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he had committed the day before, in not pursuing them immediately upon their defeat; but he confessed it a still greater fault, to have continued quiet and inactive during the night. For, without putting the rest of the army in motion, if he had only detached his light armed troops against the enemy, during their confusion and disorder in passing the river, he might without dif ficulty have cut off at least part of their army.

We see here, in a striking example, to what causes revolutions of states, and the subversion of mighty empires, are owing. No person can read this account without being greatly surprised at seeing Perseus stop short in a decisive moment, and suffer to escape an almost certain opportunity of defeating his enemy; it requires no great capacity or penetration to distinguish so gross a fault. But how came it to pass, that Perseus, who wanted neither judgment nor experience, should be so much mistaken? A motion is suggested to him by a man he confides in. It is weak, rash, and absurd. But God, who rules the heart of man, and who wills the destruction of Macedonia, suffers no other notion to prevail in the king's breast, and removes every thought, which might, and naturally ought to have induced him to take contrary measures. Nor is that sufficient. The first fault might have been easily retrieved by a little vigilance during the night. God seemed to have laid that prince and his army in a profound sleep. Not one of his officers had the least thought of observ ing the motions of the enemy in the night. We see nothing but what is natural in all this; but the holy Scripture teaches us to think otherwise, and what was said of Saul's soldiers and officers, we may well apply to this event: "And no man saw it, nor knew it, neither awaked: for they were all asleep, because a deep sleep from the Lord was fallen upon them." 1 Sam. xxvi. 12. The Romans indeed, by having the river between them and the enemy, saw themselves no longer in danger of being suddenly attacked and routed; but the check they had lately received, and the wound they had given the glory of the Roman name, made them feel the sharpest affliction. All who were present in the council of war assembled by the consul, laid the fault upon the Etolians. It was said that they were the first who took the alarm and fled; that the rest of the Greeks had been drawn away by their example, and that five of the chief of their nation were the first who took to flight. The Thessalians, on the contrary, were praised for their valour, and their leaders rewarded with several marks of honour.

The spoils taken from the Romans were not inconsiderable. They amounted to fifteen hundred bucklers, one thousand cuirasses, and a much greater number of helmets, swords, and darts of all kinds. The king made presents of them to the officers who had distinguished themselves most; and, having assembled the army, he began by telling them, that what had happened was a happy presage for them, and a certain pledge of what they might hope for the future. He passed great encomiums on the troops who had been in the action, and expatiated in magnificent terms on the victory over the Roman horse, in which the principal force of their army consisted, and which they had before believed invincible: he promised himself from hence a more considerable success over their infantry, who had only escaped their swords by a shameful flight during the night; but that it would be easy to force the intrenchments in which their fear kept them shut up. The victorious soldiers, who carried the spoils of the enemies they had slain upon their shoulders, heard this discourse with sensible pleasure, and promised themselves every thing from their valour, judging of the future by the past. The foot on their side, especially that which composed the Macedonian phalanx, prompted by a praiseworthy jealousy, pretended at least to equal, if not to excel, the glory of their comrades upon the first occasion. In a word, the whole army demanded, with incredible ardour and passion, only to engage with the enemy. The king, after having dismissed the assembly, set forward the next day, passed the river, and encamped at Mopsium, an eminence situated between Tempe and Larissa.

The joy for the success of so important a battle affected Perseus in the highest degree. He looked upon himself as superior to a people, who alone were so in regard to all other princes and nations. This was not a victory gained by surprise, and in a manner stolen by stratagem and address, but carried by open force, and the valour and bravery of his troops, and that in his own sight, and under his own conduct. He had seen the Roman haughtiness give way before him three times in one day; at first, in keeping close, out of fear, in their camp; then, when they ventured out of it, in shamefully betaking themselves to flight; and, lastly, by flying again, during the obscurity of the night, and in finding no other security than by being inclosed within their intrenchments, the usual refuge of terror and apprehension. These thoughts were highly soothing, and capable of deceiving a prince, already too much affected with his own merit.

