enmity against God, to ascertain his meaning, must be an object worth inquiry. That men have a dislike to all restraints, whether civil or divine, which they habitually disregard, will hardly be doubted. They, who habitually refuse compliance with the laws of God, must dislike those laws. Though their reason may, their hearts do not approve them. But these laws are an expression of the character of God. If, therefore, they dislike the one, it is im. possible, that they should not dislike the other. It is certain then, that those who do not live after the spirit, dislike the divine moral character. That they are not subject, i. e. not obedient to the divine law, is beyond dispute.

Suppose further, that persons, thus disliking their Maker, as a moral being, should reflect that his law will be execut ed, and the punishment which it threatens, will be inflicted, would it not follow, as a natural consequence, that their feelings of dislike would be increased? Were they not restrained by fear, and had they nothing further to hope from the Almighty, would not their dislike thus increased to violent enmity, be expressed by words? A disloyal subject under an earthly monarchy, while persevering in sedition or disobedience, thereby exposing himself to punishment, would, as a matter of course, not only dislike the government, but desire a revolution; which revolution he would effect, were power sufficient lodged in his hands. While convinced of of the impracticability of such an enterprise, he may never express such a wish, nor perceive it distinctly formed in his mind. Now, if disobedience has the same expression in regard to the divine government, which it doubless has in relation to civil government, it follows, that the wicked man's dislike of the law, and consequently of the character of God, would, under certain circumstances, lead to measures, most strikingly impious.

That we may understand still more distinctly the apostle's assertion, that the carnal mind is enmity against God, let it be considered, under what circumstances, one man becomes the enemy of another. These are an opposition of charac

ter and interest. If there is a man, whom I know to be of such a character, as to view mine with unvarying displeasure or abhorrence, and who is preparing to inflict heavy sufferings in proof of such displeasure, my feelings towards that person are not those of friendship, but hostility. Now the wicked, if they view the subject justly, know that Deity is of such character, as to contemplate theirs with displeas ure; and that he is preparing to inflict heavy sufferings in proof of this displeasure. Must there not be the same inference in this case, as in the other?

But wicked men, you reply, are not conscious of possessing a mind, hostile to their Maker. The remark is true: but admission of its truth imposes no necessity of relinquishing the doctrine in question. Suppose the best created be. ing in the Universe were in company with the worst: while each was ignorant of the other's character, there would be no actual hostility. Were two persons, between whom there had been a settled enmity, brought together, under circumstances, which prevented each from knowing the other, no unfriendly feelings would be excited. Yet they are in truth enemies. In like manner, if sinners mistake the attributes and requirements of God, fancying, that no great difference exists between his character and theirs, it is easy to perceive, why they are not conscious of any hostility. Although they should, in words, acknowledge the extent of his de. mands, yet if they never make these the subject of deliberate reflection, or if they suppose, that he, who makes these demands, will, in some way or other, dispense with them, feelings of enmity are not likely to be perceived.

In using the term enmity against God, in application to the human heart, we mean nothing more, than that state of feeling, which necessarily results to a corrupt being, from contemplating the divine rectitude, in connexion with a full persuasion of his own exposure to punishment, in consequence of his opposition to this rectitude. There can be no particular excellence in any sound, or combination of letters. Extreme attachment to this, or to any other term, is not to

be justified. As the object of language is to convey ideas, whenever a term is found to be often misunderstood; to convey more or less than the speaker designs, it ought to be fully explained, or disused. But no person, I am persuaded, who believes, that the hearts of wicked men are destitute of any affection to virtue or holiness, will condemn the term enmity, as in itself improper.

I shall now in the 2nd place notice some objections to the doctrine in general, additional to those, already mentioned. I. It is said, if sinning is natural, man cannot be blame worthy.

