this enterprise might involve them in another war, which would embarrass them very much, while they were engaged with Mithridates. So that they contented themselves for the present with causing all the effects, which Alexander had at his death, to be brought from Tyre, and did not meddle with the rest of his estates. This proceeding sufficiently implied, that they did not renounce the will, as the sequel will fully explain.*

This is the fourth example of dominions left to the Roman people by will; a very singular custom, and almost unheard-of in all other history, which undoubtedly does great honour to those in whose favour it was established. The usual methods of extending the bounds of a state, are war and conquest. But with what enormous injustice and violence are those methods attended, and how much devastation and blood must it cost to subject a country by force of arms? In this, however, there is nothing cruel and inhuman, and neither tears nor blood are shed. It is a pacific and legitimate, increase of power, the simple acceptance of a voluntary gift. Subjection here has nothing of violence to enforce it, and proceeds from the heart.

There is another sort of violence, which has neither the name nor appearance of being so, but it is no less dangerous on that account, I mean seduction: when, to obtain the suffrages of a people, mean arts, indirect means, secret collusions, and great donations of money, are employed to corrupt the fidelity of the persons of the highest authority in states and kingdoms, and events are influenced, in which the principal agents act at a distance, and do not seem to have any share. In this we now speak of, there was no visible trace of a policy so common with princes, who, far from making any scruple of it, imagined it to be their glory.

Attalus, who was the first, if I am not mistaken, that appointed the Roman people his heirs, had not engaged in any strict union with that republic, during the short time he reigned. As for Ptolemy Apion, king of Cyrenaica, the Romans, far from using any arts to attain the succession to his dominions, renounced it, left the people in the full enjoyment of their liberty, and would not accept the inheritance afterwards, till they were in some measure obliged to do so. It does not appear that they were more solicitous, either in public or private, with Nicomedes king of Bithynia, or Ptolemy Alexander king of Egypt. What motives, then, induced these princes to act in this manner? First, gratitude: the house of Attalus was indebted for all its splendour to the Romans; Nicomedes had been defended by them against Mithridates: and next, love for their people, the desire of procuring a lasting tranquillity for them, and the idea they had of the wisdom, justice, and moderation of the Roman power. They died without children, or lawful successors; for bastards were not looked upon as such. They had only in view the future divisions and civil wars that might arise about the choice of a king, dreadful examples of which were presented to them in Egypt and Syria. They saw with their own eyes, the tranquillity and happiness enjoyed by many cities and nations under the protection of the Roman people.

A prince in the situation of which we speak, had but one of three things to choose; either to leave his throne to the ambition of the grandees of his kingdom; to restore to his subjects their entire liberty, by instituting a republican government; or to give his kingdom to the Romans.

The first choice undoubtedly exposed the kingdom to all the horrors of a civil war, which the factions and jealousies of the great would not fail to excite, and continue with heat and fury; and the prince's love for his subjects induced him to spare them misfortunes as fatal as inevitable.

The execution of the second choice was impracticable. There are many nations, whose genius, manners, characters, and habit of living, do not admit their being formed into republics. They are not capable of that uniform

* Cicr. Orat. ii. in Rullum, n. 41-43.

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equality, that dependence upon mute laws, which have not weight enough to enforce obedience to them. They are made for a monarchy, and every other kind of government is incompatible with the natural frame of their minds. Cyrenaica, which has a share in the present question, is a proof of this; and all ages supply us with examples of the same kind.

A prince, therefore, at his death, could not do more wisely than to leave his subjects the alliance and protection of a people, feared and respected by all nations, and therefore capable of defending them from the unjust and violent attempts of their neighbours. How many civil divisions and bloody dis cords did he spare them by this kind of testamentary disposition? This appears from the example of Cyrenaica. The Romans, with a noble disinterestedness, having refused the gift which the king had made them at his death, that unhappy kingdom, abandoned to liberty and its own inclination, gave itself up to cabals and intrigues. Torn by a thousand factions, furious to madness against each other, and, in a word, become like a ship without a pilot in the midst of the most violent storms, it suffered many years the most incredible calamities; the only remedy of which was to pray, and in some manner to force, the Romans to vouchsafe to take the government of it upon themselves. Besides this, a prince by such conduct did no more than prevent, and that advantageously for his people, what must necessarily have happened sooner or later. Was there any city or state capable of opposing the Romans? Could it be expected, that a kingdom, especially when the royal family was extinct, could support itself, and its independence, long against them? There was an inevitable necessity for its falling into the hands of that people; and for that reason, it was highly consistent with prudence to lighten the yoke by a voluntary subjection. For they made a great difference between the people who submitted to them freely, as to friends and protectors, and those who only yielded to them by force, after a long and obstinate resistance, and being reduced by reiterated defeats, to give way at last to a conqueror. We have seen with what severity the Macedonians, at least the principal persons of the nation, and after them the Achæans, were treated, especially during the first years of their subjection.

