THIS cause was argued by Mr. Lee and Mr. Swann, for the plaintiff in error, and by Mr. Taylor, for the defendant in error. Mr. Chief Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. This is a writ of error to a judgment rendered by the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia, sitting in Alexandria, in an action of debt; and the case depends on the laws of Virginia, as they stood when jurisdiction over the District was first exercised by Congress. By the law of Virginia, the proceedings, until an issue is made up in a cause, are taken in the clerk's office at monthly rules, and judgments by default become final on the last day of the succeeding term, till which day the defendant in any such action has a legal right to set the judgment aside, and to plead to issue. The Circuit Court held its regular session in April, 1818, and continued to sit regularly till the 16th day of May, when it adjourned to the fourth Monday of the following June. The clerk, considering the day on which the Court adjourned as the last day of the term, and the judgments at the rules as having, on that day, become final, issued an execution on one of these judgments, which had been obtained by the plaintiffs against Cave Withers and his common bail. When the Court met in June, the defendant appeared, and, on motion, was allowed to set aside the office judgment, give special bail, and plead to issue. The execution was, consequently, quashed, In the course of the term judg 1821. Mechanics' Withers. February 9th. 1821. Mechanics' Bank of Alexandria V. Withers. ment was confessed by the defendant, for the sum claimed in the declaration, and a writ of error was then sued out, the object of which was to reverse the last judgment, and set aside all proceedings subsequent to the 16th of May, on the idea, that the judgment rendered at the rules became final on that day. The sole question in the cause is, whether the adjournment from the 16th of May to the fourth Monday in June, was a continuation of the April term, or constituted a distinct term? There being nothing in any act of Congress which prevents the Courts of the District from exercising a power common to all Courts, that of adjourning to a distant day; the adjournment on the 16th of May to the fourth Monday in June, would be a continuance of the same term, unless a special act of Congress, expressly enabling the Courts of the District to hold adjourned sessions, may be supposed to vary the law of the case. That act is in these words: "And the said Courts are hereby invested with the same power of holding adjourned sessions that are exercised by the Courts of Maryland." These words do not, in themselves, purport to vary the character of the session. They do not make the adjourned session a distinct session. They were, probably, inserted from abundant caution, and are to be ascribed to an apprehension, that Courts did not possess the power to adjourn to a distant day, until they should be enabled so to do by a legislative act. But this act, affirming a pre-existing power, ought not to be construed to vary the nature of that power, unless words are employed which manifest such intention. In this act, there are no such words, unless they are found in the reference to the Courts of Maryland. But on inquiry, we find, that in Maryland, an "adjourned session" is considered as the same session with that at which the adjournment was made. Since, then, the term at which this conditional or office judgment was to become final, was still continuing when it was set aside, and the defendant permitted to plead to the declaration, there was no error in that proceeding. Judgment affirmed. 1821. Hopkins V. Lee. (CHANCERY. COMMON LAW.) HOPKINS V. LEE. A judgment or decree of a Court of competent jurisdiction is conclu- In an action at law by the vendee, against the vendor, for a breach of This rule applies to the sale of real, as well as personal property: but, Quære, Whether it is the proper measure of damages in the case of an action for eviction? ERROR to the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia. This was an action of covenant, brought by the de 1821. Hopkins V. Lee. fendant in error, (Lee,) against the plaintiff in error, (Hopkins,) to recover damages for not conveying certain tracts of military lands, which the plaintiff in error had agreed to convey, upon the defendant in error relieving a certain incumbrance held by one Rawleigh Colston, upon an estate called Hill and Dale, and which Lee had previously granted and sold to Hopkins, and for which the military lands in question were to be received in part payment. The declaration set forth the covenant, and averred that Lee had completely removed the incumbrance, from Hill and Dale. The defendant below pleaded, 1. That he had not completely removed the incumbrance; and, 2. That he (the defendant below) had never been required by Lee to convey the military lands to him and on these pleas issues were joined. Upon the trial, Lee, in order to prove the incumbrance in question was removed, offered in evidence to the jury a record of the proceeding in Chancery, on a bill filed against him in the Circuit Court by Hopkins. The bill stated, that on the 23d of January, 1807, the date of the agreement on which the present action at law was brought, Hopkins purchased of Lee, the estate of Hill and Dale, for which he agreed to pay 18,000 dollars: viz. 10,000 dollars in military lands, at settled prices, and to give his bond for the residue, payable in April, 1809. That Lee, in pursuance of this agreement, selected certain military lands in the bill mentioned. That at the time of the purchase of Hill and Dale, it was mortgaged to Colston for a large sum, which Lee had promised to discharge, but had failed so to do, in consequence of which Hopkins had paid off the mortgage himself. The bill then claimed a large sum of money from Lee for having removed this incumbrance, and prayed that the defendant might be decreed to pay it, or in default thereof, that the claimant might be authorized by a decree of Chancery to sell the military lands, which he considered as a pledge remaining in his hands, and out of the proceeds thereof, to pay himself. On the coming in of Lee's answer, denying several of the allegations of the bill, the cause was referred to a master, who made a report, stating a balance of 427 dollars 77 cents, due from Hopkins to Lee. This report was not excepted to, and the Court, after referring to it, proceeded to decree the payment of the balance. To this testimony the defendant in the present action objected, so far as respected the reading of the master's report, and the decretal order thereon; but the objection was overruled by the Court below, and the evidence admitted. The counsel for the plaintiff in error then prayed the Court to instruct the jury, that in the assessment of damages, they should take the price of the military lands as agreed upon by the parties in the articles of agreement upon which the action was brought, as the measure of damages for the breach of covenant. But the Court refused to give this instruction, and directed the jury to take the price of the lands, at the time they ought to have been conveyed, as the measure of damages. To this instruction the plaintiff in error excepted; and a verdict and judgment thereon being rendered for the plaintiff below, the cause was brought by writ of error to this Court. 1821. Hopkins V. Lee. |