Castile may be wrought upon by the hope of an alliance, and that some of his courtiers are to be gained by pen

sions.

The most difficult point is, what is to be done with England? A treaty of peace must be set on foot, and if her alliance be not to be depended on, yet it is to be made as firm as possible, and she is to be called a friend, but suspected as an enemy. The Scots must be kept in readiness, to be let loose upon her on every occasion; and some banished nobleman, who hath a pretension to the crown, must be supported underhandly (from the league it cannot be done avowedly), that the mistrusted prince may be held in awe.

Now when matters are in this fermentation, and so many noblemen are joining in council how to carry on the war, if so mean a fellow as I should stand up and wish them to change all their counsels, to leave Italy alone and remain at home, France being a greater kingdom than could be properly governed by one man, and therefore not to be increased-If then I should propose to them the example of the Achorians, a people lying south-east of Utopia, who, long ago, engaged in war, to add another kingdom to the dominions of their prince, to which he had some pretension from an old alliance

They conquered it, but found the trouble of keeping it as great as that by which it was gained; that the con

quered were ever in rebellion or invaded by foreigners, while themselves were constantly at war either for or against them, and could never disband their army; that in the meantime they were oppressed with taxes, their money went out of the kingdom, they spilt their blood for the glory of their king, without the least advantage to the people, even in time of peace; and that, their manners being corrupted by a long war, robbery and murder everywhere abounded, and their laws fell into contempt, while their king, distracted by two kingdoms, was less able to apply his attention to the interest of either.

When they saw this, and that there would be no end of these evils, they humbly besought the king to choose whichever of the kingdoms he preferred, since he could not hold both-they would not, they said, be governed by half a king, when no man would willingly share, even a groom with another master. Upon this the good prince made over his new conquest to one of his friends (who was soon afterward dethroned) and contented himself with his old kingdom.

To this I would add, that, after all these attempts, the confusion, consumption of treasure and people, which must ensue, perhaps, on some misfortune, they might be compelled to give up all at last. It therefore seemed much more eligible, that the king should improve his old kingdom as much as he could and make it flourish, that he should love his people, and be beloved by them; that he VOL. II. G

should live among them, govern them mildly, and leave other kingdoms alone, since what had fallen to his share was large enough, if not too large, for him.

relished?'

How think you, would such a speech as this be

Not very well, I believe and confess,' replied I..

• But,' said he, what if I fell in with another class of ministers, whose chief object is to increase the prince's treasure. Where one proposeth raising the value of specie when the king is in debt, and lowering it when his revenues come in, that he may pay much with little, and in a little receive a great deal. Another proposeth a pretence of war, that money may be raised to carry it on, and a peace concluded as soon as this is done; and this under such religious pretences, as might work on the people, and make them impute it to the piety of their prince and his tenderness for their lives. A third offereth some musty laws, antiquated by long disuse, and forgotten and broken by all and proposeth levying the penalties of them, which would bring in much, and there is a good pretence for it, since it would look like executing a law and doing justice.

;

• A fourth proposeth to prohibit many things under severe penalties, especially such as are against the interest of the people; and then dispensing with these prohibitions on great compositions, to those who might find their advantage

in breaking them. This would answer two ends, both of them acceptable to many. Those whose avarice led them to transgress would be severely fined; and the selling licences dear, would look as if the prince were tender of his people, and would not easily, or at a low rate, dispense with any thing which might be against the public good.

• Another proposeth that the judges be secured, to declare ever in favour of the prerogative; and that they be often sent for to court, to let the king hear them argue those points in which he is concerned. Since, however, unjust any of his pretensions may be, yet some one or other of them, in the spirit of contradiction, the pride of singularity, or to make his court, would find some pretence for giving the king a fair colour for carrying his point. For let the judges but differ in opinion, and the clearest thing in the world becometh disputable; and the truth once brought in question, the king may expound the law to his own purpose, and the judges who stand out will be brought over by fear or modesty. Thus gained, they may all be sent to the bench to give sentence boldly, as the king would have it, for fair pretences will never be wanting when sentence is to be given in the prince's favour. It will either be said that equity lieth on his side, or some words in the law will be found bearing that sound, or some forced sense will be put upon them. And when all else faileth, the king's undoubted prerogative will be pretended, as what is above all law, and to which an upright judge ought to have especial regard.

Thus all consent to the maxims of Crassus, that a king cannot have sufficient treasure, since he must maintain his armies from it; that, if ever so much inclined that way, he can do no injustice; that all property is vested in him, not even excepting the persons of his subjects; and that no man hath any other property than what the king in his goodness chooseth should remain in his possession. They think it the interest of the prince, that as little should remain so, as may be, as if it was for his advantage, that his people should have neither riches nor liberty; these making them less easy under cruelty and injustice, while ty breaketh that spirit which might otherwise rebel.

pover

If, when all these propositions had been made, I should assert, that such counsels are mischievous and unbecoming a king, and that not only his honour, but his safety, consisteth more in his people's wealth than in his own. If I should shew, that they choose a king for their own sake and not for his, that by his exertion and care they may be easy as well as safe; and that therefore a prince ought to be more solicitous of his people's happiness than of his own, as a shepherd is to take more care of his flock than of himself

They also are certainly much mistaken who imagine that poverty is a safeguard to a country. Who quarrel more than beggars? Who more earnestly long for a change, than those whose present circumstances are uneasy to them?