The other nations suffered nothing of that kind, and, generally speaking, of all foreign yokes, none ever was lighter than that of the Romans. Scarcely could its weight be perceived by those who sustained it. The subjection of Greece to the Roman empire, even under the emperors themselves, was rather a means to ensure the public tranquillity, than a servitude heavy upon private persons, and prejudicial to society. Most of the cities were governed by their ancient laws, had always their own magistrates, and wanted very little of enjoying entire liberty. They were by that means secured from all the inconveniences and misfortunes of a war with their neighbours, which had so long and so cruelly distressed the republics of Greece in the time of their ancestors. So that the Greeks seemed to be great gainers in ransoming themselves from these inconveniences, by some diminution of their liberty.

It is true, the provinces sometimes suffered very much from the avarice of governors. But these were only transient evils, to which the goodness and justice of a worthy successor applied a speedy redress, and which, after all, were not comparable to the disorders with which the wars of the Athenians, Thebans, and Lacedæmonians, against each other, were attended; and still less to the violences and ravages occasioned by the insatiable avarice and barbarous cruelty of the tyrants in many cities and states.

An evident proof of the wisdom of the princes, in leaving their dominions to the Romans after their death, is, that their people never exclaimed against that disposition, nor proceeded to any revolt of their own accord, to prevent its taking effect.

I do not pretend to excuse the Romans entirely in this place, nor to justify their conduct in all things. I have sufficiently observed the views of interest

and political motives of their actions. I only say, that the Roman government, especially with regard to those who submitted voluntarily to them, was gentle, humane, equitable, advantageous to the people, and the source of their peace and tranquillity. There were indeed private oppressors, who made the Roman people authorize the most flagrant injustice, of which we shall soon see an example: but there were always a considerable number of citizens, zealous for the public good, who rose up against those violences, and declared loudly for justice. This happened in the affair of Cyprus, which it is now time to relate.

Clodius, who commanded a small fleet near Cilicia, was defeated and taken prisoner by the pirates of that coast, against whom he had been sent. He caused Ptolemy, king of Cyprus, brother of Ptolemy Auletes, to be desired in his name to send him money to pay his ransom. That prince, who was a kind of prodigy in point of avarice, sent him only two talents. The pirates chose rather to release Clodius without ransom, than to take so small a sum.* His thoughts were bent on being revenged on that king as soon as possible. He had found means to get himself elected tribune of the people; an important office, which gave him great power. Clodius made use of it for the destruction of his enemy. He pretended that that prince had no right to the kingdom of Cyprus which had been left to the Roman people by the will of Alexander, who died at Tyre. It was determined in consequence, that the kingdom of Egypt, and that of Cyprus, which depended on it, appertained to the Romans in virtue of that donation; and Clodius accordingly obtained an order of the people to seize the kingdom of Cyprus, to depose Ptolemy, and to confiscate all his effects. To put so unjust a design in execution, he had sufficient influence and address to have the justest of the Romans elected, I mean Cato, whom he removed from the republic, under the pretext of an honourable commission, that he might not find him an obstacle to the violent and criminal designs he meditated. Cato was therefore sent into the isle of Cyprus, to deprive a prince of his kingdom, who well deserved that affront, says a historian, for his many irregularities; as if a man's vice sufficiently authorized seizing all his fortunes.

Cato, on his arrival at Rhodes, sent to bid Ptolemy retire peaceably, and promised him, if he complied, to procure him the high-priesthood of the temple of Venus at Paphos, the revenues of which were sufficiently considerable for his honourable subsistence. Ptolemy rejected that proposal. He was not, however, in a condition to defend himself against the power of the Romans; but could not resolve, after having worn a crown so long, to live as a private person. Determined therefore to end his life and reign together, he embarked with all his treasures, and put to sea. His design was to have holes bored in the bottom of his ship, that it might sink with him, and all his riches. But when he came to the execution of his purpose, though he persisted constantly in the resolution of dying himself, he had not the courage to include his innocent and well-beloved treasures in his ruin; and thereby showed, that he loved them better than he did himself, by the title of king of Cyprus, but in fact the mean slave of his money. He returned to the shore, and replaced his gold in his magazines, after which he poisoned himself, and left the whole to his enemies. Cato carried those treasures the following year to Rome. The sum was so large, that in the greatest triumphs an equal amount had scarcely ever been laid up in the public treasury. Plutarch says it was nearly seven thousand talents. Cato caused all Ptolemy's precious effects and moveables

* A. M. 3946. Ant. J. C. 53. Strab. 1. iv. p. 684.

† P. Clodius in senatu sub honorificentissimo titulo M. Catonem a rep. relegavit. Quippe legem tulit, ut is (Cato)-mitteretur in insulam Cyprum, ad spoliandum regno Ptolemæum, omnibus morum vitiis eam contumeliam meritum.-Vell. Paterc. I. ii. c. 45.

