he disparaged it in his words. For story represents him very careful and jealous of his credit, very diligent to preserve it and to repair it.* Tertullian calls such philosophers negotiatores famæ, merchants for fame: and it is perchance some part of their cunning in that trade, which makes them strive to beat down the price of this commodity, that they may more easily ingross it to themselves. However, experience proves that such words are but words, (words spoken out of affectation and pretence, rather than in good earnest and according to truth;) that endeavors to banish or to extirpate this desire are but fond and fruitless attempts. The reason why is clear: for it is as if one should dispute against eating and drinking, or should labor to free himself from hunger and thirst: the appetite of honor being indeed, as that of food, innate unto us, so as not to be quenched or smothered, except by some violent distemper or indisposition of mind; even by the wise Author of our nature originally implanted therein, for very good ends and uses, respecting both the private and public benefit of men; as an engagement to virtue, and a restraint from vice; as an excitement of industry, an incentive of courage, a support of constancy in the prosecution of worthy enterprises; as a serviceable instrument for the constitution, conservation, and improvement of human society. For did not some love of honor glow in men's breasts, were that noble spark quite extinct, few men probably would study for honorable qualities, or perform laudable deeds; there would be nothing to keep some men within bounds of modesty and decency, to deter them from doing odious and ugly things; men, not caring what others thought of them, would not regard what they did themselves; a barbarous sloth or brutish stupidity would overspread the world, withdrawing from common life most of its ornaments, much of its convenience; men generally would, if not altoge * Erat famæ suæ curiosissimus, et male loquentium dictis vel literis ve sermone respondebat.-Capit. + Tert. Apol. Ut quidam morbo aliquo et sensus stupore suavitatem cibi non sentiunt; sic libidinosi, avari, facinorosi veræ laudis gustum non habent.-Cic. Philipp. 2. ther shun society, yet at least decline the cares and burdens requisite to the promoting its welfare, for the sustaining which usually the chief encouragement, the main recompense, is this of honor. That men therefore have so tender and delicate a sense of their reputation, (so that touching it is like pricking a nerve, as soon felt, and as smartly offensive,) is an excellent provision in nature; in regard whereto honor may pass among the bona naturalia, as a good necessary for the satisfaction of nature, and for securing the accomplishment of its best designs. A moderate regard to honor is also commendable as an instance of humanity or good will to men, yea, as an argument of humility, or a sober conceit of ourselves.* For to desire another man's esteem, and consequently his love, (which in some kind or degree is an inseparable companion of esteem,) doth imply somewhat of reciprocal esteem and affection toward him; and to prize the judgment of other men concerning us, doth signify that we are not oversatisfied with our own. We might for its farther commendation allege the authority of the more cool and candid sort of philosophers, (such as grounded their judgment of things on notions agreeable to common sense and experience; who adapted their rules of practice to the nature of man, such as they found it in the world, not such as they framed it in their own fancies,) who have ranked honor among the principal of things desirable, and adorned it with fairest eulogies; terming it a divine thing, the best of exterior goods, the most honest fruit and most ample reward of true virtue; adjudging that to neglect the opinions of men (especially of persons worthy and laudable) is a sign of stupid baseness, that to contemn them is an effect of unreasonable haughtiness; representing the love of honor (rightly grounded and duly moderated) not only as the parent and guardian (as productive and preservative) of other virtues, but as a virtue itself of no small magnitude and lustre in the constellation of virtues, * Negligere quid de se quisque sentiat arrogantis est et dissoluti.-Cic. de Offic. i. the virtue of generosity. A virtue which, next to the spirit of true religion, (next to a hearty reverence toward the supreme blessed Goodness, and that holy charity toward men which springeth thence,) doth lift a man up nearest to heaven; doth raise his mind above the sordid desires, the sorry cares, the fond humors, the perverse and froward passions, with which men commonly are possessed and acted: that virtue which inflames a man with courage, so that he dares perform what reason and duty require of him, that he disdains to do what is bad or base; which inspires him with sincerity, that he values his honesty before all other interests and respects, that he abhors to wrong or deceive, to flatter or abuse any man, that he cannot endure to seem otherwise than he is, to speak otherwise than he means, to act otherwise than he promises and professes; which endows him with courtesy, that he is ready to yield every man his due respect, to afford any man what help and succor he is able: that virtue which renders a man upright in all his dealings, and correspondent to all his obligations; a loyal subject to his prince, and a true lover of his country, a candid judge of persons and things, an earnest favorer of whatever is good and commendable, a faithful and hearty friend, a beneficial and useful neighbor, a grateful resenter and requiter of courtesies, hospitable to the stranger, bountiful to the poor, kind and good to all the world that virtue, in fine, which constitutes a man of honor, who surely is the best man next to a man of conscience. Thus may honor be valued from natural light, and according to common sense.t * DeîÓV TI Å TIμŃ.