But when his first transports were a little abated, and the inebriation of sudden joy was somewhat evaporated, Perseus came to himself, and, reflecting coolly on all the consequences which might attend his victory, he began to be in some sort of terror. The wisest of the courtiers about him, taking advantage of so happy a disposition, ventured to give him the counsel of which it made him capable; this was, to make the best of his late success, and conclude an honourable peace with the Romans. They represented to him, that the most certain mark of a prudent and really happy prince, was not to rely too much upon the present favours of fortune, nor abandon himself to the delusive glitter of prosperity: that, therefore, he would do well to send to the consul, and propose a renewal of the treaty, on the same conditions imposed by T. Quintius, when victorious, upon his father Philip: that he could not put an end to the war more gloriously for himself, than after so memorable a battle: nor hope a more favourable occasion of concluding a sure and lasting peace, than at a conjuncture, when the check the Romans had received would render them more tractable, and better inclined to grant him advantageous conditions: that if, notwithstanding that check, the Romans, out of a pride too natural to them, should reject a just and equitable accommodation, he would at least have the consolation of having the gods and men for witnesses of his own moderation, and the haughty tenaciousness of the Romans.*

The king yielded to these wise remonstrances, to which he had previously been averse. The majority of the council also applauded them. Ambassadors were accordingly sent to the consul, who gave them audience in the presence of a numerous assembly. They told him, that they came to demand peace; that Perseus would pay the same tribute to the Romans which his father Philip had done, and abandon all the cities, territories, and places, which that prince had abandoned.

When they withdrew, the council deliberated on the answer proper to be made. The Roman constancy showed itself on this occasion in an extraordinary manner. It was the custom at that time to express in adversity all the assurance and loftiness of good fortune, and to act with moderation in prosperity. The answer was, that no peace could be granted to Perseus, unless he submitted himself and his kingdom to the discretion of the senate. When it was related to the king and his friends, they were strangely surprised at so extraordinary, and, in their sense, so ill-timed a pride; the greater part of them considered it needless to think any farther of peace, and that the Romans would be soon reduced to demand what they now refused. Perseus was not of the same opinion. He judged rightly, that Rome was not so haughty, but from a consciousness of superiority; and that reflection daunted him exceedingly. He sent again to the consul, and offered a more considerable tribute than had been imposed on Philip. When he saw that the consul would retract nothing from his first answer, having no longer any hopes of peace, he

*Polyb. Legat. Ixix.

↑ Ita tem mos erat in adversis vultum secundæ fortunæ gerere, moderari animos in secundis.-Liv.

returned to his former camp at Sycurium, determined to try again the forte of war.

We may conclude from the whole conduct of Perseus, that he must have undertaken this war with great imprudence, and without having compared his strength and resources with those of the Romans. To believe himself happy, and after a signal victory to demand peace, and submit to more oppressive conditions than his father Philip had complied with till after a bloody defeat, seems to argue, that he had taken his measures, and concerted the means for success very badly, since after a first action entirely to his advantage, he began to discover all his weakness and inferiority, and in some sort incline to despair. Why then was he the first to break the peace? Why was he the aggressor? Why was he in such haste? Was it to stop short at the first step? How came he not to know his weakness, till his own victory showed it him? These are not the signs of a wise and judicious prince.

The news of the battle of the cavalry, which soon spread in Greece, made known what the people thought, and discovered fully to which side they inclined. It was received with joy, not only by the partisans of Macedonia, but even by most of those whom the Romans had obliged, some of whom suffered with pain their haughty manners, and insolence of power.

