...have experience. Suitably to this experience, therefore, we may define a cause to bed)i object,folhwtd by another, and where all the objects, similar 'to...are followed by objects similar to the second. Or, hi other words, wfure, if the first object had not been, the second never had existed. The appearance...

...even of Hume himself is sometimes quite as strong as this. One of his definitions of cause is, — ' where if the first object had not been, the second never had existed.' p. 88, Inquiry. And again ' 'tis universally allowed, (says he) that matter, in all its operations,...

...Jirst, are followed by objects timilar to the second. Or, in other words, where, if the Jirst olject had not been, the second never had existed. The appearance...conveys the mind, by a customary transition, to the idea of the effect. Of this also we have experience. We may, therefore, suitably to this experience,...

...we have experience. Suitably to this experience, therefore, we may define a cause to be, An object followed by another, and where all the objects similar...the first object had not been, the second never had exitted." This last circumstance, if very rigidly examined, is not admissible into a just definition...

...many respects, faulty, and not borne out by his own arguments ; for he defines a Cause " an object followed by another, and where " all the objects similar to the first are fol" lowed by objects similar to the second." — Now, if he means an object that will in future, as...

...may define a cause to be an object, followed by another, and where all tlie objects similar to t/ie first are followed by objects similar to the second. Or, in other words, where, if the first oty'ect had not been, the second never had existed. The appearance of a cause always conveys the mind,...

...this we have experience. Suitably to this experience, therefore, we may define a cause to be an object followed by another, and where all the objects, similar...similar to the second. Or, in other words, where, ifthejirst object had not been, the second never had existed. The appearance of a cause always conveys...

...We may define a cause to be an object followed by another ;" and again, in his third definition, " The appearance of a cause always conveys the mind, by a customary transition, to the idea of the effect." This doctrine has been very generally adopted by nearly all the Scottish metaphysicians,...

...many respects, faulty, and not borne out by his 'own arguments; for he defines a Cause " an object followed by another, and where " all the objects similar to the first are fol" lowed by objects similar to the second." —Now, if he means an object that will in future, as...

...we have experience. Suitably to this experience, therefore, we may define a cause to be, An object followed by another, and where all the objects, similar...object had not been, the second never had existed" This last circumstance, if very rigidly examined, is not admissible into a just definition of a cause,...