Whether it was fear or prudence that suggested this change to the general, the Athenians took the post of honour with exultation: nothing was heard among them but mutual exhortations to bravery, and a steady resolution to conquer or fall. But Mardonius, hearing of this alteration in the dispo sition of the Grecian army, made an alteration also in his own. This once more produced a change likewise in the disposition of the Greeks; by which changing and re-changing the order of battle, nothing farther was done that day.

At night, the Greeks held a council of war, in which it was resolved, that they should decamp from their present situation, and march to another, more conveniently situated for water. As their removal was to be performed in the night, much disorder ensued; and, in the morning, Mardonius per ceiving them scattered over the plain, he supposed that they were flying, rather than retreating: he, therefore, resolved to pursue them, with his whole army.

The Greeks, perceiving his design, soon collected their scattered forces, which the darkness had dispersed, but not intimidated; and, halting near the little city of Platea, there determined to await the shock of their pursuers. The barba rian forces soon came up to the engagement, with their ac customed howling, expecting rather to plunder, than to fight,

The Lacedæmonians, who closed up the rear of the Gre cian army, were the first who supported the shock of the assailants. They were, in some measure, separated from the rest of the army, by the obstinacy of one of their own regiments, who considered their retreat as contrary to the idea of Spartan discipline; but, still consisting of a formidable body of men, they were in a capacity of making head against the invaders. Collecting themselves into a phalanx, they stood impenetrable and immoveable, to all the assaults of the enemy. In the mean time, the Athenian troops, who were apprised of the attack, quickly turned back, in order to assist their allies; but the Greeks, who were in Persian pay, to the number of five thousand, intercepted their return. Thus, the battle was divided into two, and fought, with great ardour, in various parts of the field. But nothing could resist the weight of the Spartan phalanx; which, after some time, broke in upon the Persian forces, and put them into disorder.

In this tumu't, Mardonius, in attempting to restore the order of battle, and rushing into the midst of the carnage, was killed, by Aimnestus, a Spartan; and, soon afterwards, all his army betook themselves to flight. The other Greek troops soon followed the brave example set them by Sparta, and the rout became general

Artabazus, who commanded a body of forty thousand Persiáns, fled with them, towards the Hellespont: while the rest fortified themselves, in their camp, with wooden ramparts. There, they were attacked by the Spartans; but, not being well skilled in that part of war, the Athenians soon came up to their assistance, and effected a breach in this hasty rampart. It was then, that the slaughter of the enemy was indiscriminate, and terrible. Of all the Persian army, that had taken refuge there, not four thousand men escaped. Above a hundred thousand men were put to the sword; and the conquerors, willing to rid their country, at once, of their terrible invaders, refused to give quarter. Thus, ended the Persian invasions of Greece; nor, ever after, was the Persian army seen to cross the Hellespont.

The carnage being at last over, the Greeks buried their dead, which at most did not amount to ten thousand men; and soon after, as a testimony of their gratitude to Heaven, they caused a statue of Jupiter to be made, at the general expense, which they placed in his temple, at Olympia. The names of the several nations of Greece, that were present in the engagement, were engraven on the right side of the pedestal of the statue, the Spartans first, the Athenians next, and all the rest in order.

In the mean time, while success attended the Grecian arms, upon land, they were not less fortunate, at sea. The greater part of the Persian fleet, after the defeat at Salamis, wintered at Cuma; and, in the spring, moved to Samos, both to guard and awe the coasts of Asia. The Grecians, in the mean time, were refitting their ships at Ægina; and, being importuned by the Samians, they put to sea under the conduct of Leotichydes, the Spartan, and Xanthippus, the Athenian.

The Persians, apprised of their approach, and having long experienced their own inferiority, would not venture to oppose them, at sea, but drew up their ships, upon land, at Mycale, a promontory of Ionia; where they fortifie. them with a wall and deep trench, while they were also protected by an army of sixty thousand foot, under the command of Tigranes.

This, however, did not deter the Greeks from venturing to attack them. Leotichydes having endeavoured to make the Ionians revolt, landed his forces, and the next day prepared for the assault. He drew up his army in two bodies; the one consisting chiefly of Athenians and Corinthians, kept the plain, whilst the other, of Lacedæmonians, marched over the hills and precipices, to gain the highest ground.

The battle being joined, great courage and resolution was shown on both sides, and the fortune of the day continued for

a long time in suspense. The defection of the Greek augiliaries in the Persian army, turned the fate of the battle: the Persians were soon routed, and pursued, with great slaugh ter, to their very tents.

The Athenians had made themselves masters of the field before the Lacedæmonians could come to their assistance, so that all the share these had in the action was to disperse some Persian troops, which were attempting to make regular retreat; soon afterwards, their ramparts were forced, and all their vessels burned, so that nothing could be more complete, than the victory at Mycale. Tigranes, the Persian general, and forty thousand men of his army, lay dead on the field of battle; the fleet was destroyed; and, of the great army brought into Europe by Xerxes, scarcely one remained, to carry back the tidings.

