ronment of this family is itself largely shaped by certain ideas and usages of society, ideas and usages which themselves grow out of the best life of that society.

Now what, in these given conditions, are these parents to do? Are they to exercise their own judgment as to what kind of associations and amusements they will permit to their children in the society where they must rear them? Or will they be content to abide the positive instructions in this matter of some ecclesiastical council-instructions, it may be, framed by men who themselves never had to face the practical problem which these parents have to face? Of course there is but one answer to these questions. These parents must work out their own problem as best they can. But in doing this, the probabilities are that they will permit some things which the sweeping and undiscriminating letter of the statutes condemns.

Suppose, now, that these parents were summoned to trial. What would be the result? The shades of the Committee on the State of the Church in the General Conference of 1872 might vote to condemn them; but certainly, on the intrinsic merits of their action, the enlightened Christian jury of the age would give a verdict of acquittal.

It is doubtless sadly true that many in the Church who violate these statutes are not as conscientiously careful concerning their personal conduct as they ought to be. But it is equally true that many who in form violate these requirements are not in spirit law-breakers. These really constitute a pronounced section of the best grown manhood and womanhood of the Church.

But without attempting to characterize the motives of any, the truth remains that this legislation on amusements is, because practically unreceived into the convictions of our Church membership, so far a dead letter that its disciplinary requirements cannot be enforced. The statutes of this legislation are entered in the Book of Discipline under the "Trial of Members" section. But if any Methodist pastor-certainly in the older and more populous sections—should undertake to bring to trial a member for violation of these statutes he would do little more than to plunge his people into a seething turmoil and make himself the target of public ridicule. The question recurs: Is it wise to retain in the Book of Discipline of the greatest Protestant Church of this age legislative edicts of con

387 duct in the legitimacy of which many of the members of this Church not only do not believe, but which themselves are so far a dead letter that their disciplinary claims cannot be enforced? 7. Many persons now in the Church might justly object to this legislation as an impertinent infringement upon their rights of membership. For all members who joined the Methodist Episcopal Church prior to 1872 the matter of what amusements they should accept or refuse, if any, was left where it ought always to be left, with their individual conscience and judgment. For all these this legislation undertakes, at a stroke, to change the law of membership in the Church which they joined. When they joined this Church it was, in this very matter of amusements, truly a Protestant Church, leaving all decisions on this question to be settled between the individual and his Lord; but these persons all wake up one morning to find that, because of a bare majority vote of a General Conference, they are, in this respect, members of a different Church from that which they joined. It is a matter perhaps worthy of serious thought to ask, whether the high proprieties of the case do not debar any General Conference from legitimately taking such action?

8. But finally, on the assumption that this legislation is wise and in the right direction, it must still be said that it is incomplete and insufficient in its terms, and should be so supplemented and developed as logically to meet the full reguirements of the wide situation. If we must so far distrust the teaching function of our ministry, the conscientiousness and common sense of our people, as to make the adoption of a black-list of forbidden amusements a necessity for the guidance of the Church, then that list certainly ought to be characterized by some degree of completeness. Since it is assumed, in order that we go right in such matters, that we should have definite official instructions, we ought perhaps to be informed as to whether it is right or wrong for Christians to attend a prizefight.

But, on the other hand, if we are to have a list of forbidden amusements, it is equally important that we should be favored with a list of amusements that are permissible. Nobody in this day will deny the legitimacy of and the necessity for amusements. And if we are to sail by a General Conference

chart, the same chart that locates the hidden rocks and the dangerous shoals ought to line out clearly the safe channel. This policy, I am aware, indicates no end of trouble. The General Conference, instead of sitting for a month once in four years, would need to be in continuous session. The age is inventive. The devil is constantly devising new evil amusements. It seems clear that the General Conference would have to employ professional experts to decide on the moral quality of amusements. But to what does all this point save to the absolute impracticability and folly of leaving this whole question other than where it properly belongs, namely, under the cover of some general principle-a principle that will admit of moral exposition by the Christian teacher, but the application of which shall in every case be left where it properly belongs, with the individual conscience?

II. A partial list of the objectionable features of the special legislation by the General Conference of 1872 has now been entered. The remedy which I propose for the condition which I regard as unfortunate is simple. It is that the General Conference of 1892 abrogate the entire action on this question taken in 1872.

