Axiom 3. Axiom 4. much greater degrees hath it of moral Good Axiom 5. There is in fome things fuch a natural decency and fitnefs, as doth render them moft agreeable to our reason, and will be fufficient to recommend them to our Practice, abftracting from all confiderations of Reward. As in loving those who are kind to us, and from whom we receive benefit: In compenfating Good with Good, and not with Evil. It is most suitable both to the Reason and Intereft of Mankind, that every one fhould submit themselves to him, upon whom they depend for their Well-being, by doing fuch things as may render them acceptable to him. It is a defirable thing for a Man to have the affiftance of others in his need and distress. And 'tis not reasonable for him to expect this from others, unless he himself be willing to fhew it to others. The rational Nature and the Perfection belonging to it being more noble than the Senfitive, Therefore Moral Good is to be preferred before Natural; and that which is Morally Evil is more to be hated and avoided, than that which is Natural. A prefent natural Good may be parted with upon a probable Expectation of a future Moral Good. A prefent natural Evil is to be endured for the probable avoiding of a future Moral Evil. СНАР. Some Propofitions necessary to be premised for the removing of feveral Prejudices in debates about Religion. BE Efides what hath been already fuggested concerning the first Foundations to be laid, in order to a Difcourfe about Natural Religion, I fhall in the next Place offer to Confideration these Seven following Propofitions, as being very proper to prevent or obviate the Cavils of Sceptical captious Men. 1. Such things as in themfelves are equally true and certain, may not yet be capable of the fame kind or degree of Evidence as to us.. As for Inftance, That there was fuch a Man as King Henry the Eighth, that there are fuch Places as America, or China. I say these things may in themselves be equally true and certain with those other Matters, That we now fee and are awake, That the three Angles in a Triangle are equal to two right ones. Though for the First of these we have only the Teftimony of others, and human Tradition; whereas for the other we have fenfitive Proof, and Mathematical Demonftration. And the reafon is, because all C 2 Truths I. 2. cap. 3. ult. Truths are in themselves equal, according to that ordinary Maxim, Veritas non recipit magis & minus. And therefore nothing can be more irrational than for a Man to doubt of, or deny the Truth of any thing, because it cannot be made out by fuch kind of Proofs of which the Nature of fuch a thing is not capable. A Man may as well deny there is any fuch thing as Light or Colour, becaufe he cannot hear it; or Sound, because he cannot fee it, as to deny the truth of other things because they cannot be made out by fenfitive or demonstrative Proofs. The kinds of Probation for several things being as much difproportioned, as the objects of the several Senses are to one another. 2. Things of feveral kinds may admit and Ariftot. require feveral forts of proofs, all which may Eth.lib.1. be good in their kind. The Philofopher hath Metaph. long ago told us, that according to the divers lib.1.cap. Nature of things, fo muft the Evidences for them be; and that 'tis an argument of an undisciplin❜d Wit not to acknowledge this. He that is rational and judicious will expect no other kind of Arguments in any cafe than the fubject-matter will bear. How incongruous would it be for a Mathematician to perfuade with Eloquence, to ufe all imaginable Infinuations and Entreaties that he might prevail with his hearers to believe that three and three make fix? It would be altogether as vain and improper in matters belonging to an Orator Orator to pretend to ftrict Demonstration. All things are not capable of the same kind of Evidence. Though the Conclufions in Mathematicks, by reafon of the abstracted nature of those Sciences, may be demonftrated by the clearest and most unquestionable way of Probation to our reafon, yet it is not rational to expect the like proof, in such other matters as are not of the like Nature. This he himself applies to Moral things, which being not of fuch fimple abstracted Natures, but depending upon mixed circumstances, are not therefore capable of fuch kind of Demonstrative Proofs. 'Tis a Saying of Jam- Protrept. blicus, That Demonftrations are not to be exin Symbol. 25. pected in Matters concerning God and divine Things. Nor is this any greater prejudice to the certainty of fuch things, than it is that God is invifible. And thus likewise it is, for the fame reason, with many particular Conclufions in Natural Philofophy. And as for matters of Fact, concerning Times, Places, Perfons, Actions, which depend upon Story and the relation of others, these things are not capable of being proved by fuch fcientifical Principles as the others are. Now no fober Man can deny but that feveral things in Moral and in Natural Philofophy are in themselves,as abfolutely and as certainly true, and as firmly believ'd by us, as any Mathematical Principle or Conclufion can be. From whence I infer this, That it is not, ought not to be, any prejudice to the Truth or Certainty of any thing, that it is not to be made out by fuch kind of Proofs, of which the nature of that thing is not capable, provided it be capable of fatisfactory Proofs of another kind. 3. When a thing is capable of good proof in any kind, Men ought to rest fatisfy'd in the beft evidence for it, which that kind of things will bear, and beyond which better could not be expected fuppofing it were true. They ought not to expect either fenfible proof, or demonftration for fuch Matters as are not capable of fuch Proofs, fuppofing them to be true. Because otherwife nothing must be affented to and believed, but that which hath the highest Evidence: All other things being to be looked upon as uncertain and doubtful, and wholly excluded from all poflibility of being known. And at this rate, Men must believe nothing at all in Story, because fuch things cannot be demonstrated; and 'tis poffible that the rest of Mankind might have combined together to impose upon them by thefe Relations.. And how abhorrent fuch Sceptical Principles muft needs be to common Reason, I need not fay. Those who will pretend fuch kind of grounds for their disbelief of any thing, will never be able to perfuade others, that the true Cause why they do not give their Affent, is because they have no reason for it, but because they have no |