At the same time, the prætor Lucretius besieged the city of Haliartus in Boeotia. After a long and vigorous defence, it was taken by storm, plundered, and afterwards entirely demolished. Thebes soon after surrendered, and Lucretius then returned with his fleet.*

Perseus, in the mean time, who was not far from the camp of the Romans, gave them great trouble; harassing their troops, and falling upon their foragers, whenever they ventured out of their camp. He took one day a thousand carriages, laden principally with corn, which the Romans had been to reap, and made six hundred prisoners. He afterwards attacked a small body of troops in the neighbourhood, of which he expected to make himself master with little or no difficulty; but he found more resistance than he had imagined. That small body was commanded by a brave officer, called L. Pompeius, who, retiring to an eminence, defended himself there with intrepid courage, determined to die with his troops rather than surrender. He was on the point of being borne down by numbers, when the consul arrived to his assistance with a strong detachment of horse and light-armed foot: the legions were ordered to follow him. The sight of the consul gave new courage to Pompeius and his troops, who were eight hundred men, all Romans. Perseus immediately sent for his phalanx: the consul did not wait its coming up, but engaged directly. The Macedonians, after having made a very vigorous resistance for some time, were at last broken and routed. Three hundred foot were left upon the place, with twenty-four of the best horse of the troop called the Sacred Squadron, the commander of which, Antimachus, was killed.

The success of this action reanimated the Romans, and very much alarmed Perseus. After having put a strong garrison into Gonna, he marched back his army into Macedonia.

The consul, having reduced Perrhœbia, and taken Larissa, and some other cities, dismissed all the allies, except the Achæans; dispersed his troops in Thessaly, where he left them in winter quarters; and went into Boeotia, at the request of the Thebans, upon whom the people of Coronæa had made incursions.

SECTION III.-MARCIUS ENTERS MACEDONIA. PERSEUS TAKES THE ALARM; BUT

AFTERWARDS RESUMES COURAGE.

NOTHING memorable passed the following year. The consul Hostilius had sent Ap. Claudius into Illyria with four thousand foot, to defend such of

the inhabitants of that country as were allies of the Romans; and the latter had found means to add to his first body of troops, eight thousand men raised among the allies. He encamped at Lychnidus, a city of the Dassaretæ. Near that place was another city, called Uscana, which belonged to Perseus and where he had a strong garrison. Claudius, on the promise which had been made him of having the place put into his hands, in hopes of making great booty, approached it with almost all his troops, without any order, distrust, or precaution. While he thought least of it, the garrison made a furious sortie upon him, put his whole army to flight, and pursued them a great way, with dreadful slaughter. Of eleven thousand men, scarcely two thousand escaped into the camp, which had been left guarded by a thousand soldiers. Claudius returned to Lychnidus with the ruins of his army. The news of this loss very much afflicted the senate, especially as it had been occasioned by the imprudence and avarice of Claudius.*

This was the almost universal fault of the commanders of that time. The senate received various complaints from many cities, as well of Greece as the other provinces, against the Roman officers, who treated them with unheard of rapaciousness and cruelty. They punished some of them, redressed the wrongs they had done the cities, and dismissed the ambassadors well satisfied with the manner in which their remonstrances had been received. Soon after, to prevent such disorders for the future, they passed a decree, which expressed, that the cities should not furnish the Roman magistrates with any thing more than what the senate expressly appointed; which ordinance was published in all the cities of Peloponnesus.†

C. Popilius and Cn. Octavius, who were charged with this commission, went first to Thebes, where they very much praised the citizens, and exhorted them to continue firm in their alliance with the Roman people. Proceeding afterwards to the other cities of Peloponnesus, they boasted every where of the lenity and moderation of the senate, which they proved by their late decree in favour of the Greeks. They found great divisions in almost all the cities, especially among the Etolians, occasioned by two factions which divided them, one for the Romans, and the other for the Macedonians. The assembly of Achaia was not free from these divisions: but the wisdom of the persons of greatest authority prevented their consequences. The advice of Archon, one of the principal persons of the league, was to act according to conjunctures, to leave no room for calumny to irritate either of the contending powers against the republic, and to avoid the misfortunes into which they were fallen, who had not sufficiently comprehended the power of the Romans. This advice prevailed; and it was resolved that Archon should be made chief magistrate, and Polybius captain-general of the horse.