I am aware that some who would like to take this step feel that we cannot do it without damage. There is doubtless force in this view. It is not an easy thing for a great Church, before the eyes of all the world, to take the back track for the undoing of its former work. But it would be both Christian and statesmanlike for us frankly to correct the admitted mistakes of former legislation. Besides, we shall suffer greater damage by going on in a wrong path than we can by retreat. If we are on untenable and dangerous grounds the sooner we return to rational principles the better will it be for the Church, and the more certain will we be to secure for ourselves the approbation of all right judgment.

The step advised is one which commends itself for the following reasons:

1. This action would remand the whole question to that broad Christian principle first formulated for Methodism by its founder, John Wesley, a man whose peerless wisdom as an ecclesiastical legislator was only equaled by his saintliness of character. This principle simply asks of the members of the

Methodist societies that they shall take only "such diversions as can be used in the name of the Lord Jesus." This principle covers wisely and adequately the whole question, and is in itself all the legislation on this question that any Church in Christendom will ever need to the end of time.

2. This principle, standing by itself, as the only utterance of the Church, would have the merit of simplicity. Every body could comprehend it; nobody could forget it.

3. This principle is comprehensive. There is no amusement, and could be none, to which it would not apply, and concerning which it would not be an entirely sufficient rule.

4. This principle is universal, and would never need revision. It is as suitable to one age as to another; as applicable to Christians in China as to Christians in America.

5. This principle is practically undebatable. It cannot fail of indorsement by all right-minded people of the Methodist Episcopal Church, or of any other Church.

6. This principle takes the highest ground possible on the question at issue, placing it where it properly belongs, on the individual conscience.

7. Finally, there is no test, of which I can conceive, which this principle will not fully meet. In its simple comprehensiveness it says all that the Church can properly say upon the subject. The Methodist Episcopal Church, in its General Conference of 1872, undertook to supplement this principle by specific statutes. These statutes, as they stand to-day, are regarded by many as an impertinence in our Church law. They are so wanting in the genius of common sense as to be unable to carry themselves as ruling convictions into the lives of many unquestionably good people. As they stand they place many members of the Church in the attitude of law-breakers, not to say of deliberate hypocrites. Let us sweep away this rubbish, and in its place re-enthrone as supreme a principle which invites nobody's contempt, but which is eminently adapted to make the members of our Church thoughtful and conscientious.

George P. Mains

ART. IV. THE CHARACTER OF HAMLET.

In what is Shakespeare greatest? is like asking, What in the sun is brightest, or what in life is best? But if such a question were asked, his delineation of character would probably command the most support; for "his knowledge of mankind,” as Schlegel says, "has become proverbial." Less can be urged against this feature of Shakespeare's genius than against any other. He sometimes indulges in bombastic and offensive language, in puns and conceits; he takes liberties with history and geography, and sports with the classic unity of plot so dear to many; but his characters seem so individual, of such "like passions," that criticism at this point is partially disarmed.

Shakespeare's characters are neither curiosities nor monstrosities. He has a few of these, because they came within the range of "the mirror he held up to nature;" but the personages in that mirror, whether kings or serving-maids, are for the most part of our common humanity. Whatever in them is local or temporary is fused with what is human and universal; they are not lessened in their presentation by the photographic process of some modern novelists, but enlarged and conformed to the special dramatic world in which they are placed.

If their world is full of ideality, like that of "The Tempest," certain characters, like Prospero and Miranda, receive certain idealizing touches; while others, like Caliban, Stephano, and Trinculo, are coarsened for the sake of contrast. And if the world is tragic or comic a corresponding "form and pressure is given to the beings in it.

The main principle that determines the interpretation of the characters of a drama is the same that gives us our knowledge of one another. We become acquainted with a man not by means of our senses-not by reading his biography or by looking up his social standing-but by some common feeling, experience, or interest. It is not necessary that either of these should be the same as our own, for one feeling can light the way to the knowledge of a similar one; thus imagination and sympathy are generated; thus we obtain a knowledge of another's states without going through them ourselves.

In every rightly constructed drama love, hate, ambition, and