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Printed, for the PROPRIETORS, by Knight and Compton, Cloth Fair.
PUBLISHED AT THE ANTI-JACOBIN OFFICE, NO. 20, WYCH STREET, DRURY LÅNE, BY
(From JANUARY to JUNE, 1807.)
BY adverting to our last Historical Sketch, prefixed to the Twenty fifth Volume of our Review, our readers will find that we formed a juft eftimate of the Ruffian character, and that we knew how to appreciate the fituation to which Buonaparte, by his natural temerity, and by an implicit reliance on his favourite deity, Chance, which had too long fmiled upon him, had reduced himself. Subfequent events have fully juftified all the conclufions which we then drew from an attentive confideration of the relative ftate of the belligerent powers, and of the actual fituation of the different ftates of Europe. It has been our invariable opinion, from the very commencement of the French revolution, that there always existed, and that there ftill exifts, fufficient ability to crush the revolutionary hydra which has long threatened the civilized world with ruin, and that nothing but the will has been wanted to give action and effect to that ability. Did a doubt remain on the subject, we would refer for its folution to the noble stand which Ruffia, aided only by the fcanty remnant of the broken forces of Pruffia, has made against the savage hordes of France. All that we predicted, refpecting the vigour and efficacy of their exertions, has been completely fulfilled. They have already" exacted fevere vengeance, in the moraffes of Poland, for the defeat which they fuftained in the plains of Moravia." Thefe foldiers, whom the Corlican tyrant ftigmatized as a barbarous and undifciplined rabble, have taught him to feel their fuperiority in difcipline as well as in courage. In every action which has yet been fought, they have beat him by a difplay of fkill and a knowledge of tactics as much as by their cool, fteady, and determined bravery, and by their unshaken fortitude. Prudence and vigour combined to mark all the operations of the Ruffian army, from the opening of the campaign to the battle of Eylau. In that action the Ruffians manifefted an union of all the talents and endowments which are requisite to form great generals and good foldiers. The Corfican was out-generalled, (to ufe a vulgar expreffion) as well as exceeded in every other point that was neceffary to enfure fuccefs. The fickle Goddefs, Fortune, forfook him; victory fled from his standard, and, fuperior only in numbers, in all other refpects inferior, he had the mortification to find his plan difconcerted, his efforts fruitless, his hopes blafted, and his force diminished by more than forty thousand men, though reduced, by the magic power of his revolutionary pen, to five thou➡' Sand! The position of the Ruffians at Eylau was the bett that could be taken for the protection of Koning fberg, on the one hand, and of Dantzic on the other; and had Buonaparte fucceeded in his attempt to get in their rear, and then to drive them from the field, thofe towns would have been left, in a great meafure, at his mercy. The fubfequent conduct of the Ruffians has been eminently prudent. They have fo ftationed themselves as to give effectual protection to the Pruffian pofts, and to receive the immenfe reinforcements which conftantly join them. It is true, indeed, that the French alfo receive acceffions of ftrength; but, when the Ruffians are once trong enough to move forwards, in conjunction with the Pruffians, whofe numbers too are confiderably increafed, the confequence of a victory will
APP. VOL. XXVI.
be decifive. Leaving their wounded behind them, they will then rush forward, with the fame impetuohty which Suwarrow difplayed in Italy; drive the enemy before them from place to place, and give him no reft, till expelled from Germany. Nor will the effect of a defeat, on the other hand, be equally decifive in favour of France. The Ruffians are not lefs refolute in retreat, than impetuous in purfuit; they will defend every inch of ground; and fhould Buonaparte prove fuccefsful in every attack, and drive them back to their own frontier, his own numbers will, to a certainty, be fo thinned, as to reduce him to the neceffity of retracing his fteps; while the approach of a fresh army from Ruffia will enable his enemy again to advance. This conclufion will appear obvious to every one who has attended to the memorable campaign of Suwarrow in Italy, and to the recent operations of the Ruffians in Poland. The Coffacks, too, which attend their army, are most formidable to the French, whom they inceffantly harafs, by night and by day, flaughtering great numbers by a mode of warfare to which they are little accuftomed, and which, naturally enough, they very much dread.
The KING OF PRUSSIA muft now, from neceffity not lefs than from intereft, remain firm to his engagements to conclude no treaty with the Corfican, without the concurrence of his Ruffian protector, and his British ally; and means will now be fupplied to enable him to arm any number of his well-difpofed fubjects, to augment the general force. Had he yielded to the propofals of Buonaparte, Frederick William had, ere this, ceased to be a monarch, and had funk into a degraded vaffal of the most inexorable, the moft mercilefs, the moft fanguinary, of tyrants. As it is, though difpoffeffed of the greater part of his dominions, he is ftill a King, and will be reitored to the poffeffion not merely of his territory, but of his independence and his power alfo. Even should the Ruffians, contrary to all hope and expectation, fuftain a defeat, and be driven back beyond their own frontier, he may not only retreat with them, and find a fure and honourable afylum in the dominions of Alexander, but be certain, at no diftant period, to recover his own.
