...object, to the same intent. But the alternative which Heid has chosen is almost equally untenable. The assertion, that we can be conscious of an act...mental operation is only what it is, by relation to ils object ; the object at once determining its existence, and specifying the character of its existence....

...object, to the same intent. But the alternative which Reid has chosen is almost equally untenable. &[ S ɨ R R 9: p n[ 1 5 | & s$ / & iᷔqN) $f m 9 m ;m ! Л mental operation is only what it is, by relation to its object; the object at once determining its...

...the knowledge of intellectual operations to the exclusion of their objects. Reid affirms that we are conscious of an act of knowledge without being conscious of its object. Sir William Hamilton opposes this assertion of the Scotch philosopher, because, after having himself...

...object, to the same intent. But the alternative which Reid has chosen is, at least, equally untenable. The assertion, that we can be conscious of an act...the character of its existence. But if a relation can not be comprehended in one of its terms, so we can not be conscious of an operation, without being...

...object, to the same intent. But the alternative which Reid has chosen is, at least, equally untenable. The assertion, that we can be conscious of an act...the character of its existence. But if a relation can not be comprehended in one of its terms, so we can not be conscious of an operation, without being...

...knowledge of things external, there is, consequently, consciousness of the outer world." Again, he says : " The assertion, that we can be conscious of an act...at once determining its existence, and specifying its character. If a relation can not be comprehended in one of its terras, so we can not be conscious...

...mediately in something else, as represented, but immediately in itself, as existing." Phil., p. 31. "The assertion that we can be conscious of an act...being conscious of its object, is virtually suicidal." — p. 173. It is possible that to these we ought — in order to make our enumeration complete —...

...not mediately in something else, as represented, but immediately in itself, as existing." PML, p. 31. "The assertion that we can be conscious of an act...conscious of its object, is virtually suicidal."— p. 173. It is possible that to these we ought — in order to make our enumeration complete — to...

...mediately in something else, as represented, but immediately in itself, as existing." Phil., p. 31. "The assertion that we can be conscious of an act...conscious of its object, is virtually suicidal."— p. 173. I860.] Philosophy and the Knowledge of God. 341 It ia possible that to these we ought — in...

...object, to the same intent. But the alternative which Reid has chosen is, at least, equally untenable. The assertion, that we can be conscious of an act...the character of its existence. But if a relation can not be comprehended in one of its terms, so we can not be conscious of an operation, without being...