nuating and impressing them on the mind: the affections being thereby unlocked, the passage becomes open to the

reason.

But it is plainly a very preposterous method of instructing, of deciding controversies, of begetting peace, to vex and anger those concerned by ill language. Nothing surely doth more hinder the efficacy of dicourse, and prevent conviction, than doth this course, on many obvious accounts. It doth first put in a strong bar to attention: for no man willingly doth afford an ear to him whom he conceiveth disaffected toward him; which opinion harsh words infallibly will produce: no man can expect to hear truth from him, whom he apprehendeth disordered in his own mind, whom he seeth rude in his proceedings, whom he taketh to be unjust in his dealing; as men certainly will take those to be, who presume to revile others for using their own judgment freely, and dissenting from them in opinion. Again, this course doth blind the hearer's mind, so that he cannot discern what he that pretends to instruct him doth mean, or how he doth assert his doctrine. Truth will not be discerned through the smoke of wrathful expressions; right being defaced by foul language will not appear; passion being excited will not suffer a man to perceive the sense, or the force of an argument. The will also thereby is hardened and hindered from submitting to truth. In such a case, non persuadebis, etiamsi persuaseris: although you stop his mouth, you cannot subdue his heart; although he can no longer fight, yet he never will yield: animosity raised by such usage rendereth him invincibly obstinate in his conceits and courses. Briefly, from this proceeding men become unwilling to mark, unfit to apprehend, indisposed to embrace any good instruction or advice: it maketh them indocile and intractable, averse from better instruction, pertinacious in their opinions, and refractory in their

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ways.

Every man,' saith the wise man, giveth a right answer:' but no man

'shall kiss his lips that

surely will be ready to

kiss those lips which are embittered with reproach, or defiled with dirty language.

It is said of Pericles, that with thundering and lightning

he put Greece into confusion:* such discourse may serve to confound things, it seldom tendeth to compose them. If reason will not pierce, rage will scarce avail to drive it in. Satirical virulency may vex men sorely, but it hardly ever soundly converts them. 'Few become wiser or better by ill words.' Children may be frighted into compliance by loud and severe increpations; but men are to be allured by rational persuasion backed with courteous usage: they may be sweetly drawn, they cannot be violently driven to change their judgment and practice. Whence that advice of the Apostle, With meekness instruct those that oppose themselves,' doth no less savor of wisdom than of goodness.

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Fifthly, as for the examples of extraordinary persons, which in some cases do seem to authorise the practice of evil speaking, we may consider, that as they had especial commission enabling them to do some things beyond ordinary standing rules, wherein they are not to be imitated; as they had espe ́cial illumination and direction, which preserved them from swerving in particular cases from truth and equity; so the tenor of their life did.evidence, that it was the glory of God, the good of men, the necessity of the case, which moved them to it. And of them also we may observe, that in divers occasions, yea generally, whenever only their private credit or interest were concerned, although grievously provoked, they did out of meekness, patience, and charity, wholly forbear reproachful speech. Our Saviour, who sometimes on special reason in his discourses used such harsh words, yet, when he was most spitefully accused, reproached and persecuted, did not open his mouth,' or return one angry word: ' Being re

* Βροντῶν καὶ ἀστράπτων ἐκύκα τὴν Ἑλλάδα.

+ Chrys. in 2 Tim. ii. 24. Ὁ γὰρ σφοδρὸς ἔλεγχος, ὅταν μετ' ἐπιεικείας γίνεται, οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ μάλιστα δακεῖν δυνάμενος· ἔνεστι γὰρ, ἔνεστι μετὰ πραός τητος καθάψασθαι μᾶλλον, ἢ μετὰ θρασύτητος ἐντρέψαι.

This case is like the other cases, wherein the practice of good and great men, although excusable, is not yet exemplary: as the heroical acts of David, of Sampson, of Ehud, of Phineas, of Elias, of Moses; David's duel, Sampson's suicide, Moses's slaying the Egyptian, Ehud's stabbing the king of Moab, Elias's calling for fire, by extraordinary and peculiar instinct.

viled, he did not,' as St. Peter, proposing his example to us, telleth us, 'revile again; suffering, he did not threaten.' He used the softest language to Judas, to the soldiers, to Pilate and Herod, to the priests, &c. And the Apostles, who sometimes inveigh so zealously against the opposers and perverters of truth, did in their private conversation and demeanor strictly observe their own rules of abstinence from reproach: Being reviled we bless, being persecuted we suffer it;' so doth St. Paul represent their practice. And in reason we should rather follow them in this their extraordinary sallies of practice.

In fine, however in some cases and circumstances the matter may admit such exceptions, so that all language disgraceful to our neighbor is not ever culpable; yet the cases are so few and rare in comparison, the practice commonly so dangerous and ticklish, that worthily forbearing to reproach doth bear the style of a general rule; and particularly, for clearer direction, we are in the following cases obliged carefully to shun it; or in speaking about our neighbor we must observe these

cautions.

