The Nature of Thought, المجلد 1

Psychology Press, 2002 - 656 من الصفحات

This volume is a comprehensive collection of critical essays on The Taming of the Shrew, and includes extensive discussions of the play's various printed versions and its theatrical productions. Aspinall has included only those essays that offer the most influential and controversial arguments surrounding the play. The issues discussed include gender, authority, female autonomy and unruliness, courtship and marriage, language and speech, and performance and theatricality.

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CHAPTER I	51

Nor 4 make escape from the primitive inconceivable p	57

Summary p	63

Identification and distinction of universals proceed together	64

Such specification is required by the nature of thought p	69

Such differences are not now explicable biologically or physio	71

Only in appearance are discoveries ever made by chance p	76

p	78

Intelligent perception requires integration of meaning p	222

Which however is restricted in both 1 its objects p	223

And 2 its immediate aim p	224

A dominant practical interest is consistent with a subordinate theoretical interest p	225

Meaningmass varies in structure with the type of theoretical interest p	226

And also though this is often denied in judgements of perception p	227

And in value with the type of problem p	228

Such meaning is not the less useful for being unexplicit p	230

In which case the desideratum is more data p	79

First to be considered is the relation between what is given	81

Though it is narrowly and rigidly limited p	82

Mistakes in observation are chiefly due to its domination by theory p	83

Though a degree of control by theory is inevitable p	84

Such domination may 1 make us observe the wrong things a by fixing upon the irrelevant p	86

b By unfair stresses within the relevant p	87

c By creation of evidence out of hand p	89

Or b exceptions to a rule p	90

This illustrated from Bradley and Binet p	91

Though in two types of case such inference is justifiable p	92

Its distortion by feeling takes place indirectly through theory p	93

Are we to say that observation conditions theory and theory observation? p	94

Yes this is the paradox of inventive mind p	95

nents this is not historically warranted p	98

The understanding of these processes implies no claim to their mastery p	100

The associationist account of invention p	101

It excludes logical insight p	102

And when similarity is in full control reasoning disappears p	103

b The experiments seem to admit of alternative readings	104

And commits us to metaphysical nonsense p	105

Will the law of contiguity account for invention? p	107

No neither alone p	108

Nor in a context of other laws of association p	109

An example from Hume p	110

Perception involves belief which cannot be usefully described	112

Perceptual belief is not a feeling or an expectation or a prob	114

Nor is associationism aided by a law of individual differences p	115

Or by a law of context p	116

Why is teleology so repugnant to the associationist? p	117

Because he is jealous of the factual character of psychology p	118

But what facts is the psychologist concerned with? Not acts as opposed to presentations p	119

Summary p	120

Nor elements of value taken as occurrences only p	122

He must admit into his account the working of values as values p	124

Otherwise his science will caricature the nature of thought p	125

Difficulties in the synthesis of visual and tactual qualities p	126

Thus a descriptive science of thinking is not possible p	127

Nor any understanding of another mind except by sharing its ends p	128

How does an imperfectly realized end complete itself? This is the problem of invention p	129

THE NATURE OF INVENTION 1 Résumé p	130

According to James the factors of invention are sagacity and inference p	131

That these must be supplemented has been shown by Gestalt	132

But this is not as he supposed fertility in similars p	133

Since such fertility must be controlled by the requirements of system p	134

And in certain cases e g calculating prodigies may be non existent p	136

Such cases are accountable only by the working of necessity p	138

As are other cases of categorial inference p	139

Yes but a priori thinking need not be so abstract p	140

Indeed all thinking is in degree a priori p	141

Eight contemporary theories of perception enumerated p	142

Ways in which thinking falls short of necessity p	143

p	147

p	149

Within which limits imaginative fertility subserves insight	153

a The defeat of expectation p	156

e The mutual confirmation of various minds p	158

Some examples in ascending order of insight p	160

No for these cannot be true or false nor are they discernible	166

What subconsciousness here means p	172

How far can subconscious thinking be controlled? p	174

guished from that for subconsciousness p	179

p	181

An example from Spencer p	183

Examples from Coleridge p	185

Four propositions which we may accept from the theory p	187

ii More effectively by submitting to the subconscious a rough but explicit design p	188

