As this city had been peopled by colonies, which had been carried away by force from Cappadocia, Cilicia, and other places, Lucullus permitted them all to return into their native countries. They received that permission with extreme joy, and quitted it in so great a number, that from one of the greatest cities in the world, Tigranocerta became in an instant almost a desert.* If Lucullus had pursued Tigranes after his victory, without giving him time to raise new troops, he would either have taken, or driven him out of the country, and the war must have been terminated. His having failed to do so was very much censured, both in the army and at Rome, and he was accused, not of negligence, but of having intended by such conduct to make himself necessary, and to retain the command longer in his own hands. This was one of the reasons that prejudiced the generality against him, and induced them to think of giving him a successor, as we shall see in the sequel.t After the great victory he had gained over Tigranes, several nations came to make their submissions to him. He received also an embassy from the king of the Parthians, who demanded the amity and alliance of the Romans. Lucullus received this proposal favourably, and sent also ambassadors to him, who, being arrived at the Parthian court, discovered that the king, uncertain which side to take, wavered between the Romans and Tigranes, and had secretly demanded Mesopotamia of the latter, as the price of the aid he offered him. Lucullus, informed of this secret intrigue, resolved to leave Mithridates and Tigranes, and turn his arms against the king of the Parthians; flattered with the grateful thought, that nothing could be more glorious for him, than to have entirely reduced, in one expedition, the three most powerful princes under the sun. But the opposition this proposal met with from the troops, obliged him to renounce his enterprise against the Parthians, and to confine himself to pursuing Tigranes. During this delay, Mithridates and Tigranes had been indefatigable in raising new troops. They had sent to implore aid of the neighbouring nations, and especially of the Parthians, who were the nearest, and, at the same time, in the best condition to assist them in the present emergency of their affairs. Mithridates wrote a letter to their king, which Sallust has preserved, and is to be found among his fragments. I shall insert a part of it in this place. LETTER OF MITHRIDATES TO ARSACES KING OF THE PARTHIANS. "All those who, in a state of prosperity, are invited to enter as confederates into a war, ought first to consider, whether peace be their own option; and next, whether what is demanded of them, is consistent with justice, their interest, safety, and glory. You might enjoy perpetual peace and tranquillity, were not the enemy always intent upon seizing occasions of war, and entirely void of faith. In reducing the Romans, you cannot but acquire exalted glory. It may seem inconsistent in me, to propose to you either an alliance with Tigranes, or, powerful as you are, that you should join a prince in my unfortunate condition. But I dare advance, that those two motives, your resentment against Tigranes upon account of his late war with you, and the disadvantageous situation of my affairs, to judge rightly of them, far from opposing my demand, ought to support it. For, as to Tigranes, as he knows he has given you just cause of complaint, he will accept without difficulty whatever conditions you shall think fit to impose upon him; and for me, I can say, that fortune, by having deprived me of almost all I possessed, has enabled me to give others good counsels; and, which is much to be desired of persons in prosperity, I can, even from my own misfortunes, supply you with examples, and induce you to take better measures than I have done. For, do not deceive yourself, it is with all the nations, states, and kingdoms of the earth, the Romans are at war; and two motives, as ancient as powerful, put their arms into their hands; the unbounded P. 539. Strab. 1. xi. p. 532. et l. xii. ambition of extending their conquests, and the insatiable thirst of riches."