2. The Second Attribute belonging to the Divine Will, is his Justice. By which is meant not only the Rectitude of his Nature in general, but more fpecially his dealing with his Creatures according to the defert of their Deeds.

And that this Perfection is natural to the Notion of God, may appear,

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lib. 2.

1. By Teftimony. It is an Affertion of Plato, Theatetus. Θεὸς ἐδαμή ἐδαμῶς ἀδικὸς, ἀλλ ̓ ὡς οἷόν τε διKapal. "God cannot be faid in any καρτα 1. "kind or respect whatever to be unjust, "but fo far as is poffible to be moft juft. Tully lays it down as a Principle, that be- DeLegibus fore Men are fit to affociate under Government, they ought to be first convinc'd that God is the fupreme Governor of the World, and doth take particular notice, Qualis quif que fit, quid agat, quid in fe admittat, qua mente, quâ pietate religiones colat, piorumque & impiorum habere rationem; "What kind "of Perfon every one is, what he doth, and "what he thinks, how his Heart ftands in"clin'd to the Duties of Religion, and will "deal with every one according to his Reality or Hypocrify in all fuch Matters.

And that this was the general Belief a mongst them, may appear by the universal Custom of attefting him by Solemn Oaths; whereby they did appeal to him as a Righte ous Judge, who would certainly revenge all Falfhood and Injustice.

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2. From

2. From Reafon. And that not so much because Justice is a Perfection, as because Injuftice is fo great a Blemish and Imperfection; especially in the Great Sovereign and Judge of the World, who having all Power and Authority in his Hands, can have no Temptation or Byafs imaginable to do any thing that is unjust.

3. His Truth and Faithfulness. By which is meant, the congruity of his Words to his Intentions, efpecially in refpect of any Promifes which he hath made.

And that this doth belong to the Natural Notion of God, may be made evident, De Repub. I. From Teftimony. Plato afferts, all kind

lib. 1.

of Lying and Falfhood to be Imperfections, "moft odious both to God and Man, and "that the Divine Nature is abfolutely free " from all kind of Temptation to it; fo that "there can be no imaginable Reason why "God fhould falfify.

Porphyry, in the Life of Pythagoras, tells us, that it was one of his Precepts μária. dealer, That Men fhould most of all endeavour after Truth, because this only can make them like God. And he adds afterwards, That Truth is fo great a Perfection, that if God would render himself vifible to Men,, he would chufe Light for his Body, and Truth for his Soul.

2. From

2. From Reason, It is one of the greatest Reproaches, and an Argument of Baseness amongst Men, to be counted a Liar: And therefore must it neceffarily be removed from that Being which is supposed to have all poffible Perfections, and to be the Father of Truth,

as the Devil is of Lies.

That which tempts Men to falfify, is usually either the fear of fome Evil, or the hope of fome Advantage, The Reason why they break their Words, is either because of their rashness and inconfiderateness in making Promises, or their forgetfulness in not minding them, or their Inconftancy in not keeping to them, or their Impotence to perform them. But now the Divine Nature being infinitely wife, and all-fufficient, can have no Temptation to be otherwise than true and faithful. His infinite Knowledge and Wifdom doth fecure him from being deceived himself; his Omnipotence doth exempt him from standing in need of deceiving others; and his Goodness secures us from the leaft fufpicion of any inclination thereto.

CHAP.

CHA P. XI.

Of the Perfections belonging to the Pow ers and Faculties of Acting, viz. Power, Dominion, Diftribution of Future Rewards and Punishments.

TH

Hofe Perfections which are effential to the Notion of God, with refpect to his Faculties of working, are likewife threefold:

1. His Power or Omnipotence.

2. His Dominion or Right to govern us in this Life.

3. His Diftributing of Future Rewards and Punishments after this Life.

1. By the Power or Omnipotence of God is meant, an Ability of doing all fuch things, the doing of which may argue Perfection,and which do not imply a Contradiction, either in the things themselves, or to the Nature and Perfection of the Doer. Some things are repugnant to the Perfection of God, either Naturally, as that he should be fick, or die; or elfe Morally, as that he should lie, or deceive: Both which imply Imperfection. And fome other Things may imply Contradiction,

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either

either directly, or by plain confequence. And of fuch Matters it is not fo proper to say, that he cannot do them, as that they cannot be done. As the Object of the Understanding, the Eye, and the Ear, is that which is intelligible, vifible, audible: So the Object of Power must be that which is Poffible. And as it is no prejudice to the most perfect Understanding, or Sight, or Hearing, that it doth not understand what is not intelligible, or fee what is not visible, or hear what is not audible; fo neither is it to the most perfect Power, that it doth not do what is not poffible. Every kind of Faculty being neceffarily determined to its own proper Object.

But as for all poffible Things, it is natural and neceffary to apprehend of God, that he can do whatsoever any other fingle thing, or a Combination of all other things put together, can perform, and infinitely more; and that without any kind of Labour or Difficulty: So that his Power must be infinite, extenfively, with refpect to all Objects; and intenfively, with respect to the Acts of it, together with the Manner and Degrees of them.

That this kind of Omnipotence doth belong to the natural Notion of God, may appear,

1. By Teftimony. It is a frequent Tithe given unto God by the Grecian Philo

fophers,