—Plat. de Leg. iv. Καλὸν ταῖς πολλαῖς πόλεσι τὸ παρακέλευσμά ἐστι, προτιμᾷν εὐδοξίαν πρὸ τῶν TOλ.-Idem de Rep. xii. Μέγιστον τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν ἡ τιμή.—Arist. Εth. iv. 3. Levis est animi, justam gloriam, qui est fructus virtutis honestissimus, repudiare.-Cic. in Pis. Ex omnibus præmiis virtutis amplissimum est præmium gloria.-Idem pro Mil. + Trahimur omnes laudis studio, et optimus quisque maxime gloria ducitur.—Cic. pro Arch. Oi xaρlevτes Kal πрактIкоl, plausible and active men do, saith Aristotle, place happiness in honor.-Eth. i. 4. But beyond all this, the holy Scripture (that most certain standard, by which we may examine and determine the true worth of things) doth not teach us to slight honor, but rather in its fit order and just measure to love and prize it. It indeed instructs us to ground it well, not on bad qualities or wicked deeds, that is villainous madness; not on things of a mean and indifferent nature, that is vanity; not on counterfeit shows and pretences, that is hypocrisy; but on real worth and goodness, that may consist with modesty and sobriety: it enjoins us not to be immoderate in our desires thereof, or complacences therein, not to be irregular in the pursuit or acquist of it; (to be so is pride and ambition;) but to affect it calmly, to purchase it fairly it directs us not to make a regard thereto our chief principle, not to propound it as our main end of action: it charges us to bear contentedly the want or loss thereof, (as of other temporal goods ;) yea, in some cases, for conscience sake, or for God's service, (that is, for a good incomparably better than it,) it obliges us willingly to prostitute and sacrifice it, choosing rather to be infamous than impious, (to be in disgrace. with men rather than in disfavor with God:*) it, in fine, commands us to seek and embrace it only in subordination and with final reference to God's honor. Which distinctions and cautions being provided, honor is represented in holy Scripture as a thing considerably good, which may be regarded without blame, which sometimes in duty must be regarded. It is there preferred before other good things, in themselves not despicable. For, a good name is better than precious ointment;' yea, a good name is rather to be chosen than great riches,' saith the wise man. It is called a gift of God: for, 'there is a man,' saith the preacher, 'to whom God hath given riches and honor.' Yea, not only a simple gift, but a blessing, conferred in kindness, as a reward and encouragement of goodness: for, by humility and the fear of the Lord,' saith he again, are riches and honor.' Whence it is to be acknowleged as an especial benefit, and a fit ground of thanksgiving; as is * Non vis esse justus sine gloria? at mehercule sæpe justus esse debes cum infamia.-Sen. Epist. cxiii. 6 practised by the Psalmist in his royal hymn: honor,' saith he, ' and majesty hast thou laid on him.' Wisdom also is described unto us bearing in her left hand riches and honor:' and Wisdom surely will not take into any hand of hers, or hold therein, what is worth nothing. No: we are therefore moved to procure her, because, 'exalting her, she shall promote us. She shall give unto our head an ornament of grace, a crown of glory shall she deliver to us.' We are also enjoined to render honor as the best expression of good-will and gratitude toward them who best deserve in themselves, or most deserve of us; to our prince, to our parents, to our priests, especially to such of them as govern and teach well,' to all good men, ('have such in reputation,' says the Apostle.) And were not honor a good thing, such injunctions would be unreasonable. Yea, because we are obliged to bear good will toward all men, St. Peter bids us to honor all men.' From hence also, that we are especially bound to render honor unto God himself, we may well infer with Aristotle, that honor is the best thing in our power to offer.' To these considerations may be added, that we are commanded to walk evoxnuóvws, (decently, or speciously, which implies a regard to men's opinion;) to provide things honest in the sight of all men,' (rà Kaλà, that is, not only things good in substance, but goodly in appearance ;) to have our conversation honest before the Gentiles:' (kaλǹν again, that is, fair, or comely, and plausible, such as may commend us and our profession to the judgment of them who observe us.) St. Paul also exhorts us to mind, not only what things are true, are just, are pure ;' but also öoa σeμrà, (' whatever things are venerable,' or apt to beget respect,) öσa πрoopiλñ, (' whatever things are lovely,' or gracious in men's eyes and esteem,) öoa evonμa, ('whatever things are well reported, or well reputed of.") He requires us not only, if there be any virtue,' (any thing very good in itself,) but if there be any praise', (any thing much approved in common esteem,) that we should * mind such things.' Lastly, the blessed state hereafter (the highest instance of divine bounty, the complete reward of goodness) is represented and recommended to us as a state of honor and glory; to be ambitious whereof is the character of a good |