and the antient Jews Sephiroth, in the divine essence. These denominations are given, not because they can express the mode of existence in God, for that is both inexpressible and inconceivable; but because they declare, according to the

stand upon names, but upon things." We use the names, not for their accuracy of expression (for no words of man can express God, or thoughts of man search him out,) but to prevent confusion, or concealment of the truth. See Introd. to Vol. i. p. 8. Note. AUG. de Trin. I. v. GREG. NAZ. Orat. i. de Pace, apud. GASP. LAURENT. Cath. Cons. Vet. p. 44. MURET. Not. in Sen. epist.

In addition to the substance of this note, it may be here observed, that some have objected to the use of any of these terms, because they are not found in the Scriptures. If this proceeded from a real regard to what the Scriptures revealed, it would deserve the more attention; but when the objection is raised merely for cavillation, as without breach of charity it may be affirmed hath often been the case, it is sufficient to say, that if men will abide only by terms of Scripture, it will be absolutely necessary for them to use the Scripture only in the two languages of Hebrew and Greek in which they are written. For, if there be any force in such an argument, it lies against every translation in the world, because these alter the terms, and sometimes impose a sense upon them, which not only is contrary to the sense which other men may affix, but in some instances wide enough from the original. In such a case, there would be no allowable divinity, but what might appear in Greek and Hebrew, to the great edification, (no doubt) of the common people, who happen to have souls as well as rabbies and philosophers, and who in general are at least as desirous of their salvation. The truth is; the terms, used in this and other cases, would not offend; if the things, which the terms signify, were not disagreeable to the pride and conceit of man. We know, as well as these objectors, that the words Trinity, Incarnation, Person, Essence, and such like, are not to be found in the Bible; but we also know, that the truths, which these words relate to, are net only to be found there, but are the very sum and substance of it. If these terms convey the notion of these truths, they answer the use of all terms, which is to communicate the knowledge of things. And as to the terms themselves, they were first employed in opposition to various heretics by the fathers of the church, for a clearer or more full expression of their doctrines, and have been very properly retained to this day. Mosheim in his Ecclesiastical History, and some others,† affect to censure Theophilus Antiochenus for his first using the word Tpias or Trinity. He began at the wrong end; for he should first have proved, that the doctrine itself had no foundation.

Others have attempted to confound the terms Person and Essence, when they could not justly throw them aside, and have endeavoured to make the Christian assert, that there are three essences, and con

† See Dr. KING's Rites and ceremonies of the Grech church in Rusp. 7.

sia.

sense of the Scripture, that there are more subsistences than one in Jebovab, which notwithstanding are but ONE Jebovab. We are bold to say, that there is, and can be no contradiction in this assertion; because it is a proposition, delivered to us by God himself; and that, if this doctrine be

sequently three Gods; or, that the names of the persons were but mere names, and consequently that there is but one person in the Godhead. These are answered by saying, that person and essence are neither synonimous nor convertible. For though each person be or the essence; yet the three persons together do constitute THE essence: And though the whole essence is inseparably connected with each of the persons, both in willing and working ad extra; yet it cannot be said with any propriety, that the Fathrr is the whole Essence, of the Son, or the Holy Ghost, notwithstanding they are distinctly and by themselves essentially divine. Thus it will appear, that though Essence and Person differ as to the full extent of the terms, yet they perfectly agree, when they apply to the reality of the Deity. Each person by himself is God, but not the Godhead; and the Godhead is in each person, but is not each person. From this relative distinction it follows, that the Son and Spirit, being persons in Jehovah and inseparable from the essence, are both personally and essentially Jehovah, and consequently, either in union or distinction, are the object of worship. In fact, as true believers, we do not and cannot worship any one of the Divine Persons separate or alone, however we may mention each by themselves; for if we invocate the Son, we invocate the Divine Essence, which is inseparable from the Son, and consequently invocate the Father and the Holy Ghost. The same may be observed, if we address the other persons. By this we may undersand what our Lord implies, when he says, He that hath seen me [meaning spiritually] hath seen the Father: I and my Father are ONE, &c. so the apostle, He that hath the Son, hath the Father also. If this doctrine of three persons in one essence; or of the one essence existing, indivisibly though distinctly, in the three persons; were rightly stated; there would seem but little room for the disputes, respecting the proper object of worship, and the inferiority or subordination of the divine persons. This supposed inferiority, applied to Godhead, is an absurdity in termino. It originated from the doctrines of the generation and procession, which relating entirely to the modus existendi, the Scripture has not endeavoured to explain, because man could not possibly conceive that mode, nor is it necessary for him; and therefore all disputation upon these points is impertinent, and proceeds from the affectation of being wise above what is written.

We would use the word person in the sense of the Augsburgh confession, which says, Nomine Persona utuntur ea significatione, qua usi sunt in hac causa Scriptores ecclesiastici, ut significet non partem aut qualitatem in alio, sed quod proprie subsistit. Syntag. Conf. Fid. P. ii. p. 8. However, it would not be worth while to quarrel about the term, while the sense is truly and safely understood.

