he can urge no objection. They are those which have been specified. Man was bound to obey his Maker; positive laws every where exist; all individuals and communities are subjected to a trial more or less severe; the trial is usually in some matter that is in itself of little importance; and this trial was adapted to the circumstances of the newly created man. It remains only to notice some of the objections which the infidel might allege against this statement.

1. The first is, that it was ridiculous and unworthy of God; that to make the eating or not eating of the fruit of a single tree connected with such results, is ridiculous and absurd; that no man can believe that God would do it; and that it has the appearance of a crude, and foolish story, rather than the aspect of sober and dignified historical truth.

To this I answer, in addition to what has been already observed. 1. That if it was ridiculous it can be shown to be so, and the reason why it was so can be pointed out. It is easy to say of any thing that it is ridiculous, but there is argument neither in a jest, nor a sneer. If any thing is absurd, the absurdity can be specified and seen. Besides, it would be easy to say the same thing of many other laws and facts, which are nevertheless a matter of sober, and melancholy verity. It might be said that it is absurd and ridiculous to make a man's happiness and life depend on so simple a matter as abstinence from a glass of intoxicating drink; and yet nothing is more common than such an occurrence. 2. If it be said that this command was too simple, and too easily obeyed, to constitute a test, I answer (a) that the very fact of its simplicity is an argument in favor of the truth of the narrative. It better evinces the goodness of the lawgiver, than the appointment of a law of greater severity would have done. It was besides adapted to the condition of the man. Had a law been given to Adam such as might be given to Gabriel, or to a man now, every one sees that it would have been disproportioned to his capacity, and then the objection would have been well founded that the law was unjust. was, its simplicity was in favor of the man; and the fact that such a law was violated, serves to vindicate the Creator from all blame. Was a severe trial desirable? Is it not always a circumstance that shows the equity and goodness of the lawgiver when his commands are easily obeyed? But (b) the event showed that the law was severe enough. Notwithstanding its simplicity, it was broken. The slight temptation led to its vio

As it

lation. It was, therefore, a law of sufficient severity to constitute a test; and its simplicity should not be an objection against it. (c) I may add, that the same objection will lie against most of the laws which now determine a man's character. We have seen on what slight circumstances the destiny of men often hangs. And if the simplicity of the law given to Adam is an objection against the probability of its being from heaven, that argument is at once answered by an appeal to facts as they actually occur in the world. A man that was urged to swallow a drug to save his life, and that was told his life depended on it, might, with the same reason, say that it was ridiculous. And yet this would not prove that that was not the law appointed by heaven, on which his restoration might depend, and that only by this could his life be preserved.

2. A more material objection to the statement of Moses may be that it was unjust to make so great consequences depend on an action of so little importance as that of eating or abstaining from the fruit of a single tree; that the punishment of death could not be proportionate to the offence; and that to make the eternal destiny of himself and millions depend on such an action is so unjust and severe that it is impossible to credit the statement of Moses. The death of millions on earth; and the woes which precede death-the train of sorrows here, and the inextinguishable fires of an eternal hell, it is said, are too great interests to be involved in an action so trifling, and in the consequences of a deed which was momentary.

In regard to this objection, I may observe the following things.

First. That the question about pain in this life, and death, and eternal suffering is not to affect the present inquiry. That men suffer here now, and that they die, is a matter of fact about which there is to be no controversy. For the same reason we are to lay out of view just now the justice of future punishment. That men may suffer in a future world is just as proper and as probable as that they suffer here; and that they will thus suffer is a fact which is made known to us by revelation. Whether the command respecting the forbidden fruit was given to Adam or not, these are facts that belong to our melancholy history, and that cannot be called in question.

Secondly. Ir it was designed that the conduct of Adam should have any influence in determining his own future happiness; if it had any bearing on his continuance in life, and in

the circumstances of his departure, then the command, being simple, and easily obeyed, was the most favorable that could have been given. On the supposition that his disobedience in any way would bring death and wo into the world; on the supposition that his conduct could be such as, under the divine arrangement, would be the eternal undoing of himself and his posterity, unless redeemed, then it is not possible to conceive how it could have been arranged in circumstances more favorable to himself and to his posterity than it was. The law was simple and this circumstance was actually more favorable to him, and gave a better promise of a happy issue than if it had been obscure, and complicated, and unintelligible. It was easy to be obeyed, and the temptation to disobedience was smalland this circumstance is more favorable to a continuance in vir tue than if it had been difficult; than if it had been disproportioned to his powers; than if the temptation had been mighty; and than if it had required angelic powers to resist it.

