to think every one, who uses, does not perfectly understand. And possibly it is but here and there one, who gives himself the trouble to consider them so far as to know what he himself or others precisely mean by them: I have therefore in most places chose to put determinate or determined, instead of clear and distinct, as more likely to direct men's thoughts to my meaning in this matter. By those denominations, I mean some object in the mind, and consequently determined, i. e. such as it is there seen and perceived to be. This, I think, may fitly be called a determinate or determined idea, when such as it is at any time objectively in the mind, and so determined there, it is annexed, and without variation determined to a name or articulate sound, which is to be steadily the sign of that very same object of the mind or determinate idea.

To explain this a little more particularly. By determinate, when applied to a simple idea, I mean that simple appearance which the mind has in its view, or perceives in itself, when that idea is said to be in it : by determinate, when applied to a complex idea, I mean such an one as consists of a determinate number of certain simple or less complex ideas, joined in such a proportion and situation, as the mind has before its view, and sees in itself, when that idea is present in it, or should be present in it, when a man gives a name to it: I say should be; because it is not every one, not perhaps any one, who is so careful of his language, as to use no word, till he views in his mind the precise determined idea, which he resolves to make it the sign of. The want of this is the cause of no small obscurity and confusion in men's thoughts and discourses.

I know there are not words enough in any language to answer all the variety of ideas that enter into men's discourses and reasonings. But this hinders not, but that when any one uses any term, he may have in his mind a determined idea, which he makes it the sign of, and to which he should keep it steadily annexed, during that present discourse. Where he does not, or

cannot do this, he in vain pretends to clear or distinct ideas: it is plain his are not so; and therefore there can be expected nothing but obscurity and confusion, where such terms are made use of, which have not such a precise determination.

Upon this ground I have thought determined ideas a way of speaking less liable to mistakes, than clear and distinct: and where men have got such determined ideas of all that they reason, inquire, or argue about, they will find a great part of their doubts and disputes at an end. The greatest part of the questions and controversies that perplex mankind, depending on the doubtful and uncertain use of words, or (which is the same) indetermined ideas, which they are made to stand for; I have made choice of these terms to signify, 1. Some immediate object of the mind, which it perceives and has before it, distinct from the sound it uses as a sign of it. 2. That this idea, thus determined, i. e. which the mind has in itself, and knows and sees there, be determined without any change to that name, and that name determined to that precise idea. If men had such determined ideas in their inquiries and discourses, they would both discern how far their own inquiries and discourses went, and avoid the greatest part of the disputes and wranglings they have with others.

Besides this, the bookseller will think it necessary I should advertise the reader, that there is an addition of two chapters wholly new; the one of the association of ideas, the other of enthusiasm. These, with some other larger additions never before printed, he has engaged to print by themselves after the same manner, and for the same purpose, as was done when this Essay had the second impression.

In the sixth edition, there is very little added or altered; the greatest part of what is new is contained in the 21st chapter of the second book, which any one, if he thinks it worth while, may, with a very little labour, transcribe into the margin of the former edition.

1. An inquiry into the understanding pleasant and useful.
2. Design.

3. Method.

4. Useful to know the extent of our comprehension.

5. Our capacity proportioned to our state and concerns, to discover things useful to us.

6. Knowing the extent of our capacities will hinder us from useless curiosity, scepticism, and idleness.

7. Occasion of this Essay.

8. What idea stands for.

CHAPTER II.

NO INNATE PRINCIPLES IN THE MIND, AND PARTICULARLY NO INNATE SPECULATIVE PRINCIPLES.

SECT.

1. The way shown how we come by any knowledge, sufficient to prove it not innate.

2. General assent, the great argument.

3. Universal consent proves nothing innate.

4. What is, is; and it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be; not universally assented to.

5. Not on the mind naturally imprinted, because not known to children, idiots, &c.

6, 7. That men know them when they come to the use of reason, answered.

8. If reason discovered them, that would not prove them innate. 9-11. It is false that reason discovers them.

12. The coming to the use of reason, not the time we come to know these maxims.

13. By this, they are not distinguished from other knowable

truths.

14. If coming to the use of reason were the time of their discovery, it would not prove them innate.

15, 16. The steps by which the mind attains several truths. 17. Assenting as soon as proposed and understood, proves them not innate.

18. If such an assent be a mark of innate, then that one and two are equal to three; that sweetness is not bitterness; and a thousand the like, must be innate.

19. Such less general propositions known before these universal

maxims.

20. One and one equal to two, &c. not general nor useful, answered.

21. These maxims not being known sometimes till proposed, proves them not innate.

22. Implicitly known before proposing, signifies that the mind is capable of understanding them, or else signifies nothing. 23. The argument of assenting on first hearing is upon a false supposition of no precedent teaching.

24. Not innate, because not universally assented to.

25. These maxims not the first known.

26. And so not innate.

27. Not innate, because they appear least, where what is innate shows itself clearest.

28. Recapitulation.

SECT.

CHAPTER III.

NO INNATE PRACTICAL PRINCIPLES.

1. No moral principles so clear and so generally received as
the fore-mentioned speculative maxims.

2. Faith and justice not owned as principles by all men.
3. Obj. Though men deny them in their practice, yet they
admit them in their thoughts, answered.

4. Moral rules need a proof, ergo, not innate.

5. Instance in keeping compacts.

6. Virtue generally approved, not because innate, but because profitable.

7. Men's actions convince us, that the rule of virtue is not their internal principle.

8. Conscience no proof of any innate moral rule.

9. Instances of enormities practised without remorse.

10. Men have contrary practical principles.

11-13. Whole nations reject several moral rules.

14. Those who maintain innate practical principles, tell us not what they are.

15-19. Lord Herbert's innate principles examined.

20. Obj. Innate principles may be corrupted, answered.
21. Contrary principles in the world.

22-26. How men commonly come by their principles.
27. Principles must be examined.