* Mithridates afterwards enumerates at large the princes and kings they had reduced one after the other, and often by one another. He repeats also his first successes against the Romans, and his late misfortunes. He then proceeds, "Examine now, I beseech you, when we are finally ruined, whether you will be in a condition to resist the Romans, or can believe, that they will confine their conquests to my country? I know that you are powerful in men, in arms, and treasure; it is therefore we desire to strengthen ourselves by your alliance; they, to grow rich by your spoils. For the rest, it is the intent of Tigranes, to avoid drawing the war into his country, that I shall march with all my troops, which are certainly well disciplined, to carry our arms far from home, and attack the enemy in person in their own country. We cannot therefore either conquer or be conquered, without your being in danger. Do you not know, that the Romans, when they found themselves stopped by the ocean on the west, turned their arms this way? That to look back to their foundation and origin, whatever they have, they have from violence; home, wives, lands, and dominions. A vile herd of every kind of vagabonds, without country, without forefathers, they established themselves for the misfortune of the human race. Neither divine nor human laws restrain them from betraying and destroying their allies and friends, remote nations or neighbours, the weak or the powerful. They hold all enemies that are not their slaves; and especially, whatever bears the name of king for few nations affect a free and independent government; the generality prefer just and equitable masters. They suspect us, because we are said to emulate their power, and may in time avenge their oppressions. But for you, who have Seleucia, the greatest of cities, and Persia, the richest and most powerful kingdoms, what can you expect from them, but deceit at present, and war hereafter? The Romans are at war with all nations; but especially with those from whom the richest spoils are to be expected. They are become great by enterprises and deceit, and making one war lead to another. By this means they will either destroy all others, or be destroyed themselves. It will not be difficult to ruin them, if you on the side of Mesopotamia, and we on that of Armenia, surround their army, without provisions or auxiliaries. The prosperity of their arms has subsisted hitherto solely by our fault, who have not been so prudent as to understand this common enemy, and to unite ourselves against him. It will be for your immortal glory to have supported two great kings, and to have conquered and destroyed those robbers of the world. This is what I earnestly advise and exhort you to do; that you may choose rather to share with us by a salutary alliance, in conquering the common enemy, than to suffer the Roman empire to extend itself universally by our ruin."t Omnes, qui secundis rebus suis ad belli societatem orantur, considerare debent, liceatne tum pacem agere: dein quod quæritur. satisne pium, tutum, gloriosum, an indecorum sit. Tibi perpetua pace frui liceret, nisi hostes opportuni et scelestissimi. Egregia fama, si Romanos oppresseris, futura est. Neque petere audeam societatem, et frustra mala mea cum tuis bonis miscere sperem. Atqui ea, quæ te morari posse videntur, ira in Tigranem recentis belli, et meæ res parum prosperæ, si vera æstimare voles, maxime hortabattur. Ille enim, obnoxius, qualem tu voles societatem accipiet; mihi fortuna, multis rebus ereptis, usum dedit bene suadendi, et quod florentibus optabile est, ego non validissimus præbeo exemplum quo rectius tua componas. Namque Romanis cum nationibus, populis, legibus cunctis, una et ea vetus causa bellandi est. cupido profunda imperii et divitiarum. Nunc, quæso, considera, nobis oppressis, utrum, firmiorem te ad resistendum, an finem belli futuram putes Scio equidem tibi magnas opes virorum, armorum, et auri esse et ea re nobis ad societatem, ab illi ad prædam peteris. Cæterum consilium est Tigranes, regno integro, meis militibus belli prudentibus, precul ab domo, parvo labore, per nostra corpora bellum conficere; quando neque vincere neque vinci sine periculo tuo possumus. An ignoras Romanos, postquam ad occidentem pergentibus finem oceanus fecit, arma huc convertisse? Neque quicquam a principio nisi raptum habere; domum, conjuges, agros, imperium Convenas, olim sine patria, sine parentibus, peste conditos orbis terrarum; quibus non humana ulla neque divina obstant, socios, amicos, procul juxtaque sitos, inopes, potentesque trahant, excidantque; omnisqus non serva, et maxime regna, hostilia ducant. Namque pauci libertatem pars magna justos dominos valmit Nos suspecti sumus æmuli, et in tempore vindices affaturi. Tu vero cui Šeleucia maxima urbium, regessque Persidis inclitis divitiis est, quid ab illis, nisi