After this advantage, the Syracusans sustained a consider. able loss. Such of their vessels as fought at the entrance of the harbour (after having forced the Athenians) bulged furi ously one against the other, as they entered it in disorder; and, by this means, shifted the victory to their enemies, who were not contented with pursuing, but also gave chase to those who were victorious in the great harbour. Eleven Syracusan galleys were sunk, and great numbers of the sailors in them were killed. Three were taken; but the Athenians likewise lost three; and, after towing off those of the enemy, they raised a trophy, in a little island lying before Plem myrium, and retired to the centre of their camp.

One circumstance, which the besieged considered of the greatest importance, was, to attempt a second engagement both by sea and land, before the fleet and other succours, sen. by the Athenians, should arrive. They had concerted fresn measures for a battle at sea, by improving from the error they had committed in the last engagement.

The change made in the galleys was, their prows were now shorter, and, at the same time, stronger and more solid, than before. For this purpose, they fixed great pieces of timber, projecting forward on each side of the prows, and, to these pieces, they joined beams, by way of props. The beams extended to the length of six cubits, on each side of the vessel, both within and without. By this, they hoped to gain an advantage over the galleys of the Athenians, which did not dare, because of the weakness of their prows, to attack an enemy in front, but only in flank; not to mention, that, should the battle be fought in the harbour, they would not have room to spread themselves, nor to pass between two galleys, in which lay their greatest art, nor to tack about, after they should have been repulsed, in order to return to the charge; whereas, the Syracusans, by their being masters of the whole extent of the harbour, would have all these advantages; and might reciprocally assist one another. On these circumstances the latter founded their hopes of victory.

Gylippus, therefore, first drew all the infantry out of the camp, and advanced towards that part of the contravallation of the Athenians, which faced the city; whilst the troops of Olympia marched towards the other, and their galleys set sail.

Nicias did not desire to venture a second battle; saying, that as he expected a fresh fleet every moment, and a great reinforcement under Demosthenes, it would betray the greatest want of judgment, should he and his troops, who were inferior in number to those of the enemy, and already fatigued, hazard a battle, without being forced to it.

On the contrary, Menander and Euthydemus, who had just before been appointed to share the command with Nicias till the arrival of Demosthenes, fired with ambition, and jealous of those generals, were eager to perform some exploit, to bereave the one of his glory, and if possible eclipse that of the other.

The pretence alleged by them, on this occasion, was, the fame and reputation of Athens; and they asserted, with such vehemence, that it would be entirely destroyed, should they shun the battle, as the Syracusans offered it to them, that they at last forced Nicias to a compliance. The Athenians had seventy-five galleys, and the Syracusans eighty.

The first day, the fleets continued in sight of each other, in the great harbour, without engaging, and only a few skirmishes passed; after which, both parties retired, while the land forces acted in the same manner. The Syracusans did not make the least motion the second day.

Nicias, taking advantage of this inactivity, caused the transports to draw up, in a line, at some distance from one another, in order that his galleys might retire behind them, with safety, in case he should be defeated. Next morning, the Syracusans came up sooner than usual, when a great part of the day was spent in skirmishing; after which, they retired,

The Athenians did not suppose they would return; but imagined that fear would make them fly. But, having refreshed themselves with great diligence, and returned on board their galleys, they attacked the Athenians, who were far from expecting them. Being now forced to return_im, mediately on board their ships, the Athenians entered them in great disorder; so that they had not time to draw them up in a line of battle; and most of the sailors were fasting, Victory did not long continue in suspense. After making a short and slight resistance, they retired behind their line of transports. The enemy pursued them thither, but were stopped by the yards of those ships, to which were fixed dolphins of lead these being very heavy, had they fallen on the enemy's galleys, would have sunk them at once. In this engagement the Athenians lost seven galleys; and a great number of sol diers were either killed or taken prisoners.

This loss threw Nicias into the utmost consternation: all the misfortunes he had met with, since he had enjoyed the supreme command, came into his mind; and he was now involved in a greater than any of them, by his complying with the advice of his colleagues. Whilst he was revolving these gloomy ideas, the day after the battle, Demosthenes' fleet was seen coming forward, in great pomp, and with such an air

as might fill the enemy with dread. This fleet consisted of seventy-three galleys, on board of which were five thousand fighting men, and about three thousand archers, slingers, and bowmen. All these galleys were richly trimmed, their prows being adorned with shining streamers, manned with stout rowers, commanded by good officers, and echoing with the sound of clarions and trumpets: Demosthenes having affected an air of pomp and triumph, purposely to strike terror into the enemy.

This gallant sight alarmed them beyond expression. They did not see any end, or even the least suspension of their calamities. All they had done, hitherto, or suffered, was as nothing, and their work was to be begun again. What hopes could they entertain of being able to weary out the patience of the Athenians; since, though they had a camp intrenched in the middle of Attica, they were yet able to send a second army into Sicily, as considerable as the former; and their power as well as their courage, seemed, notwithstanding all their losses, instead of diminishing, daily to increase?

