CHAPTER VII

ROUSSEAU

NOTHING Could be more erroneous than to attribute to Rousseau's influence the formation of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man. As we shall endeavor to show, it was from America that the French learned of the idea of such a declaration. It was not from Rousseau the Americans derived their principles. In reality Rousseau's political philosophy, which aimed at securing freedom and equality, was destructive to individual rights. He has the individual surrender all his rights, without retaining a remnant of them, to the sovereign people or volonté générale. By this contract the individual exchanges "his natural liberty and an unlimited right to all he holds and is able to obtain" for the civil liberty which is limited by the general will.1 Though Rousseau asserted liberty to be inalienable, though he believed that equality would be preserved by having all individuals alike sacrifice the sum total of their liberties to the sovereign of which each individual is a part, he nevertheless established a despot whose power is as autocratic as is that of the Leviathan of Hobbes. This tyrant is Demos. The views of Rousseau could not give rise to the Declaration of the Rights of Man because he holds that each individual, upon entering society, surrenders his natural rights completely, without retaining the least residuum. Rousseau's volonté

générale is almighty, and is not restricted by the rights of the individual. To lose sight of this is to oversee one of the cardinal points of his system. It was the English theorists, notably Milton and Locke, who had insisted upon the fact that the natural rights of the individual were inalienable. It was their view that gave rise to the Declaration of the Rights of Man, not Rousseau's. Again the latter maintains that upon the sovereign people no law of any kind can be binding. Neither is any guarantee necessary, for the sovereign can never intend his own injury. Whatever the sovereign wishes ought to be. Obviously this view militates against any reservations of individual rights.

Yet though we cannot give Rousseau the credit of having given rise to this declaration, we must regard him as the apostle of a new social and political era. Though his works are full of contradictions and visionary ideas, probably no writer ever exerted a greater influence than he. That is largely due to the fact that he was the true child of his time. He was oppressed by the abuses and evils of the old régime and longed for a more natural condition of affairs. It is this desire for freedom which characterizes him as it does his contemporaries. It was this desire for liberty, for naturalness, which appealed to them. Most of them did not see the real consequence of his political system until the Reign of Terror opened their eyes to the fact that sovereign Demos may become as great a tyrant as any king. It is therefore safe to say that though the Contrat Social did not beget the Declaration of the Rights of Man, the enthusiasm with which the idea of such a declaration met in France was due in no small part to the writings of Rousseau. A brief consideration of his doctrines will, therefore, not be out of place.

"Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains. Many a person considers himself lord over his fellows, and yet is more of a slave than they. How has this change taken place? I know not. How can it be made legitimate? I believe I can answer that question." Thus Rousseau begins his Contrat Social. These words define the purpose of that work.

"The strongest is not strong enough to remain master if he does not change his might into right, obedience into duty." Might, says Rousseau, does not confer right. Since no man has a natural power over his fellows, there is no other foundation of lawful power among men except what arises from contract.1

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He declares it to be absurd "to believe a man may give himself away gratuitously. Such an act is unlawful and void, because the person who performs it is devoid of good sense. To say a people may enslave themselves is to declare them to be insane; insanity does not give right." "To renounce one's liberty is to renounce the quality of being a man, the rights of humanity, and even its duties. No adequate compensation can be made to any person who has relinquished all. Such a renunciation is incompatible with the nature of man. To take away freedom of will is to remove all morality from one's actions. It is a vain and contradictory agreement to stipulate absolute authority on the one hand and boundless obedience on the other. Is it not evident that one has not engaged in anything to any person from whom one has a right to exact anything?" Even though in these words Rousseau declared that an individual could not relinquish his liberty, with even more emphasis than Milton, Locke, or any other political philosopher, yet

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his attempt to preserve this freedom and equality intact was not successful because he confuses liberty with democracy.

When men have arrived at a point where the single efforts of individuals do not suffice to overcome the obstacles that are pernicious to men's preservation in the natural state, this original condition can last no longer without leading to the destruction of the human race. Since men cannot produce new forces they must combine existing forces and have them work as a whole. This combination can be formed only when a number combine their efforts. How can this be achieved without sacrificing the strength and freedom of each individual? How can a “form of association be found which defends and protects with the entire combined force the person and property of each individual associated, and by which each, uniting himself to all, obeys but himself and remains as free as before"? The social contract is the solution of this problem.

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The stipulations of this contract are so constituted that the least change makes them void and ineffective. Though not explicitly pronounced, they are everywhere accepted tacitly. If the contract is broken, each individual receives his original rights and natural liberty again, losing the freedom which rested upon contract, to obtain which he relinquished his natural rights.

All these stipulations may be reduced to a single one, namely, the alienation of each person with all his rights to the entire community. If each gives up himself entirely the condition is alike for all and equality is preserved. No one is interested in rendering the relation which is the same for all, onerous to any one in particular. Inasmuch as each gives himself to all, he 1 Contrat Social, I. 6.

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gives himself to no one in particular. Since each receives the same right over every other individual as he yields to him, he receives a compensation for what he loses, and more force to preserve what he possesses. "Each of us gives to the community his person and all his power under the supreme direction of the general will, and we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole body." The social contract, says Rousseau, produces a moral and collective body composed of as many members as the assembly has voices. The association gives to the body resulting therefrom its unity, its common self (son moi commun), its life, and will. This public person is called republic or body politic. When passive it is a State; when active, sovereign; when compared with other like bodies, power. In regard to those associated, the name people is employed. Each individual is a citizen when considered as a participant in the sovereign authority, and a subject when submitting to the laws of the State."

This contract between the individual and the State being mutual, binds the individual as a member of the sovereign to the other members, as member of the State to the sovereign. The sovereign cannot be bound toward himself; he can impose no law which he could not break. Inasmuch as the sovereign can consider himself only in one and the same relation, he is in the same situation as a private person contracting with himself. There is no sort of fundamental obligation for the body of the people, not even the social contract.3

The sovereign owes his existen e to the sanctity of the contract. He can therefore never bind himself to anything which would cause an alteration of this contract. He can never alienate any portion of himself. 1 Contrat Social, I. 6. 3 I. 7.

2 I. 6.