1821. Farmers and Bank of V. Smith. Legislature of the said Commonwealth, passed on the 13th of March, 1812, entitled, "An act for the Mechanics' relief of insolvent debtors residing in the city and Pennsylvania county of Philadelphia," did, on the said 8th day of September, 1812, at the city of Philadelphia aforesaid, present his petition to Charles Jared Ingersoll, &c. the Commissioners appointed under and by virtue of said act, &c. ; in which petition, he, the said petitioner, did state his belief, that he was insolvent, and did pray that he might be permitted to assign all his estate and property for the benefit of his creditors, and be discharged by virtue of said act. Whereupon the said Commissioners did appoint Mathew Randall, &c. to be curators, to whom the defendant did thereupon forthwith assign all his estate, real and personal, in conformity with the provisions of the said act. And the said Commissioners did then and there appoint the second day of October, 1812, aforesaid, for the hearing the defendant and his creditors, of which due notice was given according to the provisions of the act aforesaid. Upon which day, &c. the said petitioner did exhibit a true account and list of all his creditors, and moneys due, and to become due, and owing to them respectively by him; and, also, an inventory and account of his estate, real and personal, and of all interest of him, the said petitioner, either present or contingent, in any thing of value, and of all books, vouchers, and securities relating to the same. And thereupon the said Charles Jared Ingersoll, one of the said Commissioners, did administer to him, the said petitioner, the oath required by the said law, which was duly 1821. Farmers and Bank of V. Smith. taken by him, the said petitioner, according to the requisition of the said law. And, afterwards, &c. the said Commissioners did assign to Chandler Mechanics' Price, &c., who were duly nominated and appointed Pennsylvania assignees, all the estate, real and personal, of him the said petitioner, or which was of him the said petitioner, at the time of the provisional assignment so as aforesaid made to the curators aforesaid. And the said Commissioners did appoint the 15th day of October, then next, for a second examination of him the said petitioner. Upon which second examination, it appearing to the satisfaction of the said Commissioners, that the said petitioner had not concealed any part of his property, &c., and he, the said petitioner, having also, in all other things, conformed to the provisions of the said act, the said Commissioners did, then and there, give to him, the said petitioner, a certificate, under their hands and seals, that he, the said petitioner, had, in all things, conformed to, and was discharged by, said act. The plea also averred, that the cause of action arose in the city and county of Philadelphia, from contracts made within the same, and that the plaintiffs and defendants were, at the time the said contracts were made, and at the time the causes of action accrued, and at the time the said act passed, citizens of the State of Pennsylvania, and still continued to be citizens thereof. To this plea there was a demurrer; and judgment being rendered thereon for the defendant, the cause was brought by writ of error to this Court. 1821. This cause was argued by Mr. Hopkinson, for the Farmers and plaintiffs, and by Mr. Sergeant, for the defendant. Mechanics' Bank of Pennsylvania V. Smith. Mr. Chief Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court, that this case was not distinFebruary 12th. guishable from its former decisions on the same subject, except by the circumstances, that the defendant, in the present case, was a citizen of the same State with the plaintiffs, at the time the contract was made in that State, and remained such at the time the suit was commenced in its Courts. But that these facts made no difference in the cases. The constitution of the United States was made for the whole people of the Union, and is equally binding upon all the Courts and all the citizens. Judgment reversed. JUDGMENT. This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record of the Supreme Court for the Eastern District of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, the Court is of opinion, that the said Supreme Court for the Eastern District of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, erred in giving judgment for the defendant, on the demurrer of the plaintiffs to the plea of the said defendant. It is, therefore, adjudged and ordered, that the judgment of the said Supreme Court for the Eastern District of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania be, and a Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. Rep. 122. M'Millan M'Neill, id. 209. the same is hereby reversed and annulled. And it is farther ordered, that the said cause be remanded to the said Supreme Court for the Eastern District of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, with directions to enter judgment for the plaintiffs in the said Court. 1821. U. States V. Wilkins. (COMMON LAW. CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE.) UNITED STATES V. WILKINS. Where, in a contract with the Secretary of War, for supplying the troops of the United States with provisions, specific prices are stipulated for rations issued at certain places mentioned in the contract; and it is further provided, that "should any rations be required at any places not specified in this contract, the price of the same shall be hereafter agreed on betwixt the public and the contractor;" if the parties cannot agree upon the price for the rations thus required, a reasonable compensation is to be allowed, and is to be proved by competent evidence, and settled by a jury; and the contractor, upon the trial, is at liberty to show, that the sum allowed by the Secretary of War is not a reasonable compensation. Under the 3d and 4th sections of the act of the 3d of March, 1797, c. 74. the defendant is entitled, at the trial, to the full benefit of any credit in his favour, whether arising out of the particular transaction for which he was sued, or out of distinct and independent transactions, which would constitute a legal or equitable set-off, in whole or in part, of the debt sued for by the United States. THIS was an action of debt brought in the District Court of Kentucky against the defendant, a former contractor for supplying the troops of the United 1821. U. States V. Wilkins. States with provisions. The defendant pleaded nil debet. The attorney of the United States, to support the issue on the part of the United States, produced a certain account marked A. The counsel for the defendant, to support the issue on his part, produced the contract marked B.; also, a paper marked C., and an account for contingent claims, marked D. By the contract entered into between the defendant and the Secretary of War, on the 3d of July, 1801, it was, among other things, agreed, that the contractor should receive "for every complete ration issued at the Chickasaw Bluffs, at Nashville, at Bear Creek, on the Tennessee, or at any other place on the road between Nashville and Bear Creek, fourteen cents ;" and "for every complete ration issued at any place in the Chickasaw or Chocktaw country, on the road between Bear Creek and Natchez, eighteen cents and one half cent;" and that, "should any rations be required at any places, or within any other Districts not specified in this contract, the price of the same shall be hereafter agreed on betwixt the public and the contractor." It appeared from the evidence, that at the time the contract was entered into, the road from Nashville to Natchez crossed the Tennessee river at the mouth of Bear Creek, which empties into the Tennessee river on the southwest side. That after the date of the contract, a new road from Nashville to Natchez, passing through the Chickasaw and Chocktaw country, was cut out by the United States' troops, which crossed the Tennessee river about twelve or fourteen miles above the mouth of Bear Creek, and |