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Thirdly. Change the circumstances of the case, and grant what the objector would seem to demand. We assume here as a matter of fact, and as a matter not called in question by the point of the objection, that the fall of man would involve himself and his posterity in ruin. Now suppose that the law on which these stupendous and eternal results depended had not been of such a character as that stated by Moses. Suppose it had not been simple, easily understood; or easily obeyed. Suppose it had involved temptation up to the full powers of the man; suppose it had required service up to the utmost limit of human ability; suppose that God had required of him a service that involved every thing but impossibility, does not any one see that this would have had altogether more the appearance of injustice than in the case stated by Moses? Would it not have placed the world under circumstances of positive disadvantage compared with those on which, according to the sacred writer, the affairs of the world were actually commenced? And would not this have been liable to the real objection that there was severity, and harshness in the laws of the Creator; that, so to speak, man had but a slender chance of obedience and happiness?

Fourthly. The greatest events in the universe depend often on causes as liable to objection as this. The planets are bound in their orbits by simple laws. They move regularly and harmoniously. While they thus move every thing is well; and

the material universe is safe. But who can tell what would be the effect of the slightest deviation-say in the planet Jupiter from its fixed and settled laws of motion? Suppose it were to deviate ever so little from its regular path; and suppose the deviation should be such as should compare well with the slight deviation of Adam from the path of rectitude. What astronomer could calculate the effect which it would have on the worlds and systems with which it is connected? What part of the universe would be safe from the threatening rush of matter and crush of worlds? The order of the universe, so to speak, depends on the unvarying preservation of an infinite number of simple laws that must be observed, or ruin will rush at once through all the worlds and systems of the universe. Thus also it is in moral conduct. Is any one ignorant that the mightiest consequences often depend on actions that seem to be of little importance. The safety of the Roman empire, and the destiny of the world once depended on the simple question whether Caesar should or should not cross the Rubicon. The destiny of the kingdom of Persia once depended on the neighing of a horse. The simplest action often determines the destiny of a man or a nation. An error, a fault, an act of neglect in some small matter that passed unnoticed at the time has decided ultimately many a battle, and the destiny of many an empire. Great events often depend on small causes; and trains of events, most prosperous, or most disastrous in their issue, often result from some action that at the time passed unnoticed, and that sent its influence far into advancing years. So the water gushes forth from the base of the mountain swells to a river- and rolls on its impetuous torrents to the ocean. The result of conduct thus spreads and widens, and expands, until all connected in any way with the original agent feel its effects, and are blessed or withered by its influence. It is easy to speak of the transaction with Adam in the language of ridicule, and the voice of contempt. But if it shall be carefully examined, it will be found that somehow Moses has stated here an arrangement that accords strikingly with all the arrangements of the world, in which actions themselves apparently of little importance strike onward into coming times, and spread their influence over ages and generations of men. If so, the objection, lying as much against the ordinary course of events as against the statement of revelation, is of force against neither; since it is the actual mode in which the world is governed.

forms a rill

ARTICLE IX.

RICH'S KOORDISTA N.

Narrative of a Residence in Koordistan, and on the site of ancient Nineveh; with journal of a voyage down the Tigris to Bagdad, and an account of a visit to Shiraz and Persepolis. By the late Claudius James Rich, Esq. The Hon. East India Company's Resident at Bagdad, author of " An account of ancient Babylon." Edited by his widow. London 1836, 2 vols. 8vo. pp. 398, 410.

KOORDISTAN is a mountainous country on the borders of the Turkish and Persian empires, from which issue the different head-streams of the Tigris. Persian Koordistan answers, in a considerable degree at least, to the ancient Elymais or Elam, having for its chief towns, Sulimania, Sinna, and Kermanshah. A part of this territory embraced Susiana, the modern Khusistan. Sometimes, the sacred writers comprehend under the name, Elam, the Persians generally. Elam, which is mentioned in Gen. 10: 22, as a tribe descended from Shem, the second son of Noah, is in Gen. 14: 1, introduced along with the kingdom of Shinar, and in Is. 21: 2, and Jer. 25: 25, is connected with Media. The Elamites are described in Ezra 4: 9, among the nations of the Persian empire, and according to Dan. 8: 2, Susa lay on the river Ulai, that is the Eulaeus or Choaspes, in the province of Elam. It was in the capacity of archers that the tribes in Elam were chiefly celebrated. In Is. 22: 6, of a hostile army that was to go forth against Jerulasem, it is said:

Elam bears the quiver,

And comes with chariots, footmen, and riders.

When Jeremiah, 49: 34, threatens this people with conquest and subjugation, he begins with these words:

Thus saith Jehovah of hosts!

Behold! I break the bow of Elam,

The chief instrument of his might.

For further references, see Gen. 14: 1. Ez. 32: 24. Dan. 8: 1, 2. 1 Macc. 6: 1, 2. 2 Macc. 9: 2.