1. We should never in severe terms inveigh against any man without reasonable warrant, or presuming on a good call and commission thereto. As every man should not assume to himself the power of administering justice, (of trying, sentencing, and punishing offenders,) so must not every man take on him to speak against those who seem to do ill; which is a sort of punishment, including the infliction of smart and damage on the persons concerned. Every man hath indeed a commission, in due place and season, with discretion and moderation to admonish his neighbor offending; but otherwise to speak ill of him, no private man hath just right or authority: and therefore in presuming to do it he is disorderly and irregular, trespassing beyond his bounds, usurping an undue power to himself.

2. We should never speak ill of any man without apparent just cause. It must be just: we must not reproach men for things innocent or indifferent; for not concurring in disputable opinions with us, for not complying with our humor, for not serving our interest, for not doing any thing to which they are not obliged, or for using their liberty in any case: it must be

at least some considerable fault, which we can so much as tax. It must also be clear and certain, notorious and palpable; for to speak ill on slender conjectures, or doubtful suspicions, is full of iniquity. Όσα οὐκ οἴδασι, βλασφημοῦσι, • they rail at things which they know not,' is part of those wicked men's character, whom St. Jude doth so severely reprehend. If indeed, these conditions being wanting, we presume to reproach any man, we do therein no less than slander him; which to do is unlawful in any case, is in truth a most diabolical and detestable crime. To impose odious names and characters on any person, which he deserveth not, or without ground of truth, is to play the devil; and hell itself scarce will own a fouler practice.

3. We should not cast reproach on any man without some necessary reason. In charity (that charity which covereth all sins,' which 'covereth a multitude of sins') we are bound to connive at the defects, and to conceal the faults of our brethren; to extenuate and excuse them, when apparent, so far as we may in truth and equity. We must not therefore ever produce them to light, or prosecute them with severity, except very needful occasion urgeth; such as is the glory and service of God, the maintenance of truth, the vindication of innocence, the preservation of public justice and peace, the amendment of our neighbor himself, or securing others from contagion. Barring such reasons, (really being, not affectedly pretended,) we are bound not so much as to disclose, as to touch our neighbor's faults; much more, not to blaze them about, not to exaggerate them by vehement invectives.

4. We should never speak ill of any man beyond measure : be the cause never so just, the occasion never so necessary, we should yet nowise be immoderate therein, exceeding the bounds prescribed by truth, equity, and humanity. We should never speak worse of any man whatever than he certainly deserveth, according to the most favorable construction of his doings; never more than the cause absolutely requireth. We should rather be careful to fall short of what in rigorous truth might be said against him, than in the least to pass beyond it. The best cause had better seem to suffer a little by our reservedness in its defence, than any man be wronged by our aspersing him;

for God, the patron of truth and right, is ever able to secure them without the succor of our unjust and uncharitable dealing. The contrary practice hath indeed within it a spice of slander, that is, of the worst iniquity.

5. We must never speak ill of any man out of bad principles, or for bad ends.

No sudden or rash anger should instigate us thereto, For, 'let all bitterness, and wrath, and anger, and clamor, and evilspeaking, be put away from you, with all malice,' is the apostolical precept: they are all associates and kindred, which are to be cast away together. Such anger itself is culpable, as a work of the flesh, and therefore to be suppressed; and all its brood therefore is also to be smothered: the daughter of such a mother cannot be legitimate: The wrath of man worketh not the righteousness of God.'

We must not speak ill out of inveterate hatred or ill-will. For this murderous, this viperous disposition should itself be rooted out of our hearts; whatever issueth from it cannot be otherwise than very bad; it must be a poisonous breath that exhaleth from that foul source.

We must not be provoked thereto by any revengeful disposition, or rancorous spleen, in regard to any injuries or discourtesies received. For, as we must not revenge ourselves, or render evil in any other way; so particularly not in this, which is commonly the special instance expressly prohibited. Render not evil for evil,' saith St. Peter, nor railing for railing ; but contrariwise bless,' or speak well: and, Bless them,' saith our Lord, which curse you :''Bless,' saith St. Paul, ' and curse not.'

We must not also do it out of contempt; for we are not to slight our brethren in our hearts. No man really (considering what he is, whence he came, how he is related, what he is capable of) can be despicable. Extreme naughtiness is indeed contemptible; but the unhappy person that is engaged therein is rather to be pitied than despised. However, charity bindeth us to stifle contemptuous motions of heart, and not to vent them in vilifying expression. Particularly, it is a barbarous practice out of contempt to reproach persons for natural imperfections, for meanness of condition, for unlucky disasters, for