perceived. 3. Some seemingly absolute 26, 27. Person a forensic term. 2. Divine law, the measure of sin and duty. 9. Civil law, the measure of crimes and innocence. 10, 11. Philosophical law, the measure of virtue and vice. 12. Its inforcements, commendation, and discredit. 13. These three laws the rules of moral good and evil. 14, 15. Morality is the relation of actions to these rules. 16. The denominations of actions often mislead us. 17. Relations innumerable. 18. All relations terminate in simple ideas. 19. We have ordinarily as clear (or clearer) notions of the relation, as of its foundation. 20. The notion of the relation is the same, whether the rule, any action is compared to, be true or false. CHAP. XXIX. Of clear and distinct, obscure and confused ideas. 8-11. Ideas of substances, as collections of their qualities, are all inadequate. 12. Simple ideas έ×тuñα, and adequate. 13. Ideas of substances are EXTUTα, and inadequate. 14. Ideas of modes and relations are archetypes, and cannot but be adequate. CHAP. XXXII. Of true and false ideas. SECT. 1. Truth and falsehood properly belongs to propositions. 2. Metaphysical truth con tains a tacit proposition. 3. No idea, as an appearance in the mind, true or false. 4. Ideas referred to any thing may be true or false. 5. Other men's ideas, real existence, and supposed real essences, are what men usually refer their ideas to. 68. The cause of such references. 9. Simple ideas may be false in reference to others of the same name, but are least liable to be so. 10. Ideas of mixed modes most liable to be false in the sense. 11. Or at least to be thought false. 12. And why. 13. As referred to real exist enscs, none of our ideas can be false, but those of substances. 14, 16. First, Simple ideas in this sense not false, and why. 15. Though one man's idea of blue should be different from another's. 17. Secondly, Modes not false. 18. Thirdly, Ideas of sub stances, when false. 19. Truth or falsehood always supposes affirmation or negation. 20. Ideas in themselves neither true nor false. 21. But are false, First, when judged agreeable to another man's idea without being so. 22. Secondly, When judged to agree to real existence, when they do not. 23. Thirdly, When judged adequate without being so. 24. Fourthly, When judged to represent the real essence. 25. Ideas, when false. 26. More properly to be called right or wrong. 27. Conclusion. CHAP. XXXIII. Of the association of ideas. SECT. 1. Something unreasonable in most men. 2. Not wholly from self- 3. Nor from education. 5. From a wrong connexion 6. This connexion how made. 7, 8. Some antipathies an effect of it. 9. A great cause of errours. 10--12. Instances. 13. Why time cures some disorders in the mind, which reason cannot. 14--16. Farther instances of the |