not true, the rest of the Bible will be equally false, which has no other sanction to command our submission, than that of its being a divine revelation. We do not presume to reason upon God's Essence; because it is impossible that such an essence should be the subject of our reason; and especi ally too since we know, that our reason cannot determine upon the mode of its own existence, nor specify the constitution of any one property, whether tangible or intelligible, about us. Reason would be unreasonable, if it pretended to define what it cannot reach; or rather becomes ignorance and folly, in attempting assumptions without data, and arguing, from what is unknown, to any positive or determinate propositions. It is impossible that God, as to the mode of his existence, should be comprehended by the idea of any of his creatures, and certainly not by so low and imperfect a creature as man; because, in that case, HE must first cease to be infinite and eternal; which attributes are themselves not to be conceived by the utmost extent of human thought and imagination.. We can say, what God is not from our reason, rather than what he is. In order to comprehend God, creatures must be no longer creatures; or (with reverence be it spoken) God would be no more that height and depth, that length and breadth, which are eternally exploring, but never explored. To know God in this view, would be to possess ideas commensurate with his own; which is a presumption, perhaps, attempted by no man in profession, however in practice it is absurdly and ignorantly attempted every day. Of all philosophers, they are the most inconsistent with themselves, who, asserting that "nothing is in the intellect but what was before in the sense," preposterously fix any notion of a BEING, whom no sense can possibly perceive, and whom no intellect but his own can ever explain. Nay, did God condescend to explain the extent of his nature, with all its wonders; the faculties of his creatures must be equal to his own attributes, before they could fully conceive that extent and those wonders; and this equality is impossible, on the first view. Reason thus can help us to discern our own ignorance; but cannot lift us up to attainments, which creatures, as creatures, can never possess. Our ideas, aided with our senses, can conceive something of the weight of a mountain, by the weight of a pound; but sense and idea

* Thus it may be safely asserted; that God is not a liar; and that he is without sin, and cannot sin; by which, (as Augustine hath observed) there is no derogation of his omnipotence, because sin and error proceed from infirmity; and therefore if God could sin, he would cease to be omnipotent.

Vol. II.

fail together in forming an adequate notion of the weight of the universe of things, because its extent is beyond their perception. Yet this universe is material and tangible; and its quantity is subject to our senses as far as they can go. But we presently sink beneath the weight of this extent of substance, and feel ourselves with regard to matter about us, but almost imperceptible atoms, lost in astonishinent among innumerable worlds.

Matter, however, neither is nor can be infinite, or eternal, or omnipotent; and is far beneath those intelligible forms, of which we can faintly conceive the existence, such as angels and superior spirits, and of whose vastness or multitude we have some notion, though certainly not a notion commensurate with what they are. If this be true, and we have almost a sensible demonstration that it is true, how must we sink below the Ens Entium, the BEING which includes all this being within himself, to whom the universe is but as a span, and the nations of the earth as emptiness and nothing? If the mere works transcend our investigation beyond every comparison or idea; how must the nature of the GREAT ARCHITECT himself ascend above our thoughts, and cause us to shrink within ourselves as littleness and vanity?" What is man (says the admirable M. Pascal) considered in nature? A nothing in regard to infinity, and every thing in regard to nothing; a medium between nothing and every thing. He is alike removed from the two extremes; and "his being is no less distant from the nothing, from which he was taken, than from the infinity, in which he is lost. "His understanding holds the same rank in the order of intelligible beings, as his body in the extent of nature; and "all that it can do, is to perceive some appearances in the "middle of things, in an eternal despair of knowing either "the beginning or the end. Who can follow these amazing progressions?The AUTHOR of these wonders compre"bends them; which only HE can do."*

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From hence it plainly appears, that the powers of reason. can have no exercise in a point of this sublime and superior kind; but, like the powers of sense amidst the universality of matter, must stand still and own, that God's infinitude is absolutely beyond them.

"Has reason then no employment in this research, no of fice in religion? Are we to give up all understanding and knowledge concerning the Deity, and no longer see with our eyes, or hear with our ears, or reflect with our minds ?" We have found, that it is as reasonable for reason to confess her own weakness here, even were it perfect reason, which our * ROLLIN'S Belles Lettres. Vol. iv. B. 5.

reason is not; as it would be for a man to own his want of strength to remove a mountain or a world. This, then, is the first exercise of true reason, to know that there are boundaries to her powers, and to find where those boundaries are. We call it wisdom to discover this in all other things; and why it should not be so here in the great cause of those things, it seems very difficult to explain. God's intellect alone, from the necessity of his nature, is unbounded: He is all centre as to himself, and all circumference to every other being. Our knowledge is a very minute circle within himself, which he has been pleased to describe around us; and if we attempt to look beyond it, we only see a stupendous immensity, which swallows up all our conceptions, and leaves imagination itself to wander in a pathless profound, till it recurs to the earth again. In this confinement of our parts; is it not reasonable and right to understand, that we are thus confined, and that if we pass beyond our line, we shall lose our powers like a machine without a rest, and in that case become truly irrational? If one wise heathen could justly say, that the maxim KNOW THYSELF descended from beaven; he, who was called the wisest of the heathens, did not say amiss, when he confessed, that he knew nothing but bis own ignorance. Right reason publishes this, because it is a truth; and right reason can only be employed upon truth: In any other engagement, it would degenerate into nonsense and folly. And, if it be a truth, that reason by searching cannot find out God, is it not perfectly reasonable for reason to confess that inability? Surely, it is. What, then, is its next procedure? Is it right to sit still, and go no farther; or because we cannot fly like angels, are we not to walk as men?

-If we had no other beginning or end but SELF, and no other assistance but what SELF can procure; perhaps it might be right to stop here.

But it doth not follow, that because we cannot know the whole of God by ourselves, we are therefore, unable to know any thing of him by all other communication. Nor, though none of God's creatures can possibly discover any notion of the manner of his existence by their own intellect, is it by any means rational to say, that they cannot be sure, that such and such a manner doth exist, when it is discovered to them by HIM, who alone is able to inform them. Nor yet is it absurd to say, that He still exists beyond their comprehension, though some idea of his existence is brought within it; any more than it would be to affirm, that an unfathomable ocean still remains, though a man or a thousand men had received a part of it within them. God alone can make out his discoveries proportionally to our faculties; and, in this case, he adapts the faculty to the discovery, not merely to indulge