You will recollect what was said in the last lecture; viz. "That may be considered, as natural to man, which, without any divine influence, he generally or universally pursues." The question then is, whether a man ceases to be blame worthy, because, without divine influence on the heart, he generally or universally pursues a course of disobedience. Let this question be considered, 1st, on the ground. of necessity, 2nd, on the ground of freedom. They, who believe in the doctrine of necessity, whether on the principle of Mr. Edwards or Dr. Priestly, can with no consistency, urge this objection. They suppose, that all actions through the Universe, are necessary. Yet they believe, that there are such qualities, as virtue and vice. Now, if necessi ty does not exculpate him, who in a moral point of view proceeds obliquely part of the time, it will not exculpate those, who never proceed in a right direction. Once admit the doctrine of necessity, and so far as the present objection; so far as human accountability is concerned, it matters not whether wrong conduct be occasional or perpetual.

Let us now contemplate the objection or supposition of human liberty. It is evident, that men do sin part of the time. This, it is conceded, is not inconsistent with freedom; and the transgressor is justly punished. That some individuals sin with great frequency, will not be denied. Do they for this reason, cease to be blame worthy? Let us proceed a little further, and suppose, that a few abandoned

persons pursue uniformly that course, which the individuals last mentioned, pursue occasionally. Do they cease to be criminal? If men, without constraint, and in opposition to reason and interest, choose to do wrong part of the time, they may uniformly make the same choice. If a disposition to moral evil, or, if you please, a disposition, criminally defective, occasionally existing, does not prove a necessitating impulse; neither would the same disposition, were it con

stant.

II. It may be further objected, that the doctrine before us appears to attribute moral evil to those, who are incapa

ble of moral action.

Whether such representations of the doctrine are ever made, as are fairly liable to this objection, I do not undertake to determine. It is sufficient, if it does not lie against the doctrine, as it has, in these lectures, been defined. At what time, moral agency commences, in human creatures, it would be extremely difficult to determine. Previously to the existence of moral agency, no guilt can be contracted. It is doubtless absurd to predicate virtue or vice of a creature, incapable of both. Nor would it be less absurd to speak of reward or retribution, or moral goodness, in reference to such a being. But if children at a very early period are not moral agents; if they are not capable of doing or feeling wrong: they are, it will be remembered, equally incapable of doing or feeling right, and therefore, as it should seem, perfectly unqualified to partake in a retribution. The doctrine, attempted to be proved, is this, and this only, that human creatures do not practise righteousness, or sincerely obey the divine law, without divine influence: a proposition, which has no necessary connexion with the period, at which moral agency commences.

If any of the human race are taken from the world, while destitute of qualities, which capacitate them for moral action, God will doubtless dispose of them agreeable to that wisdom and rectitude, which characterize his government.

It is, I suppose, scarcely necessary to say, that the doc

trine of depravity, as here stated, does not imply, that one being can be answerable for the sins of another. Whatever connexion there may be between the sin of any progenitor and the present moral state of the world, we are, without reasonable doubt, exclusively answerable for personal offences. The sin of another person can no more be my sin; than the palpitations of his heart can be the palpitations of mine. No appointment, constitution, or covenant can create identity between two beings, which are different: nor render it true, that a creature can have sinned before he existed. But,

III. It may well deserve inquiry, whether there is any eonnexion between the sin of our first parents and the present moral character of their descendants.

That our present condition is, in some respects, affected by the apostacy of Adam, is an opinion, almost uniformly received among the friends of revealed religion. That temporal death is the consequence of this defection, is equally conceded by those, whose opinions on many subjects widely differ. If this opinion be correct, that animal constitution, which now tends to decay and death, had not originally the same tendency. Considered merely as an animal, therefore, man is not the same, as was Adam before his transgression. Without any positive evidence on the subject, it would appear not improbable, that this change in the constitution of man would produce some effects on his moral character. The way is then prepared for inquiry, whether the scriptures afford any evidence, that this was in fact the

case.

In the fifth chapter of the epistle to the Romans, a comparison is instituted between Adam and Christ;-between the disadvantages, conveyed to mankind through the medium of the one, and the benefits received through the medium of the other. Now, the latter, i. e. the benefits received through Christ, are chiefly of a moral or spiritual nature. There would be no ground for a contrast, then, unless the detriment received from Adam, comprehended in it something moral or spiritual.