The KING OF SWEDEN, with a heroifm almoft peculiar to himself, and which perpetually makes us regret that his means are not equal to his fpirit, fets all the power of France at defiance, and contributes more than his portion towards the emancipation of Europe. The check which his troops recently received, from a mifcalculation of the enemy's force, was not fufficient to induce this gallant Prince to fanction the difgraceful armistice concluded by his General, Von Effen. He has, on the contrary, reinforced his army, and again prepared to take the field; and whatever skill and courage can achieve, we may confidently predict, will be accomplished by the Swedes, under the guidance of fuch a Sovereign. They will ferve materially to keep a part of the French force employed, and fo to prevent it from joining the main army; and, in the event of a victory gained by the Ruffians, he will effectually harafs the French in their retreat.
Auftria, meanwhile, who holds, as it were, the balance of Europe in her hands, remains a mere fpectator of the furrounding fcene. Whether this paffiveness be the refult of any fecret understanding with Ruffia, or whether it be the confequence of a fettled fyftem of inaction, a fhort time will fuffice to demonftrate. If the former, the is waiting till Ruffia fhall be able to push forward with her whole force, when the Auftrian army may ad
vance in the rear of the French from Bohemia, and cut off their retreat, Such a ftep would, at once, crush the tyrant, and rescue fubjugated Europe from his iron yoke. If the latter be the cafe, if by a perfeverance in the fame timid and miftaken policy which has lately marked his conduct, the Emperor Francis, deaf alike to the fuggeftions of wifdom, the voice of experience, and the dictates of felf-prefervation, should refolve to remain neuter, and to limit his impotent efforts to the prefervation of his neutral-ity, his fituation will be perilous. Should France prove ultimately victorious, his ruin will be certain, and in the fate of Sardinia, Naples, and Pruffia, he may read his own. And fhould Ruffia prevail in the conteft, the Imperial Alexander will not look with an eye of fatisfaction on a line of conduct which, he will know, could only be dictated by fear or by treachery. And what refiftance Auftria could make to the conqueror of France it would be difficult to conjecture. At all events, the will have made a formidable enemy, where the might have fecured a moft powertųl friend; and, if no immediate lofs of territory or of power fhould ensue, the will, at least, be placed in a state of conftant uneafinefs and alarm, between Ruffia on the one fide, and France on the other; while he will have forfeited all pretenfions to character and all claim to refpect-a consideration of primary importance to a great nation.
We have no fufficient data on which to form any thing like a rational opinion as to the conduct which Auftria, thus fituated, will purfue. It has been generally fuppofed that Francis himfelf is of a pacific difpofition; that the Archduke Charles, who has conceived fome difguft at the English (whether fince Mr. Adair has refided at Vienna, or before, we know not), has confirmed him in his fentiments; and that the Queen (whom he has lately loft) exerted her influence over him for the purpofe of perfuading him to adopt a fyftem of policy more confonant with his dignity, and more conducive to his fecurity. If this fuppofition be correct, and if no change of circumftances has occurred to produce a correfponding change of difpofition, there is little to hope from the exertions of Auftria. But we have fome reason to doubt the accuracy of this statement; and are more inclined to believe,.that the influence and firmnefs of the Ruffian Emperor will ultimately fubdue all other influence in the mind of Francis; an effect which the departure of Mr. Adair from Vienna, and the circumstances which gave rife to it, will contribute, not a little, to produce.
In Sicily, the last refuge of the exiled King of Naples, where, it might naturally be expected, all would unite in one common effort for felfdefence, and in one common fentiment of indignation against the Tyrant of Europe, and of gratitude to thofe who enable them to reift his final exertions for their utter deftruction, firange to fay! the fame spirit of party prevails, which, at the beginning of the French revolution, obtained among the emigrants from that devoted country. There fubfifis in that ifland three different parties;-the King's party, the Queen's party, and the party of the Nobles; the last of which is infected with revolutionary ideas, and, as far as they are capable of attachment, are attached to the deftroyers of their country. Such reptiles ought to be crushed; and the fooner they are configned to the gallows, the better. While the English troops remain there, however, no bad confequences can enfue irónì this difcord.
If we cast our eyes upon the Turkish Empire, we fhall there behold the