at Rhodes, king Archelaus who was not very remote from thence, residing generally at Eleusis, distant six leagues from Rhodes, paid him no honours, forgetting the great obligations he had to him. It was not, says Tacitus, out of pride or haughtiness, but by the advice of the principal friends of Augustus, who believed the amity of Tiberius dangerous at that time.* On the contrary, when young Caius Cæsar, appointed governor of the east, was sent into Armenia by Augustus, to appease the troubles of that country, Archelaus, who looked upon him as the future successor to the empire, paid him every honour, and distinguished himself by the zeal with which he paid his court to him. a Politicians are often mistaken in their conjectures, for want of a clear insight 3 into futurity. It had been more consistent with prudence and wisdom in År chelaus, to have observed such a conduct as had been agreeable to each of the princes, who might both arrive at the empire. Something of this nature 2 is observed of Pomponius Atticus, who, during the divisions with which the La republic was torn at different times, always knew how to render himself agreeable to both parties. Tiberius never forgot the injurious preference that had been given to his rival, which was the more offensive to him, as it argued an ungrateful disposition in Archelaus. He made him highly sensible of this when he became master. Archelaus was cited to Rome, as having endeavoured to excite troubles in the province.§ Livia wrote to him; and without dissembling the emperor's anger, gave him hopes of pardon, provided he came in person to demand it. This was a snare laid for drawing him out of his kingdom. The aking of Cappadocia either did not perceive it, or dared not act as if he did. He set out for Rome, was very ill received by Tiberius, and saw himself proceeded against as a criminal. Dion assures us, that Archelaus, depressed with age, was generally believed to have lost his reason; but that in reality he was perfectly in his senses, and counterfeited the madman, because he saw no other means of saving his life. The senate passed no sentence against him; but age, the gout, and more than those, the indignity of the treatment he was made to suffer, soon occasioned his death. He had reigned two-and-fifty years. After his death Cappadocia was reduced into a province of the Roman empire. This kingdom was very powerful. The revenues of Cappadocia were so considerable when Archelaus died, that Tiberius thought himself able, from his new acquisition, to abate the half of a tax he had caused to be levied. He even gave that province some relief, and would not exact from it the heavy duties which it had been compelled to pay to the last king. The kings of Cappadocia generally resided at Mazaca, a city situated upon the mountain Argea, and was governed by the laws of Charondas.** The city was built upon the River Melas, which empties itself into the Euphrates. A king of Cappadocia, whom Strabo only calls Ariarathes, without mentioning the time when he lived, having filled up the mouths of this river, it overflowed all the neighbouring country; after which he caused small islands to be made in it, after the manner of the Cyclades, where he passed part of his life in puerile diversions. The river broke the dams of its mouths; and the waters returned into their channel. The Euphrates, having received them, * Rex Archelaus quinquagesimum annum Cappadocia potiebatur, invisus Tiberio, quod eum Rhodi agentem nullo officio coluisset. Nec id Archelaus per superbiam omiserat, sed ab intimis Augusti monitus; quia florente Caio Cæsare missoque ad res Orientis, intuta Tiberii amicitia credebatur.-Tacit. Annal. I. ii. c. 42. †A. M. 4002. Ant. J. C. 2. Hoc quale sit, facilius existimabit is, qui judicare quantæ sit sapientiæ, eorum retinere usum benevolentiamque inter quos maximarum rerum non solum æmulatio, sed obtrectatio tanto intercedebat, quantum fuit incidere necesse inter Cæsarem atque æntonium, cum se uterque principem non solum urbis Romanæ, Led orbis terrarum esse cuperet.-Corn. Nep. in Attic. c. xx. A. M. 4020. A. D. 16. Ille ignarus doli, vel, si intelligere videretur, vim metuens, in urbem properat: exceptusque immiti a principe, et mox accusatus a senatu; non ob crimina, quæ fingebantur, sed angore, simul fessus senio, et quia regibus æqua, nedum infima, insolita sunt, finem vitæ sponte an fato implevit.-Tacit. Annal. l. ii. c. 42. Strab. 1. xii. p. 537, 539. ** This Charondas was a celebrated legislator of Græcia Major, of whom mention has been made, overflowed, and did incredible damage in Cappadocia. The Gallatians, who inhabited Phrygia, suffered also great losses by that torrent; for which they insisted upon being made amends. They demanded three hundred talents of the king of Cappadocia; and made the Romans their judges. Cappadocia abounded with horses, asses, and mules.* It was from thence the horses were brought, so particularly allotted for the use of the emperors, that the consuls themselves were forbid to have any of them. It furnished also great numbers of slaves and false witnesses. The Cappadocians were reported to accustom themselves to the bearing of torments from their infancy, and put one another to the question by the rack, and other methods of torture, in order to inure themselves against the pains their false witnesses might one day expose them to suffer. This people exceeded the Greek nation in perjury, though the latter had carried that vice to a great height, if we may believe Cicero, who ascribes to them the having made this manner of speaking common among them; "Lend me your evidence, and I'll pay you with mine." Cappadocia, generally speaking, was far from being a country of great geniuses and learned men. It has produced however, some very celebrated authors. Strabo and Pausanius are of that number. It was believed especially, that the Cappadocians were very unfit for the profession of orators: and it became a proverb, that a rhetorician of that country was as hard to be found as a white raven or a flying tortoise. S. Basil and S. Gregory Nazianzen are exceptions to this rule.