As

Especially this scurrilous and scoffing way is then most detestable, when it not only exposes the blemishes and infirmities of men, but abuses piety and virtue themselves: which practice tends in the highest degree to the disparagement and discouragement of goodness; growing proportionally more criminal as it presumes to attack persons eminent in dignity or worth. In fine, no jesting is allowable which is not thoroughly innocent; and it is strange that any men should from so mean and silly a practice as that of foolish jesting expect commendation, or that others should bestow it. Neither is it an argument of considerable ability in him that happens to please by this way: a slender faculty will serve the turn, &c. 3. Consideration of facetiousness in obscene matters may well be omitted. Such things, as St. Paul says, are not so much as to be named among Christians. 4. All unseasonable jesting is blameable. there are proper seasons of relaxation, so there are some times and circumstances of things when it becomes us to be serious in mind, grave in demeanor, and plain in discourse; as in the presence of superiors, and especially in the performance of sacred offices. In deliberations and debates about affairs of great importance, the simple is the proper manner of speaking, since facetious speech there serves only to obstruct business, lose time, and protract the result. It is improper. to be facetious with those who are in a sad or afflicted condition; also with those who desire to be serious, and like not the humor. 5. To affect, admire, or highly value this way of speaking, and thence to be drawn into an immoderate use of it, is blameable. The proper object of man, the grand drift of human life, is to follow reason, that noble spark kindled in us from heaven; not to sooth fancy, that shallow and giddy power, which is able to perform nothing worthy of much regard. In particular, to do so is unworthy of a Christian, who is advanced to so high a rank and to such glorious relations: this point enlarged on. 6. Vain-glorious ostentation in this way is very blameable.

All

ambition and all vanity, on whatever ground they may be founded, are unreasonable and silly but yet when founded on some real ability, or some useful skill, are wise and manly in comparison with this, which stands on a foundation manifestly slight and weak. 7. In the last place, it is our duty never so far to engage ourselves in this way as thereby to lose or impair that habitual seriousness, modesty, and sobriety of mind, which become Christians, who should always keep their souls intent on their high calling and grand interests. Concluding exhortations.

SERMON XIV.

AGAINST FOOLISH TALKING AND JESTING.

EPHESIANS, CHAP. V.-VERSE 4.

-Nor foolish talking, nor jesting, which are not convenient.

MORAL and political aphorisms are seldom couched in such terms, that they should be taken as they sound precisely, or according to the widest extent of signification; but do commonly need exposition, and admit exception: otherwise frequently they would not only clash with reason and experience, but interfere, thwart, and supplant one another. The best masters of such wisdom are wont to interdict things, apt by unseasonable or excessive use to be perverted, in general forms of speech, leaving the restrictions, which the case may require or bear, to be made by the hearer's or interpreter's discretion: whence many seemingly formal prohibitions are to be received only as sober cautions. This observation may be particularly supposed applicable to this precept of St. Paul, which seemeth universally to forbid a practice commended (in some cases and degrees) by philosophers as virtuous, not disallowed by reason, commonly affected by men, often used by wise and good persons; from which consequently if our religion did wholly debar us, it would seem chargeable with somewhat too uncouth austerity and sourness: from imputations of which kind as in its temper and frame it is really most free, (it never quenching natural light, or cancelling the dictates of sound reason, but confirming and improving them;) so it carefully declineth them, enjoining us, that if there be any things' poopiй,

('lovely,' or grateful to men,) any things' evpnμa, (' of good report' and repute,) if there be any virtue and any praise,' (any thing in the common apprehensions of men held worthy and laudable,) we should mind those things,' that is, should yield them a regard answerable to the esteem they carry among rational and sober persons.

Whence it may seem requisite so to interpret and determine St. Paul's meaning here concerning evrρareλía, (that is, facetious speech or raillery, by our translators rendered 'jesting,') that he may consist wth himself, and be reconciled to Aristotle, who placeth this practice in the rank of virtues; or that religion and reason may well accord in the case; supposing that, if there be any kind of facetiousness innocent and reasonable, conformable to good manners, (regulated by common sense, and consistent with the tenor of Christian duty, that is, not transgressing the bounds of piety, charity, and sobriety,) St. Paul did not intend to discountenance or prohibit that kind.

For thus expounding and limiting his intent, we have some warrant from himself, some fair intimations in the words here. For, first, what sort of facetious speech he aimeth at, he doth imply by the fellow he coupleth therewith; μwpoλoyía, saith he, evтpañeλía, foolish talking,' or 'facetiousness:' such facetiousness therefore he toucheth as doth include folly, in the matter or manner thereof. Then he farther determineth it, by adjoining a peculiar quality thereof, unprofitableness or impertinency; rà μǹ åvýkovτa, which are not pertinent,' or conducible to any good purpose: whence may be collected, that it is a frivolous and idle sort of facetiousness which he condemneth.

But, however, manifest it is that some kind thereof he doth earnestly forbid: whence, in order to the guidance of our practice, it is needful to distinguish the kinds, severing that which is allowable from that which is unlawful; that so we may be satisfied in the case, and not on the one hand ignorantly transgress our duty, nor on the other trouble ourselves with scruples, others with censures, on the use of warrantable liberty therein.

And such a resolution seemeth indeed especially needful in this our age, (this pleasant and jocular age,) which is so infi

nitely addicted to this sort of speaking, that it scarce doth affect or prize any thing near so much; all reputation appearing now to veil and stoop to that of being a wit: to be learned, to be wise, to be good, are nothing in comparison thereto; even to be noble and rich are inferior things, and afford no such glory. Many at least, to purchase this glory, to be deemed considerable in this faculty, and enrolled among the wits, do not only make shipwreck of conscience,' abandon virtue, and forfeit all pretences to wisdom; but neglect their estates, and prostitute their honor: so to the private damage of many particular persons, and with no small prejudice to the public, are our times possessed and transported with this humor, To repress the excess and extravagance whereof, nothing in way of discourse can serve better than a plain declaration when and how such a practice is allowable or tolerable; when it is wicked and vain, unworthy of a man endued with reason, and pretending to honesty or honor.

This I shall in some measure endeavor to perform.

But, first, it may be demanded what the thing we speak of is, or what this facetiousness doth import? To which question I might reply as Democritus did to him that asked the definition of a man, 'It is that which we all see and know' any one better apprehends what it is by acquaintance, than I can inform him by description. It is indeed a thing so versatile and multiform, appearing in so many shapes, so many postures, so many garbs, so variously apprehended by several eyes and judgments, that it seemeth no less hard to settle a clear and certain notion thereof, than to make a portrait of Proteus, or to define the figure of the fleeting air. Sometimes it lieth in pat allusion to a known story, or in seasonable application of a trivial saying, or in forging an apposite tale: sometimes it playeth in words and phrases, taking advantage from the ambiguity of their sense, or the affinity of their sound: sometimes it is wrapped in a dress of humorous expression: sometimes it lurketh under an odd similitude: sometimes it is lodged in a sly question, in a smart answer, in a quirkish reason, in a shrewd intimation, in cunningly diverting, or cleverly retorting an objection: sometimes it is couched in a bold scheme of