dolum in præsens, et postea bellum expectas? Romani in omnes arma habent, acerrima in eos quibus spolia maxima sunt. Audendo et fallendo, et bella ex bellis ferendo, magni facti. Per hunc morem extinguent omnia aut occident: quod difficile non est, si tu Mesopotamia, nos Armenia circumgredimur exercitum sine frumento, sine auxiliis. Fortuna autem nostris vitiis adhuc incolumis. Teque illa fama sequetur, auxilio profectum magnis regibus latrones gentium oppres sisse. Quod uti facias moneo bortorque, neu malis pernicie nostra unum imperium probare, quam societato victor fieri. It does not appear that this letter had the effect upon Phraates which Mithridates might have hoped from it; so that the two kings contented themselves with their own troops. One of the means made use of by Tigranes to assemble a new army, was to recall Megadates from Syria, who had governed it fourteen years in his name; he sent orders to him to join him with all the troops in that country.* Syria being thereby entirely ungarrisoned, Antiochus Asiaticus, son of Antiochus Eupator, to whom it of right appertained, as lawful heir of the house of Seleucus took possession of some part of the country, and reigned there peaceably during four years.t The army of Tigranes and Mithridates was at last formed. It consisted of seventy thousand chosen men, whom Mithridates had exercised well in the Roman discipline. It was about midsummer before he took the field. The two kings took particular care, in all the motions they made, to choose an advantageous ground for their camp, and to fortify it well, to prevent Lucullus from attacking them in it; nor could all the stratagems he used engage them to come to a battle. Their design was to reduce him gradually; to harass his troops on their marches, in order to weaken them; to intercept his convoys, and oblige him to quit the country for want of provisions. Lucullus not being able, by all the arts he could use, to bring them into the open field, employed a new means which succeeded. Tigranes had left at Artaxata, the capital of Armenia before the foundation of Tigranocerta, his wives and children, and almost all his treasures. Lucullus marched that way with all his troops, rightly foreseeing that Tigranes would not remain quiet when he saw the danger to which his capital was exposed. That prince accordingly decamped immediately, followed Lucullus to disconcert his design, and by four great marches, having got before him, posted himself behind the river Arsamia or Arsania, which Lucullus was obliged to pass in his way to Artaxata, and resolved to dispute the passage with him. The Romans passed the river without being prevented by the presence or efforts of the enemy. A great battle ensued, in which the Romans again obtained a complete victory. There were three kings in the Armenian army, of whom Mithridates behaved the worst; for, not being able to look the Roman legions in the face, as soon as they charged, he was one of the first who fled, which threw the whole army into such a consternation, that it entirely lost courage, and was the principal cause of the loss of the battle. Lucullus, after this victory, determined to continue his march to Artaxata, which was the certain means to put an end to the war; but as that city was still several day's journey from thence toward the north, and winter approached with its train of snows and storms, the soldiers, already fatigued by a very arduous campaign, refused to follow him into that country, where the cold was too severe for them.§ He was obliged to lead them into a warmer climate, by returning the way he came. He therefore repassed Mount Taurus, and entered Mesopotamia, where he took the city of Nisibis, a place of considerable strength, and put his troops in winter quarters.|| It was there the spirit of mutiny began to show itself openly in the army of Lucullus. That general's severity, and the insolent liberty of the Roman soldiers, and still more the malignant practices of Clodius, had given occasion for this revolt. Clodius, so well known for the invectives of Cicero, his enemy, is hardly better treated by historians. They represent him as a man abandoned to all kinds of vices, and infamous for his debaucheries, which he carried so far as to commit incest with his own sister, the wife of Lucullus; to these he added unbounded audacity, and uncommon cunning in the contrivance of seditions; in a word, he was one of those dangerous persons born to disturb and ruin every * Appian in Syr. p. 118, 119. Justin. 