|| *Boch. Phaleg. 1. iii. c. 11. Schol. Persii. [[ Θατίου & ην λευκές κοράκας στηνας χελωνας Ευρέιν, ή δόκιμον риторх Καππαδόκην. # BOOK TWENTY-FIRST. THE HISTORY OF SYRACUSE. PLAN. THIS book contains the conclusion of the history of Syracuse. It may be divided into three parts. The first includes the long reign of Hiero II. The second, the short reign of his grandson Hieronymus, the troubles of Syracuse occasioned by it, and the siege and taking of that city by Marcellus. The third is a concise abridgment of the history of Syracuse, with some reflections upon the government and character of the Syracusans, and on Archimedes. ARTICLE I. SECTION 1.-HIERO II. CHOSEN CAPTAIN-GENERAL BY THE SYRACUSANS, AND SOON AFTER APPOINTED KING. HIERO II. was descended from the family of Gelon, who had formerly reigned in Syracuse.* As his mother was a slave, his father, Hierocles, according to the barbarous customs of those times, caused him to be exposed soon after his birth; believing that the infant dishonoured the nobility of his race. If Justin's fabulous account may be believed, the bees nourished him several days with their honey. The oracle declaring, that so singular an event was a certain presage of his future greatness, Hierocles caused him to be brought back to his house, and took all possible care of his education. The child improved as much from the pains taken to form him as could be expected. He distinguished himself early from all those of his years, by his address in military exercises, and his courage in battle. He acquired the esteem. of Pyrrhus, and received several rewards from his hands. He was of a beautiful aspect, large stature, and robust complexion. In conversation, he was affable and polite, in business just, and moderate in command; so that he wanted nothing royal, except a throne.f Discord having arisen between the citizens of Syracuse and their troops, the latter, who were in the neighbourhood, raised Artemidorus and Hiero to the supreme command, which comprehended all authority, civil and military, The latter was at that time thirty years old, but of a prudence and maturity that promised a great king. Honoured with this command, by the help of some friends he entered the city, and having found means to bring over the adverse pa rty, who were intent upon nothing but raising disorders, he behaved with so mch wisdom and greatness of mind, that the Syracusans, though highly dissatis fied with the liberty assumed by the soldiers of choosing their officers, were, however, unanimous in conferring upon him the title and power of captaingeneral.‡ * A. M. 3700. Ant. J. C. 304. Justin. 1. xxiii. c. 4. tla alloquio blandus, in negotio justus, in imperio moderatus; prorsus ut nihil ei regium deesse præter regnum videretur.-Justin. A. M. 3729. Ant. J. C. 275. Polyb. I. i. p. 8, 9. From his first measures, it was easy to judge that the new magistrate aspired at something more than that office. Observing, indeed, that the troops no sooner quitted the city, than Syracuse was involved in new troubles by seditious spirits and lovers of innovation, he perceived how important it was, in the absence of bimself and the army, to have somebody upon whom he might rely for keeping the citizens within the bounds of their duty. Leptinus seemed very fit for that purpose. He had many persons devoted to his interests, and had great influence with the people. Hiero attached him to himself for ever, by espousing his daughter and by the same alliance secured the public tranquillity, during the time he should be obliged to remove from Syracuse, and march at the head of the armies. Another, much bolder, though far less just, stroke of policy, established his security and repose. He had every thing to fear from the foreign soldiers, turbulent, malignant men, void of respect for their commanders, and of affection for a state of which they made no part, solely actuated by the desire of command and lucre, and always ready for a revolt, who having been bold enough to assume a right in the election of magistrates, which did not belong to them, were capable, upon the least discontent, of attempting any thing against him self. He easily comprehended, that he should never have the mastery over them, as they were too well united among themselves; that if he undertook to punish the most criminal, their chastisement would only provoke the rest; and that the only means to put an end to the troubles they occasioned, was utterly to exterminate the factious militia, whose licentiousness and rebellious disposition were only fit to corrupt others, and incline them to pernicious excesses. Deceived by a false zeal, and blind love for the public good, and sensibly affected also with the prospect of the dangers to which he was perpetually exposed, he thought it incumbent on him, for the safety of his country, and security of his person, to proceed to this cruel and sad extremity, directly contrary to his character and justice, but which seemed necessary to him in the present conjuncture. He therefore took the field, under the pretext of marching against the Mamertines. When he came within view of the enemy, he divided his army into two parts; on the one side he posted such of the soldiers as were Syracusans; on the other, those who were not so. He put himself at the head of the first, as if he intended an attack, and left the others exposed to the Mamertines, who cut them to pieces; after which he returned quietly to the city with