Demosthenes, having made an exact inquiry into the state of things, imagined it would not be proper for him to lose time, as Nicias had done, who having spread a universal terror, at his first arrival, became afterwards the object of contempt, for having wintered in Catana, instead of going directly to Syracuse; and had afterwards given Gylippus an opportunity of throwing troops into it.

He flattered himself with the hopes that he should be able to carry the city at the first attack, by taking advantage of the alarm which the news of his arrival would spread through every part of it; and, by that means, should immediately put an end to the war: otherwise, he intended to raise the siege, and no longer harass and lessen the troops, by fighting battles never decisive; nor quite exhaust the city of Athens, by em ploying its treasures in needless expenses.

Nicias, terrified by this bold and precipitate resolution of Demosthenes, conjured him not to be so hasty; but to take time to weigh things deliberately, that he might have no cause to repent of what he should do. He observed to him, that the enemy would be ruined by delays; that their provisions, as well as money, were entirely exhausted; that their allies were going to abandon them; that they must soon be reduced to such extremity, for want of provisions, as would force them to surrender, as they had before resolved. For there were certain persons in Syracuse, who held a secret correspondence with Nicias, and exhorted him not to be impatient, because the Syracusans were tired of the war with

Gylippus; and, that should the necessity to which they were reduced, be ever so little increased, they would surrender at discretion.

As Nicias did not explain himself clearly, and would not declare, in express terms, that sure and certain advices were sent him of whatever was transacted in the city, his remonstrances were considered as an effect of the timidity and slowness with which he had always been reproached. "Such," said they," are his usual protractions, delays, distrusts, and fearful precaution, whereby he has deadened all the vivacity, and extinguished all the ardour of the troops, in not marching them immediately against the enemy; but, on the contrary, by deferring to attack them, till his own forces were weakened and despised." This made the rest of the generals, and all the officers, come over to Demosthenes' opinion; and Nicias himself was at last forced to acquiesce.

Demosthenes, after having ineffectually attacked the wall which cut the contravallation of the besiegers, confined himself to the attack of Epipolæ, from a supposition, that, should he once be master of it, the wall would be quite undefended. He, therefore, took provisions for five days, with workmen, implements, and every thing necessary for him to defend that poet, after he should obtain possession.

As it could not be approached, in the day time, undiscovered, he marched thither in the night, with all his forces, followed by Eurymedon and Menander; Nicias staying behind, to guard the camp. They went up by the way of Euryclus, as before, unperceived by the sentinels, attacked the first intrenchment, and stormed it, after killing part of those who defended it. Demosthenes, not satisfied with this advantage, to prevent the ardour of his soldiers from cooling, and to delay the execution of his design, marches forward.

During this interval, the forces of the city, sustained by Gylippus, marched, under arms, out of the intrenchments. Being seized with astonishment, which the darkness of the night increased, they were immediately repulsed, and put to flight. But, as the Athenians advanced in disorder, to force whatever might resist their arms, lest the enemy might rally again, should time be allowed them to breathe and recover from their surprise, they are stopped on a sudden by the Boeotians, who make a vigorous stand, and, marching against the Athenians with their pikes presented, they repulse them with great shouts, and make a dreadful slaughter.

This spread a universal terror through the rest of the army. Those who fled, either force along such as were advancing to their assistance, or else, mistaking them for enemies, turn

their arms against them. They were now all mixed indiscriminately; it being impossible to discover objects in the horrors of the night; which was not so gloomy as entirely to make objects imperceptible, nor yet so light as that one could distinguish those which were seen.

The Athenians sought for one another in vain; and, from their often asking the word, by which only they were able to know one another, a strange confusion of sounds was heard, which occasioned no little disorder; not to mention that they, by this means, divulged the word to the enemy, and could not learn theirs; because by their being together, and in a body, they had no occasion to repeat it.

In the mean time, those who were pursued threw them. selves from the top of the rocks; and many were dashed tc pieces by the fall: and as most of those who escaped, strag gled from one another, up and down the fields and woods, they were cut to pieces, the next day, by the enemy's horse, who pursued them. Two thousand Athenians were slain, in this engagement; and a great number of arms were taken; those who fled having thrown them away, that they might be the better able to escape over the precipices.

Soon afterwards, Gylippus, having made the tour of Sicily, brought a great number of troops with him, which rendered the affairs of Athens still more desperate; and deprived Nicias of all hopes of success: besides, the Athenian army now began to diminish exceedingly, by sickness; and nothing seemed to remain, but their quitting an island, in which they had experienced every mortification. Nicias no longer op posed the resolution, and only desired to have it kept secret. Orders were therefore given, as privately as possible, for the fleet to prepare for setting sail, with the utmost expedition.

When all things were ready, the moment they were going to sail wholly unsuspected by the enemy, who were far from surmising they would leave Sicily so soon) the moon was suddenly eclipsed, in the middle of the night, and lost all its splendour; which terrified Nicias and the whole army; who, from ignorance and superstition, were astonished at so sudden a change, the causes of which they did not know, and therefore dreaded the consequences.

They then consulted the soothsayers; who, being equally unacquainted with the reasons of this phenomenon, only aug mented their consternation. It was the custom, after such things, to suspend their enterprise only for three days. The soothsayers pronounced, that he must not sail till three times nine days were past, (these were Thucydides' words) which