ill health; in addressing myself to jurors on any common subject, I have not been in the habit of addressing myself to the interposition of the court, or to the good-natured consideration of the jury, on behalf of my client. I have mentioned, indeed, my own enfeebled, worn-out body, and my worn-out state of mind, not out of any paltry respect to myself, nor to draw your attention to myself, but to induce you to reflect upon this-that, in the weakness of the advocate, the case of my client, the prisoner at the bar, is not implicated; for, his case is so strong in support of his innocence, that it is not to be weakened by the imbecility or the fatigue of his advocate.

Gentlemen of the jury, I lament that this case has not been brought forward in a simple, and in the usual way, without any extraneous matter being introduced into it, as I think in justice, and as I think in humanity, it ought to have been. I lament that any little artifices should be employed upon so great and solemn a case as this, more especially in desperate times than upon more ordinary occasions; some allegations of criminality have been introduced, as to persons and things, that ought not, in my opinion, to have been adverted to in a case like this. What, for instance, has this case to do with the motion made by Lord Moira in the house of lords in Ireland, in February last, or the accidental conversation of Lord Edward Fitzgerald? If you have a feeling for virtue, I trust that Lord Moira will be revered as a character that adds a dignity to the peerage. What made that noble character forego his great fortune, to quit his extensive domains, and the tranquillity of a philosophic mind, but in the great and glorious endeavour to do service to his country? I must repeat, he is an honour to the Irish peerage. Let me ask, why was the name of Lord Moira (or Lord Wycombe, who happened to dine at Sir Duke Giffard's) introduced into this trial? What has the motion which Lord Moira introduced into the house of lords to do with the trial of Mr. Oliver Bond on a charge of high treason?

Gentlemen of the jury, you have been addressed as against a person by whom a fire has been supposed to have been kindled, and this, too, at the period of its being extinguished. [Some ignorant persons in the crowded gallery having created some noise in the court, prevented the learned advocate a few minutes from proceeding. The court said they would punish any person who dared to interrupt the counsel for the prisoner, and said they hoped Mr. Curran would be able to proceed in stating the prisoner's case.]

Mr. Curran in continuation. I have very little hope to be able to discharge my duty, but I impute the interruption to mere accident; I cannot suppose it was levelled against me, but I am afraid it was excited by prejudice. Gentlemen of the jury, I was cautioning you against being preju diced against my unfortunate client; I fear there is much reason why I should caution you against the influence of any prejudice against the prisoner at the bar. You are to decide, in your verdict, by the evidence given, and the evidence that, on the part of the prisoner, will be laid before you, and you will see the evidence does not support the prosecution. You will banish any prejudices, and let your verdict be the result of cool and deliberate investigation; and not given in the heat of the season, when men's minds may be heated by the circumstances of the times. I shall lay before you the case of my client, to controvert the evi. dence given on the part of the prosecution, and shall offer to your consideration some observations in point of law, under the judicial control of the court as to matter of law. I will strip my client's case from the extraneous matter that has been attempted to be fastened on it. I feel, gentlemen, the more warm, when I speak to you in favour of my client's innocence, and to bring his innocence home to your judg ment. I know the honesty and rectitude of your characters, and know my client has nothing to fear from your under standings.

It is my duty to state to you, we have evidence to prove to you, that the witness on the part of the prosecution is undeserving of credit, and it is my duty to apprize you, that it is your duty to examine into the moral character of the witness that has been produced; and it is of the utmost concern you should do this, as your verdict is to decide on the life or death, the fame or dishonour, of the prisoner at the bar. With respect to prosecutions brought forward by the state, I have ever been of opinion, the decision is to be by the jury, and as to any matter of law, the jury do derive information from the court; for jurors have, by the constitution, a fixed and permanent power to decide on matter of fact, and the letter of the law the sovereign leaves to be expounded by the mouth of the king's judges. Some censure on former occasions hath fallen on former judges, from a breach of this doctrine. Upon a former occasion I differed in opinion from the learned judge who then presided, as to what I conceived to be the law, as to what is to be construed in the law of high treason, as to the compassing or imagining the death of the king; I am not ashamed of the opi nion in the point of law I entertained; I never shall be ashamed of it. I am extremely sorry I should differ from the bench in opinion on a point of law, but judges have had different opinions on the same subject. When an overt act is laid of compassing and imagining the death of the king, it does not mean, in construction of law, the natural dissolution of the king; but where there was not the fact acted upon, but confined merely to the intention a man had, the proof of such intention must, according to Lord Coke and Sir M. Foster, be proved by two witnesses in England; the stat. of Edw. III. provides against the event of the death of the king by any person levying war, whereby his life might become endangered. The proof of such overt act must, in England, be substantiated by two witnesses; how it comes not to be so settled and required in Ireland, is not accounted for.

