of their Minds. And this no prejudice to the Standing-Laws of Nature. And befides it ought to be confidered, that the fame Stories which mention fuch Perfons as profeft Atheists, do likewife give an Account of di vers fignal Judgments, whereby they were witnessed against from Heaven.

3. But I add farther, There never yet was any fuch Person, who had any full and abi ding conviction upon his Mind, against the Existence of God. Mentiuntur qui dicunt fe non fentire effe Deum, nam etfi tibi affir"ment interdiu, noctu tamen & fibi dubitant, "They lie who say that they believe there is

no God (faith Seneca); though they may "profefs this fomewhat confidently in the "Day-time, when they are in Company, "yet in the Night and alone they have doubt"ful Thoughts about it. 'Tis their Wifh, but not their Opinion. The Interest of their Guilt doth make them defire it. But they are never able with all their endeavours wholly to extinguish their natural Notions about it. Witness thofe continual Fears and Terrors, whereunto fuch kind of Men are above all other most obnoxious.

The second Objection was, That if the Confent of Nations be a fufficient Evidence to prove the Exiftence of God, it may as well prove Palytheism and Idolatry, for which the like confent may be pleaded.

To this two Things may be answered:

1. Tho'

1. Tho' the Unity of the Godhead, and the Unfitness of worshipping him by Idols, be discoverable by the Light of Nature; yet these things are not fo immediate, and fo obvious to every ones Understanding as thẹ Being of God is, but will require fome deeper Confideration, and fome skill in the Rules of reasoning. Now it could not be reasonably expected, that either the generality, or any confiderable number of the Vulgar, fhould attain to fuch a degree of Knowledge, as their own natural Reason, duly exercised and improved, might have furnished them with. Partly by reafon of the Prejudice of Education, which must needs incline them to acquiefce in what is delivered down to them, as the belief or practice of their Forefathers; and confequently hinder them from an impartial Enquiry into the Nature of things: But chiefly for want of fufficient leifure to apply themselves to the business of Contemplation, by reafon of their being immersed in the Affairs of the World, either Pleasures, Ambition, Riches, or else being wholly taken up with Cares, about providing the Neceffaries of Life for themselves and their Families; which muft needs much divert them from the serious Confideration of things, and hinder them from the improvement of their natural Light to all the due Confequences of it.

2. The most confidering and the wifeft Men in all Ages and Nations, have constantly differed from the Vulgar in their Thoughts about these things, believing but one fupreme Deity, the Father of all other fubordinate Powers:

Hominum fator atque Deorum.

Whom they called Jupiter or Jove, with plain reference to the Hebrew Name Jehovah. And to this one God did they afcribe feveral Names, according to thofe feveral Virtues they supposed to be in him, or Benefits they expected from him. Bacchus and Neptune, Nature, Fortune, Fate: Omnia quidem Dei nomina funt, varie utentis fua poteftate, faith Seneca. So likewife Pythagoras, SocraDe Benefic tes, Plato, Ariftotle, &c. And they advise lib.4. c.7. Men to worship this God, not fo much by Images or by Sacrifices, as by inward Goodness, by endeavouring to be like him; as I fhall fhew more largely afterwards. Now though the Opinion of the Vulgar, with the Confent of the Wife, may be of great Authority, yet being separated from or especially oppofed unto, their Opinion, who are beft able to judge, it must needs fignify but little.

If the Question should here be proposed, How comes it to pass, that Mankind should thus consent and agree in the notion of a Deity, and to what Ground or Cause may it be af cribed?

Το

To this I fhall fuggeft fomething by way of anfwer, both negatively and pofitively.

1. Negatively, From what hath been faid it may appear, that this belief doth not proceed from any particular Infirmity, or occafi onal Prejudice in the Judgment, because it hath been so constant and universal amongst Mankind. And befides, there is not the leaft probability for those things which are affigned as the grounds of this Prejudice, namely, Fear, Policy, Stipulation.

1. Not Fear, or a certain jealousy of the worst that may happen. For though it must be granted natural to the Minds of Men, to be poffeffed with an awe towards fuch things as are able to hurt them; yet 'tis much more probable, that the fear of a fupreme Being, is rather the Confequence and Effect of such a Belief, than the Caufe of it. For this reafon, because the Notion of a Deity doth comprehend under it infinite Goodness and Mercy, as well as Power and Justice; and there is no reason why Fear fhould difpofe a Man to fancy a Being that is infinitely Good and Mer ciful.

2. Not Policy or the device of Statists, to keep Men's Confciences in awe and oblige them to subjection. 1. Because the greatest Princes and Politicians themselves, have in all Ages been as much under this conviction of a Deity, and the lashes of Conscience, as any other Perfons whatsoever; which could

not

not be, had they known this business of Religion to have been a Device or State-Engine, whereby their Subjects were to be impofed upon. 2. Because this Belief is a

mongst the more rude and favage Nations, fuch as in all other Regards are ignorant and wild, and utterly deftitute of all common Policy.

3. Not Stipulation or mutual Agreement, for the fame Reafon: Because 'tis amongst those barbarous and favage People, who decline all kind of Commerce with others. Nor is it imaginable, how fuch kind of Perfons fhould agree together to promote any Opinion, who are widely separated from one another, by Seas, and Mountains, and Defarts; and yet not at fo great a distance in their Habitations, as in their Customs and Manners.

From all which it may appear, That this Opinion or Belief which is fo general amongst Men, doth not arife from any prejudice or partiality upon their Minds; But rather the doubting or questioning of these Things, which belongs but to few. There is reafon enough to believe, that this may be founded in prejudice. Nor is it difficult to determine whence their prejudice doth arife, namely, from the vicious Inclinations of Men, which will corrupt and byafs their Judgments. When once Men are immersed in fenfual Things, and are become Slaves to

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their