LETTER IV.

SIR,

T is not without fome confiderable degree of re

IT

luctance that I enter upon your third letter, because it is on a subject on which I entertain but flender hopes that we can ever agree; and ftrongly difinclined, as I am, to dispute with a refpectable man, I cannot help wishing it had not been introduced. Indeed I fee no good purpose that can be answered by any difcuffion of a subject, on which no complete fatisfaction can be gained; because no data have been vouchfafed to man, by which his judgment on it can decidedly be determined. Hence it is that good men on both fides have formed, and will continue to form upon this fubject, according to the light in which they have been accustomed to fee it, very different opinions. The only rule that I know of, by which Christian conduct should be governed under fuch circumstances, must be a rule fimilar to that laid down

by the Apostle for the direction of his disciples upon another occafion. "Let not him that eateth despise

him that eateth not; and let not him that eateth not judge him that eateth." Let a mutual toleration of opinion take place among Christians upon this controverted fubject; and let them not think the worfe of each other's fpiritual condition, because they do not perfectly agree upon it; and all will be well. In fuch cafe, the Calvinist and Anti-Calvinift may meet together in the fame communion; confident, that whilst the bond of charity remains unbroken between them, and they continue in the fame Chriftian fellowship, GOD will receive them both.

The answer which our SAVIOUR made to the queftion, "LORD, are there few that be faved?" is applicable to the present fubject; because it is calculated to check impertinent curiofity, and to direct the attention of man in the great work of his falvation to its proper object. "Strive to enter in at the ftrait gate; for many shall seek to enter in, and shall not be able."

The fecret things are to be left to that Being to whom they belong: they refpect God's government of the world, not man's government of himself; they are, confequently, not proper fubjects. for human

fpeculation, Of the former we can know no more than what has been revealed, and that has been too little to qualify us to pronounce a decided judgment upon the future condition of any; with respect to the latter, we know enough, from the precepts and promises contained in the Gospel, to direct the conduct and establish the faith of every pious Christian.

With these, therefore, the attention of the Chriftian may be fafely engroffed; because, without any unprofitable diverfion of the human mind, they lead to a certain event; for the fecret will of GoD doubt. lefs correfponds with that which has been revealed, and Divine decrees and Divine promifes will ultimately be found in perfect harmony with each other. Now whatever imperfect ideas we may form, (and imperfect they must be, while "we fee through a glass darkly") of the Divine decrees, we must still obferve, that all promises suppose the parties to whom they are made poffeffed of a certain degree of freedom; otherwise promises of pardon and favour upon cer tain implied conditions would not be fo much acts of grace as acts of mockery. The reconciliation of these two apparently difcordant fubjects may be left to that Divine Power, whofe office it will be to judge the world in righteoufnefs; whilft man must be governed,

not by thofe indiftin&t intimations of the Divine will upon which fufficient light has not been vouchfafed to qualify him to form a judgment, but by those pofitive declarations of it which have been clearly revealed. For it is easy to be conceived, that a thing may be according to the will of GOD in two fenfes; either as He permits it, or as He chooses it fhould be done; in the former sense, it may be understood of that fecret will which accompanies, in certain cafes, the dispositions of Divine Providence in the world; in the latter, of that revealed will which was defigned to be a standard for the regulation of human conduct.

Such has been the idea which I have always entertained, confidering the Divine decrees to be a mysterious fubject, with which man has nothing to do. At the fame time I pronounce no cenfure upon those who venture to speak more decidedly than I can think myself authorised to speak, being contented to contemplate in reverential filence a subject which I profess myself incompetent to explain.

The principle by which ST. AUGUSTINE was go verned, in the original establishment of the doctrine Divine decrees, and by which doubtlefs many pious perfons are still governed in the fupport of it, every Christian must respect, because it originated in a lau

dable zeal of oppofition to a great and notorious error. It has however, I believe, been generally thought, that AUGUSTINE, with the view of maintaining the univerfality of the Divine agency against the supposed independent will of the creature, took the texts of scripture on which the doctrine of predestination has been founded, in a sense different from that in which, in conformity with the context, they ought to be taken. Certain it is, that neither ST. AUGUSTINE, nor the other principal patrons of this doctrine, have maintained an uniform confiftency upon it: a circumstance, which will have weight with all confiderate perfons, and prevent them from speaking with too great confidence upon a fubject, which has never yet been placed upon ground fo firm as not to be shaken.

In fact, Sir, the points which constitute the fubject of your third letter, have been disputed in the church from the days of ST. AUGUSTINE down to the present time; and will continue to be so, whilst men are less intent in forming correct notions in divinity from the general tenour of revelation, than in accommodating particular parts of it to their own pre-conceived opinions.