Before the stat. of Edw. III. the law relative to high treason was undefined, which tended to oppress and harass the people; for, by the common law of England, it was formerly a matter of doubt whether it was necessary to have two witnesses to prove an overt act of high treason. Lord Coke says, that in England, there must be two witnesses to prove an overt act; it seems he afterwards was of a contrary opinion; but in the reign of William III. a statute passed, and by that statute it appears there must be two witnesses; but when that statute came to be enacted here, the clause relative to there being two witnesses to an overt act of high treason is not made the law in Ireland, but why it was not required in Ireland is not explained. By the English act of William III. in England, the overt act must be proved by two witnesses, but it does not say so in Ireland; but, as the common law of England and the common law of Ireland is the same, the consciences of an Irish jury ought to be fully satisfied, by the testimony of two witnesses to an overt act; but, on this point, however, some of the Irish judges are of opinion, that two witnesses are not, in Ireland, required to substantiate an overt act: therefore their opinion must be acquiesced in. Let me suppose that Confucius, Plato, Solon, or Tully, or any other great philosopher, was of opinion, on any particular point, as suppose, for instance, that on the statute of William III. in order to have a just and equal trial, there must be two witnesses to prove an overt act; Blackstone and Montesquieu are of opinion we should have the equal protection to our liberties, why then should not a jury in Ireland require the same evidence, i. e. two witnesses here as well as in England? [The learned counsel referred to the statute of Edw. III. the act of Wm. III. on high treason, Blackstone's Commentaries, Montesquieu's Spirit of Laws, Coke, and Foster's Pleas of the Crown.]

Gentlemen of the jury, let me state to you, in the clearest point of view, the defence of the prisoner at the bar, and see what has been the nature of the evidence adduced. The

prisoner at the bar is accused of compassing or imagining the death of the king, and of adhering to the king's enemies. The evidence against him is parol and written evidence. Now, gentlemen of the jury, I will venture to observe to you, that as to the written evidence, if suffered to go before' you by the court, it is only as evidence at large, but as to the credibility of it, that is for you to decide upon. Mr. Reynolds, in his parol testimony, has sworn, that he was made a United Irishman by the prisoner at the bar; Mr. Reynolds says he was sworn to what he considered to be the objects of that society; he stated them to you, but whether true or false, is for you to determine, by the credit you may give to his testimony. This is the third time Mr. Reynolds has appeared in a court of justice, to prosecute the prisoners. He says the objects of the United Irishmen are to overturn the present government, and to establish a republican form of government in its stead, and to comfort and abet the French, on their invading this kingdom, should such an event take place. You have heard his testimony: let me ask, do you think him incapable of being a villain? Or do you think him a villain? You observed with what kind of pride he gave his testimony; do you believe his evidence by the solemn oath you have taken? Or do you believe it was a blasted perjury? Can you give credit to any man of a blasted character? It has been the misfortune of many former jurors to have given their verdict founded upon the evidence of a perjured witness, and on their death-beds they repented of their credulity in convicting a man upon false testimony: the history of former ages is replete with such conduct, as may be seen in the State Trials, in the case of Lord Kimbolton and Titus Oates. The then jurors convicted that nobleman, but some time after his death, the jurors discovered they had given implicit credit to a witness unworthy of it; and the lawyers of those times might have said, "I thank God they have done the deed." Does not the history of human infirmity gave many instances of this kind?