The Relation of Berkeley's Later to His Earlier IdealismInland Press, 1899 - 71 من الصفحات |
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abstract ideas abstract image abstract matter Accordingly activity Alciphron appear archetypal aspect associational psychology Berke Berkeley's theory Berkelian British Thought causal character color Commonplace Book complete complex of sensations conceived conception connection definite deistic denied Descartes dialogue between Hylas Ding-an-sich discovery distance distinct Divine DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY doctrine elements empirical Empiricism ence Essay external fact faculties Fraser Human Knowledge Hume Hylas and Philonous hypostatization Ibid idealism ideas of sense immanent immediately implied independent interpretation Kant Locke Locke's magnitude means merely mind-dependent Modern Speculation necessary pantheism passive perceived perception phenomena phenomenal object phenomenon Philosophy of Berkeley Platonic primary qualities Principles of Human rational reality recognition regard relations representative rience says sciousness secondary qualities seems sign language Siris soul subjective subjective idealism tabula rasa tangible ideas Theory of Vision things thinking third dialogue Thought and Modern tion true ultimate unity universals of Reason visual Wenley
مقاطع مشهورة
الصفحة 13 - I believe we shall acknowledge, that an idea, which considered in itself is particular, becomes general, by being made to represent or stand for all other particular ideas of the same sort.
الصفحة 29 - IT is evident to any one who takes a survey of the objects of human knowledge, that they are either ideas actually imprinted on the senses; or else such as are perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind; or lastly, ideas formed by help of memory and imagination— either compounding, dividing, or barely representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways.
الصفحة 12 - It is, I know, a point much insisted on, that all knowledge and demonstration are about universal notions, to which I fully agree. But then it does not appear to me that those notions are formed by abstraction in the manner premised — universality, so far as I can comprehend, not consisting in the absolute, positive nature or conception of...
الصفحة 26 - I do not argue against the existence of any one thing that we can apprehend either by sense or reflection. That the things I see with my eyes and touch with my hands do exist, really exist, I make not the least question. The only thing whose existence we deny is that which philosophers call Matter or corporeal substance.
الصفحة 25 - The table I write on I say exists, that is I see and feel it, and if I were out of my study I should say it existed, meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit actually does perceive it.
الصفحة 50 - Experience then convinces us that we have an intuitive knowledge of our own existence, and an internal infallible perception that we are. In every act of sensation, reasoning, or thinking, we are conscious to ourselves of our own being; and, in this matter, come not short of the highest degree of certainty.
الصفحة 10 - The use of words then being to stand as outward marks of our internal ideas, and those ideas being taken from particular things, if every particular idea that we take in should have a distinct name, names must be endless. To prevent this, the mind makes the particular ideas received from particular objects to become general; which is done by considering them as they are in the mind such appearances, — separate from all other existences, and the circumstances of real existence, as time, place, or...
الصفحة 56 - Look you, Hylas, when I speak of objects as existing in the mind or imprinted on the senses, I would not be understood in the gross literal sense, as when bodies are said to exist in a place, or a seal to make an impression upon wax. My meaning is only that the mind comprehends or perceives them; and that it is affected from without, or by some being distinct from itself.
الصفحة 12 - I can comprehend, not consisting in the absolute, positive nature or conception of anything, but in the relation it bears to the particulars signified or represented by it; by virtue whereof it is that things, names, or notions, being in their own nature particular, are rendered universal.
الصفحة 57 - I know that I, one and the same self, perceive both colours and sounds : that a colour cannot perceive a sound, nor a sound a colour : that I am therefore one individual principle, distinct from colour and sound; and, for the same reason, from all other sensible things and inert ideas.