1. xl. c. 2. A. M. 3936. Ant. J. C. 68. Plut. in Lucul. p. 513-515. Noster exercitus, etsi urbem ex Tigranis regno ceperat, et præliis usus erat secundis, tamen nimia longinquitate locorum, ac desiderio suorum commovebatur.-Cic. pro Lege Mer. n. 23. VOL. IV. Dion. Cass. 1. xxxvii. p. 3-7. 24 thing, by the unhappy union in himself of the most wicked inclinations with the talents necessary for putting them in execution. He gave a proof of this upon the occasion we are now speaking of. Discontented with Lucullus, he secretly spread reports against him to render him odious. He affected to lament extremely the fatigues of the soldiers, and to enter into their interests. He told them every day, that they were very unfortunate in being obliged to serve so long under a severe and avaricious general, in a remote climate, without lands or rewards, while their fellow-soldiers, whose conquests were very moderate in comparison with theirs, had enriched themselves with Pompey. Discourses of this kind, attended with obliging and popular behaviour, which he knew how to assume occasionally without the appearance of affectation, made such an impression upon the soldiers, that it was no longer in the power of Lucullus to govern them. Mithridates, in the mean time, had re-entered Pontus with four thousand of his own, and four thousand troops given him by Tigranes. Several inhabitants of the country joined him again, as well out of hatred to the Romans, who had treated them with great rigour, as the remains of affection for their king, reduced from the most splendid fortune and exalted greatness, to the mournful condition in which they saw him: for the misfortunes of princes naturally excite compassion; and there is generally a profound respect in the hearts of the people for the name and person of kings.* Mithridates, encouraged and strengthened by these new aids, and the troops which several neighbouring states and princes sent him, resumed courage, and saw himself more than ever in a condition to make head against the Romans. So that, not contented with being re-established in his dominions, which a moment before he did not so much as hope ever to see again, he had the boldness to attack the Roman troops, so often victorious, beat a body of them commanded by Fabius, and after having put them to the rout, pressed Friarius and Sornatius, two other lieutenants of Lucullus in that country, with great vigour. Lucullus at length engaged his soldiers to quit their winter-quarters, and to go to their aid. But they arrived too late. Friarius had imprudently ventured a battle, in which Mithridates had defeated him, and killed seven thousand men; among whom were one hundred and fifty centurions, and twenty-four tribunes, which made this one of the greatest losses the Romans had sustained in a great while. The army would have been entirely defeated, but for a wound which Mithridates received, which exceedingly alarmed his troops, and gave the enemy time to escape. Lucullus, upon his arrival, found the dead bodies upon the field of battle, but did not give orders for their interment, which still more exaspe rated his soldiers against him. The spirit of revolt rose so high, that without any regard for his character as a general, they looked upon him no longer but with insolence and contempt: and though he went from tent to tent, and almost from man to man, to conjure them to march against Mithridates and Tigranes, he could never prevail upon them to quit the place where they were. They answered him contemptuously, that as he had no thoughts but of enriching himself only out of the spoils of the enemy, he might march alone, and fight them if he thought fit.§ SECTION IV. MITHRIDATES RECOVERS ALL HIS DOMINIONS. POMPEY OVER THROWS HIM IN SEVERAL BATTLES. MANIUS Acilius Glabrio, and C. Piso, had been elected consuls at Rome. The first had Bithynia and Pontus for his province, where Lucullus commanded. Mithridates et suam manum jam confirmaverat, et eorum qui se ex ejus regno collegerent, et magas adventitiis multorum regium et nationum copiis juvabatur. Hoc jam fere sic fieri solere accepimus; ut regum afflictæ fortunæ facile multorum opes alliciant ad misericordiam, maximeque eorum qui aut reges sust. aut vivant in regno; quod regale iis nomen magnum et sanctum esse videatur.-Cic. pro Lege Manil. n. 24. Itaque tantum victus efficere potuit, quantum incolumis nunquam est ausus optare. Nam cum se regnum recepisset suum, non fuit eo contentus, quod ei præter spem acciderat, ut eam, postea quam pulsu erat, terram unquam attingeret; sed in exercitum vestrum clarum atque victorem impetum fecit.