the Syracusan troops. * The army being thus purged of all who might excite disorders and sedition, he raised a sufficient number of new troops, and afterwards discharged the duties of his office in peace. The Mamertines, elated with their success, advancing into the country, he marched against them with the Syracusan troops, whom he had armed and disciplined well, and gave them battle in the plain of Myla. A great part of the enemy was left upon the field, and their generals made prisoners. At his return he was declared king by all the citizens of Syracuse, and afterwards by all the allies. This happened seven years after his being raised to the supreme authority.t It would be difficult to justify the manner in which he attained that eminence. Whether he put the foreign soldiers in motion himself, which seems very probable, or only lent himself to their zeal, it was a criminal infidelity to his country, and the public authority, to which his example gave a mortal wound. It is true, the irregularity of his entrance upon office was somewhat amended by the consent which the people and the allies afterwards gave to it; but can we suppose, in such a conjuncture, that their consent was perfectly free? As to his being elected king, there was no compulsion in that; if his secret ambition had any part in it, that fault was well atoned for by his wise and disinterested conduct through the long duration of his reign and life. They were originally Campanian troops, whom Agathocles had taken into his pay, and who afterwards seized Messina, having first put the principal inhabitants to the sword. A. M. 3756. Aut. J. C. 268. The loss of the battle we have spoken of, entirely disconcerted the affairs of the Mamertines. Some of them had recourse to the Carthaginians, to whom they surrendered their citadel; others resolved to abandon the city to the Romans, and sent to desire their aid. Hence arose the first Punic war, as I have explained more at large elsewhere.* Appius Claudius the consul put to sea, in order to aid the Mamertines. Not being able to pass the strait of Messina, of which the Carthaginians had possessed themselves, he made a feint of abandoning that enterprise, and of returning toward Rome with all the troops he had on board his fleet. Upon this news, the enemy, who blocked up Messina on the side next the sea, having retired, as if there had been nothing farther to apprehend, Appius tacked about, and passed the strait without danger.t The Mamertines, between menaces and surprise, having driven out of the citadel the officer who commanded in it for the Carthaginians, they called in Appius, and opened the gates of their city to him. The Carthaginians soon after formed the siege of it, and made a treaty of alliance with Hiero, who joined his troops to theirs. The Roman consul thought fit to venture a battle, and attacked the Syracusans first. The fight was warm. Hiero showed all possible courage, but could not resist the valour of the Romans, and was obliged to give way, and retired to Syracuse. Claudius, having obtained a like victory over the Carthaginians, saw himself master of the field, advanced to the walls of Syracuse, and even designed to besiege it. When the news of the success of Appius arrived at Rome, it occasioned great joy. In order to make the most of it, it was thought proper to use new efforts. The two consuls lately elected, Manius Otacilius and Manius Valerius, were ordered into Sicily. Upon their arrival, several of the Carthaginian and Syracusan cities surrendered at discretion.§ The consternation of Sicily, and the number and force of the Roman legions, enabled Hiero to form some idea of the event of this new war. He was sensible that he might rely upon a more faithful and constant amity on the side of the Romans. He knew that the Carthaginians had not renounced the design they had anciently formed, of possessing themselves of all Sicily; and if they made themselves masters of Messina, he rightly judged that his power would be very insecure, in the neighbourhood of such dangerous and formidable enemies. He saw no other expedient for the preservation of his kingdom, than to leave the Carthaginians engaged with the Romans; well assured that the war would be long and obstinate between those two republics, equal in their forces; and that as long as they should be contending, he should have no reason to apprehend being distressed either by the one or the other. He therefore sent ambassadors to the consuls to treat of peace and alliance. They were far from refusing those offers. They were too much afraid that the Carthaginians, masters at sea, might cut off all transportation of provisions; which fear was the better founded, as the troops who had first passed the strait had suffered extremely by famine. An alliance with Hiero secured the legions in that respect, and was immediately concluded. The conditions were, that the king should restore to the Romans, without ransom, all the prisoners he had taken from them, and pay them one hundred talents in money. From that time Hiero saw no war in his dominions, nor had any other share in it, than of sending supplies to the Romans upon occasion. In other respects he reigned as a king who had no view nor ambition but the esteem and love of his people. No prince was ever more successful in that point, nor enjoyed, for a longer time, the fruits of his wisdom and prudence. For more than fifty years after his being elected king, he and his people enjoyed profound peace, and were only spectators of the conflagrations and distress that surrounded them, occasioned by the wars between the two most powerful states of the world. Vol. I. History of the Carthaginians. A. M. 3741. Ant. J. C. 263. Polyb. 1. i. p. 10, 11. t Frontin. Strat. 1. i. c. 4. Polyb. 1. i. p. 15, 16. |