:

What reason seeth here,

Myself can tell thee; beyond that, await
For Beatrice, since 'tis a work of faith.

So ever-Virgil for the plainer way, Beatrice for the beatific vision. Lux Mundi shall say our closing words: "We are not in reality dreaming of limiting reason by any limitations except those it makes for itself. We are not violently attempting to make reason stop short at any point where it could go on. We are only asking, Is there a point at which it stops of itself, and cannot go further? We propose to use reason right out, to press it to its utmost limit, to spur it to put forth all its powers; and we assert that, in so doing, reason will, at last, reveal its inability to get right to the end, to carry clear home."

R.Iftenenson

ART. VIII.-MOSES AS A POLITICAL ECONOMIST.

THIS ought not to be considered a peculiar subject. To one who has given it a fair degree of attention it becomes a matter of surprise that so little has been written about it. Let us admit that the most important element in the Mosaic code is the religious; we must at least claim the second place for the economic element, which is withal scarcely less unique than the religious.

Social and economic questions are, to-day, so clamorous for attention that historians realize that they have missed one vital point in the history of any nation if they do not know something of its economic life. The economy of a nation furnishes a key to its history. Men must get for themselves food, clothing, and shelter before they can have art, literature, or philosophy-before they can form states and establish dynasties. The character of these products of civilization-of the civilization itself is determined largely by the kinds of food, clothing, and shelter the people are able to get, and the manner of getting them. The economics of the chosen people must, therefore, claim the attention of any one who would properly understand their historical development. The daily effort of each individual must be principally concerned in providing for the necessities of himself and of those dependent on him. The character of one's occupation may largely affect his whole

nature.

Certain features of the Mosaic economy have already received some attention, though little has been said concerning the system as a whole. Unfortunately, most of those who have given attention to the subject have lacked a proper understanding of the true principles of political economy, and, naturally enough, have developed some grotesque opinions. A common error, even among distinguished economists of the old school, has been to suppose that the same economic laws are good for all times and places. One great economist (Mr. J. B. Say) went so far as to say that the history of political economy is simply a record of false and exploded theories. Out of this common error two widely variant opinions concerning the economics of Moses have been developed, and it would be hard to decide

which is the less rational. By an examination of present conditions some have found that the laws of Moses would not suit our times therefore they conclude that they were always bad. We have heard some smart talk about the mistakes of Moses. Others reason that the laws of Moses are from God, and must be good; therefore all existing laws which do not correspond with them are bad. With a zeal not according to knowledge, such persons sometimes denounce the taking of interest.

By a more enlightened view of political economy it is revealed that one set of economic laws may be very good under one set of circumstances, but very bad under another. We must understand the conditions they were designed to fit before we can condemn any group of laws. When we are thus prepared to consider the laws of Moses the question of interest will give no trouble.

In a simple agricultural community, where every man is settled "under his own vine and fig-tree;" where each household produces all that is necessary for itself, and where trade is only rudimentary; where expensive machinery is unknown; where division of labor has made no progress and the entrepreneur has not put in an appearance; finally, where capital, in its modern sense, is not thought of, there could be no need of interest. Borrowing could not be made profitable. The only man who would have occasion to borrow would be the one who had been unfortunate-whose crop had failed and left him destitute, whose ox had died and left him without a team to cultivate his ground. The man with money would receive no profit by withholding it; he could not use it, it would be only stored. up. Under such circumstances there could be no occasion for demanding interest; to do so would be to take advantage of another's necessities. The principle of the law of Moses is to prevent just that thing, and upright men regard this principle as binding to-day.

But it needs not to be said that an entirely different set of circumstances is met with in modern times. Capital has become a productive factor, and is capable of yielding a profit to the one who uses it. To follow out the spirit of the Mosaic law it is only necessary to prevent the lender from taking advantage of the borrower's position by extorting a burdensome rate of interest. Whatever we may hope for in the millennium, it

is certain that if interest were not allowed to-day money would not be loaned; only those who own it could engage in business, and the poor would remain poor forever.

The simplicity of Hebrew commerce at the time the law was given is shown by the extreme simplicity of their laws of trade. They consist only in a prohibition of hard bargaining and a demand for just weights and measures.

Hebrew taxation consisted of 1) a poll-tax of half a shekel; 2) tithes of the increase of property; 3) firstlings, or their ransoms; 4) a share of the spoils of war. The total of the burden was rather large, but by far the greater part of it was for sacrificial purposes; a comparatively small portion went to the support of the Levites, who, as priests, received no share in the land except homes in certain cities. The defense of sacrifices must be left to the theologian. If he decides that they were for the benefit of the people the economist must accept, for "the starting-point, as well as the object-point, of our science is man.” *

We are at once impressed by the fact that the distribution of this tax was more nearly in accordance with modern methods than were those practiced by any other ancient people. Athens supplied her public treasury by 1) a capitation tax on alien residents for the privilege of living within her sacred walls; 2) the products of mines; 3) fines, licenses, and donations. The Roman republic was supported by the spoils of war and the tribute which conquered nations were bound to pay. The emperors found many ways of supplying the treasury, of which tax-farming was probably the most common. But nowhere do we find a tax distributed among all the people according to their ability, except among the Hebrews. They thus anticipated in practice what Adam Smith afterward taught in theory.

In a primitive state of society, such as existed among the early Hebrews, the phenomenon of tax-shifting would be impossible. Each household lives in a state of economic isolation, being almost self-sufficient; consequently, the burden of a tax would be borne by the ones upon whom it was primarily placed. A. could not shift his tax upon B., nor B. upon C., etc. But with the progress of society has grown up an almost infinite interdependence of man upon man. The words, "None of us liveth

* Roscher.