About this time, Attalus having something to demand of the Achæan league, caused the new magistrate to be sounded; who, determined in favour of the Romans and their allies, promised that prince to support his suit with all his power. The affair in question was, to have a decree reversed, by which it was ordained, that all the statues of king Eumenes should be removed from the public places. At the first council that was held, the ambassadors of Attalus were introduced to the assembly, who demanded, that in consideration of the prince who sent them, Eumenes his brother should be restored to the honours the republic had formerly decreed him. Archon supported this demand, but with great moderation. Polybius spoke with more force, enlarged on the merit and services of Eumenes, demonstrated the injustice of the first decree, and concluded, that it was proper to repeal it. The whole assembly applauded his discourse, and it was resolved that Eumenes should be restored to all his honours.

* A. M. 3834. Ant. J. C. 170. Liv. 1. xliii n. 9, 10.

Polyb. Legat. 74. Liv. 1. xliii. n. 17.

It was at this time that Rome sent Popilius to Antiochus Epiphanes, to prevent his enterprises against Egypt, which we have mentioned before.*

The Macedonian war gave the Romans great employment; Q. Marcius Philippus, one of the two consuls lately elected, was charged with it.

Before he set out, Perseus had conceived the design of taking advantage of the winter to make an expedition against Illyria, which was the only province from whence Macedonia had reason to fear irruptions during the king's being employed against the Romans. This expedition succeeded very happily for him, and almost without any loss on his side. He began with the siege of Uscana, which had fallen into the hands of the Romans, it is not known how, and took it, after a defence of some duration. He afterwards made himself master of all the strong places in the country, the greater part of which had Roman garrisons in them, and took a great number of prisoners.

Perseus, at the same time, sent ambassadors to Gentius, one of the kings of Illyria, to induce him to quit the party of the Romans, and come over to him. Gentius was far from being averse to it; but he observed, that having neither munitions of war nor money, he was in no condition to declare against the Romans; which was explaining himself sufficiently. Perseus, who was avaricious, did not understand, or rather affected not to understand, his demand; and sent a second embassy to him, without mention of money, and received the same answer. Polybius observes, that this fear of expense, which denotes a little, mean soul, and entirely dishonours a prince, made many of his enterprises miscarry, and that if he had made some sacrifices, and those far from being considerable, he might have engaged several republics and princes in his party. Can such a blindness be conceived in a rational creature! Polybius considers it as a punishment from the gods.

Perseus having led back his troops into Macedonia, made them march afterwards to Stratus, a very strong city of Ætolia, above the gulf of Ambracia. The people had given him hopes, that they would surrender it as soon as he appeared before the walls; but the Romans prevented them, and threw succours into the place.

Early in the spring, the consul Marcius left Rome, and went to Thessaly, from whence, without losing time, he advanced into Macedonia, fully assured, that it was necessary to attack Perseus in the heart of his dominions.

Upon the report that the Roman army was ready to take the field, Archon, chief magistrate of the Achæans, to justify his country from the suspicions and evil reports that had been propagated against it, advised the Achæans to pass a decree, by which it should be ordained, that they should march an army into Thessaly, and share in all the dangers of the war with the Romans. That decree being confirmed, orders were given to Archon to raise troops, and to make all the necessary preparations. It was afterwards resolved, that ambassadors should be sent to the consul, to acquaint him with the resolution of the republic, and to know from him where and when the Achæan army should join him. Polybius, our historian, with some others, was charged with this embassy. They found that the Romans had quitted Thessaly, and were encamped in Perrhobia, between Azora and Dolichæa, greatly perplexed about the route it was necessary to take. They followed them for a favourable opportunity of speaking to the consul, and shared with him in all the dangers he encountered in entering Macedonia.†

Perseus, who did not know what route the consul would take, had posted considerable bodies of troops in two places, by which it was probable he would attempt to pass. For himself, he encamped with the rest of his army near Dium, marching and counter-marching without much design.

Marcius, after long deliberation, resolved to pass the forest which covered part of the country, called Octolapha. He had incredible difficulties to surA. M. 3835. Aut. J. C 169. Liv. xliii. n. 11 et 18-23. Polyb. Legat. 76, 77. ↑ Polyb. Legat, lxxviii. Liv. I. xliv. n. 1-10.