The battle of Platea was fought in the morning, and that of Mycale in the evening of the same day. But, what is very extraordinary, it is universally affirmed, that the victory at Platea was known at Mycale before the battle began, though it is a passage of several days from one place to the other. It is most probable that Leotichydes made use of the report to encourage his army, and incite them to emulate their associates in the cause of freedom.

During these misfortunes, Xerxes, who had been the cause of all, lay at Sardis, expecting the event of his expedition; but every hour coming loaded with the news of some fatal disaster, finding himself unable to retrieve his affairs, he retired farther into the country; and endeavoured to drown, in luxury and riot, the uneasy reflections of his unsuccessful ambition.

To the want of success abroad, was added the contempt of his subjects at home; and this brought on a train of treasons, insurrections, sacrilege, murder, incest, and cruelty: so that the latter part of his reign was as scandalous, as the first part of it had been unfortunate.

The Grecian fleet, after the battle of Mycale, set sail towards the Hellespont, to occupy the bridges which Xerxes had built over that strait; but, finding them already destroyed by the tempestuous weather, they returned home. From this time, all the cities of Ionia revolted from the Persians; and, having entered into the general confederacy, most of them preserved their liberty during the time that empire subsisted.

The treasures which the Persians had brought into Greece, were very great; and these, of course, became a prey to the conquerors. From this period, the Greeks began to lose their

spirit of hardy and laborious virtue; and to adopt the refined indolence, the captious petulance, and the boundless love of pleasure, which are always the result of extreme wealth. The former equality of the people, now began to be broken; and, while one part of the inhabitants rioted in opulence and luxu ry, another was seen pining in want and despair. It was in vain that philosophy reared its head, to stop these calamities: its voice reaches only a few; the great, and the little vulgar, are equally deaf to its dictates.

From this time, we are to view a different picture; and, instead of a brave and refined people, confederating against tyranny, we are to behold an enervated and factious populace, a corrupt administration among those in power, and wealth alone making distinction.

CHAPTER VIII.

From the Victory at Mycale, to the beginning of the Peloponnesian War.

No sooner were the Greeks freed from the appre- A. M.

3526.

nensions of a foreign invasion, than they began to entertain jealousies of each other. Indeed, these petty animosities had all along subsisted among them; but they were kept under by the sense of general danger. As this collection of republics was composed of states entirely dissimilar in manners, interests, and inclinations, it was no way surprising to find its parts ever at variance with each other.

The first marks of jealousy, after the destruction of the Persian army, exhibited themselves between the Athenians and Spartans; the one, a refined ambitious people, unwilling to admit a superior in the general confederacy; the other, a hardy unpolished race, which could never think of admitting a feebler state as an equal. The Athenians, with their fami lies, having returned to their own country, began to think of rebuilding their city, which had been almost destroyed dur ing the Persian war.

As every new foundation aims at improving the old, they laid a plan of strengthening and extending their walls; and giving their city, at once, more magnificence and security. This was but natural: however, the Lacedæmonians conceived a jealousy at this undertaking; and began to think that Athens, from being mistress of the seas, would soon attempt usurp ing all authority upon land.

They, therefore, sent an embassy to the Athenians, to dissuade them from this undertaking: giving, as an ostensible

reason, the danger such fortifications would be of to the gene ral confederacy, if they should ever fall into the hands of the Persians. This message at first appeared reasonable, and the Athenians put an immediate stop to their undertaking; but Themistocles, who, since the battle of Salamis, continued to guide in the assemblies of Athens, easily saw through the pretext; and advised the council to meet their dissimulation with similar address.

He, therefore, answered the Spartan ambassadors, that the Athenians would soon send an embassy to Lacedæmon, in which they would fully satisfy all their scruples. Having thus gained time, he procured himself to be elected for that important negociation; and took care to draw out the treaty by studied delays. He had previously desired that his colleagues should follow, one after another; and still he alleged, at Lacedæmon, that he only waited for their arrival, to determine the affair at a single audience.

During all this time, the work was carried on at Athens with the utmost vigour and industry; the women and chil dren, strangers and slaves, were all employed in it, nor was it interrupted for a single day.

It was in vain, that the Spartans complained of this proce dure; it was in vain, that they urged Themistocles to hasten his business: he steadfastly denied the fact, and entreated them not to give any credit to loose and idle reports. He desired they would send again, and inquire into the truth of the matter; and, at the same time, advised the Athenians to detain the Spartan envoys, until he and his colleagues should return.

At last, finding all his pretence for delay exhausted, he boldly demanded an audience; and, knowing that the work was finished, he no longer kept on the mask. He then informed the Spartans, in full council, that Athens was now in a condition to keep out any enemy, whether foreign or domestic ; that what his countrymen had done, was conformable both to the law of nations and the common interests of Greece; that every city had a right to consult for its own safety, without submitting to the voice or control of its neighbours; that what had been done was entirely in consequence of his advice: and, in short, that whatever injury they offered him, they must expect would be returned upon their own ambassadors, who were still detained at Athens.

These declarations extremely displeased the Lacedæmonians: but, either sensible of their truth, or unwilling to come to an open rupture, they dissembled their resentment; and the ambassadors, on both sides, having all suitable honours paid them, returned to their respective cities. Themistocles