Procul dubio hic non possedit divitias, sed a divitiis possessus est; titulo rex insula, animo pecuniæ miserabile mancipium.

to be sold publicly; reserving only to himself a picture of Zeno, the founder of the Stoics, the opinions of the sect he followed.*

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The Roman people here take off the mask, and show themselves, not such as they had been in the glorious ages of the republic, actuated by a noble contempt for riches, and esteem for poverty, but as they were become, after gold and silver had entered Rome in triumph with their victorious generals. Never was any thing more capable of disgracing and reproaching the Romans than this last action. The Roman people," says Cicero," instead of making it their honour, and almost their duty, as formerly, to re-establish the kings, their enemies, whom they had conquered, upon their thrones, now see a king, their ally, or at least a constant friend to the republic, who had never done them any wrong, of whom neither the senate nor any of our generals had ever the least complaint, who enjoyed the dominions left him by his ancestors in tranquillity, plundered on a sudden without any formality, and all his effects sold at auction almost before his eyes, by order of the same Roman people. This,” continues Cicero, "shows other kings, upon what they are to rely for their security; from this fatal example they learn, that among us, there needs only the secret intrigue of some seditious tribune, for depriving them of their thrones, and of plundering them at the same time of all their fortunes."t

What I am most amazed at is, that Cato, the most just and upright man of those times, should lend his name and service in so notorious an injustice. Cicero, who had reasons for sparing him, and dared not blame his conduct, openly shows, however, in the same discourse which I have now cited, but in an artful and delicate manner, and by way of excusing him, how much be had dishonoured himself by that action.

During Cato's stay at Rhodes, Ptolemy Auletes, king of Egypt, and brother to him of Cyprus, came thither to him. I reserve for the following book the history of that prince, which merits particular attention.

*Plut. in Cato. p. 776.

† Ptolemæus, rex, si nondum socius at non hostis, pacatus, quietus, fretus imperio populi Rom. regno paterno atque avito regali otio perfruebatur. De hoc nihil cogitante, nihil suspicante, est rogatum, ut sedens cum purpura et sceptro et illis insignibus regiis, præconi publico subjiceretur, et imperante populo Rom. qui etiam victis bello regibus regna reddere consuevit, rex amicus, nulla injuria commemorata, nullis repetitis rebus, cum bonus omnibus publicaretur.-Cyprius miser, qui semper socius, semper amicus, fuit; de quo nulla unquam suspicio durior aut ad senatum, aut ad imperatores nostros allata est: vivus (ut aiunt) est et videns, cum victu et vestitu suo, publicatus. En cur cæteri reges stabilem esse suam fortunam arbitrentur, cum hoc ilius funesti anni perdito exemplo videant, per tribunum aliquem se fortunis spoliar (posse) et regno omni nudari.-Cic. Orat. pro Sex. n. 57.

BOOK TWENTIETH.

THE

HISTORY

OF

ALEXANDER'S SUCCESSORS,

CONTINUED.

PLAN.

THE twentieth book is divided into three Articles, which are all abridgments; the first, of the history of the Jews, from the reign of Aristobulus to that of Herod the Great; the second, of the history of the Parthians, from the establishment of that empire to the defeat of Crassus; the third, of the history of the kings of Cappadocia, to the annexing of that kingdom to the Roman empire.

ARTICLE I.

ABRIDGMENT OF THE HISTORY OF THE JEWS, FROM ARISTOBULUS TO HEROD THE IDUMEAN.

As the history of the Jews is often connected with that of the kings of Syria and Egypt, I have taken care, as occasion offered, to relate of it what was most necessary and suitable to my subject. I shall add here what remains of that history to the reign of Herod the Great. The historian Josephus, will satisfy the curiosity of such as are desirous of being more fully informed in it. Dean Prideaux, whom I have used here, may be also consulted for the same purpose.

SECTION 1.-REIGN OF ARISTOBULUS I. WHICH LASTED TWO YEARS.

HYRCANUS, high-priest and prince of the Jews, had left five sons at his death. The first was Aristobulus, the second Antigonus, the third Alexander Jannæus, the name of the fourth is unknown. The fifth was called Absalom.* Aristobulus, as the eldest, succeeded his father in the high-priesthood and temporal sovereignty. As soon as he saw himself well established, he assumed the diadem and title of king, which none of those who had governed Judea from the Babylonish captivity had done, besides himself. The conjuncture seemed favourable for that design. The kings of Syria and Egypt, who were alone capable of opposing it, were weak princes, involved in domestic troubles and civil wars, insecure upon the throne, and not maintaining themselves long in the possession of it. He knew that the Romans were strongly inclined to authorize the dismembering and dividing the dominions of the Grecian kings, in order to weaken them in comparison with themselves. Besides, it was natural for Aristobulus to take advantage of the victories and acquisitions made by his ancestors, who had given an assured and uninterrupted establishment to the Jewish nation, and enabled it to support the dignity of a king among its neighbours.

The mother of Aristobulus, in virtue of the will of Hyrcanus, pretended to the government; but Aristobulus was the strongest, and put her in prison, where he caused her to be starved to death. As he was very partial to Antigonus, the eldest of his brothers, he at first gave him a share in the government; but

* A. M. 3898. Ant. J. C. 106. Joseph. Antiq. xiii. 19, &c. Id. de Bel. Jud. 1. 3.