An example from Goethe p	189

Miscellaneous examples p	190

This mass may have a high degree of internal unity p	193

Which means in part a presenting an express and definite ques tion p	194

Testimony from Russell from Poincaré from Mill p	195

The debate about conscious effort in creation p	196

In part b the mobilizing of present resources p	199

3 The rise of suggestion may be promoted or inhibited by feeling p	201

the same percepts p	202

No less in abstract reasoning than in art p	203

1 it facilitates search p	204

3 It refines sensory discrimination p	205

4 It increases the speed of perceiving p	206

5 It maintains attention through producing variety in the object p	207

6 It aids in isolating and dealing with the novel p	209

Though we have at best only the beginnings of a technique of invention p	210

Its disadvantage lies in its productivity of error p	211

But there is a twofold limit to its influence p	212

Summary p	213

CHAPTER VI	215

This implies that meaning is hierarchically organized p	216

Or for no reasons and this would justify contradictory doctrines p	217

Depth of meaning springs from a continuing interest p	218

As becomes clear in examples p	220

Which may be either congenital or acquired p	221

Soundness of judgement is independent of the power of explicit recall p	232

Or to resort to a correspondence in part p	233

Givenness may be possessed by the illusory p	234

Though not as sometimes supposed obstructed by it p	235

Perceptual thinking may achieve 1 great accuracy p	236

And 2 extreme complexity p	237

Such achievement is aided by a prior explicit analysis p	238

This criticism however is of small weight p	239

Though it appears in certain forms of intuition p	240

Perceptual thinking may achieve 3 great flexibility p	241

A trait which depends on the eye for identities p	242

The levels of flexibility in the animal scale p	243

Advance in flexibility implies a better implicit analysis p	245

And the degrees of selfevidence correspond to the systems that would be destroyed by rejecting these axioms p	246

And a more complex and orderly synthesis illustrations from	247

ii Some competent logicians deny logical laws to be self evident and hold to alternative logics p	249

To rest the selfevidence of such laws on reaffirmation through denial is to appeal implicitly to coherence p	252

a that a defence of such law by a reductio ad absurdum of the contradictory is illegitimate p	254

CHAPTER VII	257

p	263

practically p	269

ideas are generally noncopying	271

And render impossible the explanation of a course of ideas p	279

MR RUSSELL ON IDEAS	282

And 3 meanings that we do not intend p	288

Difficulties 1 Words are never what we believe p	297

His theory of thought is widely eclectic p	304

The notion of a nuclear invariant meaning is a superstition	311

CHAPTER IX	313

And from the nature of definition p	317

This theory is false for p	319

Bradleys view stated and criticized p	323

The behaviourist falls back however on the identification	326

physiological knowledge p	332

b That when this or nothing is applied to such law nothing is meaningless p 255	338

The theory is neither new nor in the proper sense scientific	339

p	346

Nor is it a sufficient defence to admit an ulterior nonpractical	357

But then the charge of solipsism is well grounded p	370

inference p	375

But then the theory a distorts the facts of meaning p	379

Hence the logic that employs it is essentially a return to an older	383

But i this dependence is far from uniform p	388

It springs from the neglect of intension by symbolic logic this	390

CHAPTER XI	394

Summary p	397

But i the facts can probably be explained otherwise p	401

As are a great variety of further propositions p	406

But i the belief entails a sharp conflict with science and common	411

And between logic and alternative geometries p	414

affirmed in judgement p	423

It holds that we can directly grasp the character of objects	428

But this position when developed is incoherent p	429

The validity of every inference turns on unexpressed conditions	432

And 4 in inference p	436

Critical realism affords no permanent haltingplace p	443

Is the ideal of thought relevant to the real? That depends on	449

This view also is untenable p	450

But 1 such a science is inadequate to thought proper i e	457

This view has been dismissed as inconsistent with law p	458

The meaning of this argument exemplified in syllogism p	465

CHAPTER XIV	471

The teleological ideal of explanation p	477

Does the above view accord with the nature of knowledge? Yes	486

Thought must be conceived as a stage in the realization of	493

these differ in kind Answer a study of images	500

In whose achievement the immanent and transcendent ends	505

It provides no basis for inductive argument p	506

you would make error objectless purpose Answer	511

The above theory is not in essence new p	518

Conclusion p	519

Which becomes more intelligible in the light of our general	526

They are fixed in their independence 1 by a growing theoretic	533

Though the error must be avoided that a definite idea precedes	539

May a free idea e g of a feeling be described as a partial realiza	549

Bradleys	555

The image qua idea is itself a partially realized object this con	562

The general idea is not a synthesis of particular impressions	568

The general idea presents three main problems of which	575

psychology into logic p	590

May it not be a genuine object of implicit apprehension?	597

The point illustrated from Cook Wilson p	603

CHAPTER XVII	609

And with the greater command of instances given by true than	615

Which lies in the comparative length of interval between	621

sive units p	627

A supposition due to elementary confusions p	633

VOL I	641

It has been held that to deny particulars is to violate an axiom	642

Retrospect and prospect p	651

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نبذة عن المؤلف (2002)

Brand Blanshard, Professor of Philosophy, Swarthmore College.

معلومات المراجع

العنوان	The Nature of Thought, المجلد 1 Library of philosophy المجلد 1 من Muirhead library of philosophy (Routledge).: Philosophy of mind and psychology Muirhead library of philosophy Philosophy of mind and psychology The Nature of Thought, Brand Blanshard, رقم ISBN (الرقم الدولي المعياري للكتاب) 041527897X, 9780415278973
المؤلف	Brand Blanshard
الإصدار	معاد طباعته
الناشر	Psychology Press, 2002
رقم ISBN (الرقم الدولي المعياري للكتاب)	0415296064, 9780415296069
عدد الصفحات	656 من الصفحات

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