...respecting the nature of personality — If, therefore, we speak of the mind as a series of feelings, we are obliged to complete the statement by calling...accepting the paradox, that something which ex hypothesi H but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series. If we may trust the passage quoted...

...Mill, with his usual candour, states the case thus — " We are reduced (by the phenomena of memory) to the alternative of believing that the Mind or Ego...them, or of accepting the paradox that something which is, ex hypothesi, but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series" * There is always a...

...Possibilities of feeling must be possible to somewhat. And this is not altered by changing it into a " series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future." JA series of magnetic currents adds nothing but number to the first of the series taken by itself....

...those sensations is the part now present. If, therefore, we speak of the Mind as a series of feelings, we are obliged to complete the statement by calling...and future; and we are reduced to the alternative of believThe truth is, that we are here face to face with that final inexplicability, at which, as Sir...

...a series of feelings, we are obliged Vo complete the statement by calling it a sej-iea of reelings which is aware of itself as past and future ; and...reduced to the alternative of believing that the Mind or JSjo is something different from any series of feelings or possibilities of them, or of accepting th«...

...an inexplicable mystery must be acknowledged in the mind's constitution. It must be thought of as " a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future." The alternative was that either the definition of mind as " a series of feelings " must be abandoned,...

...those sensations is the past now present. If, therefore, we speak of the mind as a series of feelings, we are obliged to complete the statement by calling...of accepting the paradox, that something which, ex hypolhesi, is but a series of feelings, can be aware of ' as a series." — P. 211. It would be impossible...

...future. ' If then,' he says, ' we speak of the mind as a series of feelings, we are obliged to conclude the statement by calling it a series of feelings which...of accepting the paradox that something which, ex hypothcsi, is but n scries of feelings can be aware of itself as a series.' Mr. Mill allows this difficulty...

...of the mind as a series of feelings, we are obliged to complete the statement by calling it a scries of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future,...of accepting the paradox, that something which, ex fiypothesi, is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself at a series."— P. 211. It would be...

...however adheres to his name. His words are these : " If we speak of the mind as a series of feelings, we are reduced to the alternative of believing that...or of accepting the paradox that something which, ey liypothesi, is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series. The truth is, we are...