-Cic. pra Lege Man. n. 25. Quæ calamitas tanta fuit, ut eam ad aures L. Luculli, non ex prælio nuntius, sed ex sermone rumst afferret-Cic. pro Lege Man. a 25. A. M. 3337. Ant. J. C. 67. The senate at the same time disbanded Fimbria's legions, which were part of his army, All this news augmented the disobedience and insolence of the troops in regard to Lucullus. It is true, his rough, austere, and frequently haughty disposition, gave some room for such usage. He cannot be denied the glory of having been one of the greatest captains of his age, and of having had almost all the qualities that form a complete general. But, the want of one diminished the merit of all the rest; I mean address in winning the heart, and making himself beloved by the soldiers. He was difficult of access, rough in commanding, carried exactitude in point of duty to an excess that made it odious, was inexorable in punishing offences, and did not know how to conciliate esteem by praises and rewards bestowed opportunely, an air of kindness and favour, and insinuating manners, still more efficacious than either gifts or praises. And what proves that the sedition of the troops was in a great measure his own fault, was, their being very docile and obedient under Pompey.* In consequence of the letters which Lucullus wrote to the senate, in which he acquainted them, that Mithridates was entirely defeated, and utterly incapable of retrieving himself, commissioners had been nominated to regulate the affairs of Pontus, as of a kingdom totally reduced. They were much surprised to find, upon their arrival, that far from being master of Pontus, he was not so much as master of his army, and that his own soldiers treated him with the utmost contempt. The arrival of the consul Acilius Glabrio added still more to their licentiousness. He informed them that Lucullus had been accused at Rome of protracting the war for the sake of continuing in command; that the senate had disbanded part of his troops, and forbade them paying him any farther obedience, so that he found himself almost entirely abandoned by the soldiers.† Mithridates, taking advantage of this disorder, had time to recover his whole kingdom, and to make ravages in Cappadocia. While the affairs of the army were in this condition, great noise was made at Rome against Lucullus. Pompey had returned from putting an end to the war with the pirates, in which an extraordinary power had been granted him. Upon this occasion, one of the tribunes of the people, named Manilius, passed a decree to this effect: "That Pompey, taking upon him the command of all the troops and provinces which were under Lucullus, and adding to them Bithynia, where Acilius commanded, should be charged with making war upon the kings Mithridates and Tigranes, retaining under him all the naval forces, and continuing to command at sea, with the same conditions and prerogatives as had been granted him in the war against the pirates: that is to say, that he should have absolute power on all the coasts of the Mediterranean, to thirty leagues distance from the sea." This was in effect subjecting the whole Roman empire to one man: for all the provinces which had not been granted him by the first decree, Phrygia, Lycaonia, Galatia, Cappadocia, Cilicia the Higher, Colchis, and Armenia, were conferred upon him by this second, which included also all the armies and forces with which Lucullus had defeated the two kings, Mithridates and Tigranes. Consideration for Lucullus, who was deprived of the glory of his great exploits, and in the place of whom a general was appointed, to succeed more to the honours of his triumph than the command of his armies, was not, however, what gave the nobility and the senate most concern. They were well convinced that great wrong was done him, and that his services were not treated with the gratitude they deserved; but what gave them most pain, and they could not Dion. Cass. 1. xxxv. p. 7. "In ipso illo malo gravissimaque belli offensione, L. Lucullus, qui tamen aliqua ex parte iis incommodis mederi fortasse potuisset, vestro jussu coactus, quod imperii diuturnitate modum statuendum, veteri exemplo, putavistis, partem militum, qui jam stipendiis confectis erant, dimisit, partem Glabrioni tradidit.-Cic. pro Lege. Manil. n. 26. A. M. 3938. Ant. J. C. 66. Plut. in Pomp. p. 634. Appian. p. 238. Dion. Cass. 1. xxxv. p. 20 |