PART III.

OF INTERPRETATION IN GENERAL.

[With this chapter, may be compared Keil, Hermeneutica, pp. 1-14. Beck, Monogramm. Herm. pp. 1-22. Seiler, Hermeneutik, §§ 9-11.]

The

§ 1. Necessity and utility of Interpretation. interpretation of the sacred books is the highest and most difficult task of the theologian. This may be shown from the nature of the case, from experience, and also from the consent of all enlightened periods. All solid knowledge and judicious defence of divine truth, must originate from a right understanding and accurate interpretation of the Scriptures. The purity of the Christian religion has shone brighter or been obscured, in proportion as the study of sacred interpretation has flourished or decayed.

Finally, those have always been reckoned as the most distinguished theologians, who have excelled in this kind of learning. (Compare Morus, Hermeneutica, p. 3. 1.)

As Christian doctrine is preserved only in written records, the interpretation of these is absolutely essential to a knowledge of it; and unless we know what Christianity is, we can neither maintain its purity, nor defend its principles to the best advantage.

§ 2. Difficulties attending interpretation. The science of interpretation in general is difficult; because it requires much learning, judgment, and diligence. Not unfrequently a felicity of talent, or a more than usual degree of understanding, is requisite

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But to manage an exegetical inquiry with success. the interpretation of the sacred books is, from various causes, (a) still more difficult; as the general consent of the learned, and the wonderful paucity (b) of good interpreters fully evince. (Morus, p. 4. 11.)

(a) These causes are, their antiquity; the peculiar dialect of the Scriptures, which greatly differs from that of the western languages; the manners, customs, education, style, modes of thinking and expression, situation, government, climate, &c. of the authors, in many respects, so very dissimilar to ours; the fewness of the books written in the Scriptural dialect; and the want of commentators and lexicographers to whom the language was vernacular. To these causes may be added, the authority and influence which many erroneous commentaries of distinguished men have had over the Christian world.

(b) The paucity of good interpreters, who, unbiassed by party sentiments, have pursued the interpretation of the Scriptures in a simple philological manner, and been consistent throughout in the application of principles purely exegetical, is much greater than any one will be disposed to believe, until experience, acquired by consulting commentaries, shall have convinced him.

§ 8. Definitions. The art of interpretation is the art of teaching what is the meaning of another's language; or that faculty, which enables us to attach to another's language the same meaning that the author himself attached to it. (Morus, p. 6. 111.)

It is better to define interpretation as an act than as an art. To interpret a passage is to shew or declare the sense of it, or simply to explain the meaning, i. e. the meaning which the author himself of the passage attached to it. Any other meaning than this can never be called, with propriety, the meaning of the author.

Interpretation, strictly speaking, may be called grammatical, when the meaning of words, phrases, and sentences, is made out from the usus loquendi and context; historical, when the meaning is illustrated and confirmed by historical arguments, which serve to evince that no other sense can be put upon the passage, whether you regard the nature of the subject, or the genius and manner of the writer.

§ 4. Requisites of a good interpreter. The act of interpretation implies two things; viz. a right perception of the meaning of words, and a proper explanation of that meaning. (a) Hence a good interpreter must possess a sound understanding, and be skilful in explanation. (Morus, p. 8. Iv.)

(a) The words of Ernesti are subtilitas intelligendi et explicandi; a phrase which would convey a meaning quite foreign to his intention, if literally translated into English, or, at most, convey his idea very imperfectly. His meaning is, that the interpreter, who exercises a sound understanding, or possesses subtilitas intelligendi, must demand satisfactory reasons for believing in any particular exegesis, and build his opinion in respect to the meaning of any passage on such reasons. These reasons are founded on the usus loquendi, the context, the nature of the subject, the design of the writer, &c. An interpretation supported by none of these, cannot be admitted by a sound understanding.

The subtilitas explicandi, which I have translated skill in explanation, consists generally in the accuracy of explanation. To constitute such accuracy, in its proper sense, a right use must be made of all the means of interpretation, so as to gain precise and definite views of the author's meaning; then every thing should be so defined and expressed as to exclude all ambiguity and uncertainty; and lastly, the whole should be exhibited in the proper order which the nature of language and of reasoning demands.

§ 5. Subtilitas intelligendi. A sound understanding is exhibited in two ways; first, in discerning whether we really understand a passage or not, and provided we do not, in discovering the difficulties that lie in the way of rightly understanding it, and the grounds of those difficulties; secondly, in finding out, by a proper method of investigation, the sense of those passages which are difficult. (Morus, p. 10. v.)

§ 6. Means by which difficulties and their causes are detected. A good degree of talent or capacity is re

quisite for this; for men of small capacity frequently assent to things which seem to be taught, without any good reasons for so doing; and often believe themselves to understand what they do not understand. To a good degree of talent must be joined a careful habit of distinguishing ideas of things from mere words or sounds; (a) for we ought always to inquire, in respect to any word, whether we have a distinct perception of the thing or idea which it is meant to designate, and not to regard merely the sound of the word. (Morus, p. 10. vI.)

(a) Specially should this be done, where language is employed to designate any thing that is not the object of our senses, but is of an intellectual or metaphysical nature. Habit as well as care will do much in these cases. TRANSLATING FROM ONE LANGUAGE INTO ANOTHER, IS AN EXCELLENT EXERCISE TO FORM A HABIT OF NICE DISTINCTION; for when we come to express the ideas of an author in another language, we often find that we had only an indefinite perception of them. The employment of teaching, also, is well adapted to promote the same purpose; as is the study of logic, or any science which leads to nice discrimination.

§ 7. Means of removing these difficulties. The first means is, a just and accurate knowledge of languages. (a) The next, an acquaintance with the principles of interpretation. Not that no one can interpret, at all, without a scientific knowledge of these principles; but because they assist men of moderate talents, and guide them as it were in the right way, so that they are not left to depend on chance rather than reason. Besides, they are, in this way, supplied with a common rule for judging in controverted cases. (b) Finally, as in detecting difficulties exercise and habit are important; so here, they are of so much consequence that all other advantages will be of little use without them. (Morus, p. 12–19. vII. Nos. I. II. III.)

(a) An accurate knowledge of grammatical principles and of the usus loquendi is here intended; for what authority can an interpretation have, which violates rules of grammar and the usages of speech?

(b) Precepts for interpretation, well grounded, clearly understood, and judiciously applied, very much facilitate the task of the interpreter, and render the result of his labours more worthy of confidence. He who acts by well established rules is more certain that he acts right, than if he followed his own opinion merely, in all cases of difficulty and doubt. And in controversies of an exegetical or doctrinal nature, to what can the appeal be made, in the ultimate resort, but to the principles of intepretation, i. e. the precepts or rules which it prescribes? Nor are these principles useful only to men of moderate talents, (as Ernesti would seem to intimate,) but to men of the highest talents and best acquirements. Men may, indeed, learn them by usage in the interpretation of authors, without the scientific study of them; but the latter is the easier method, and guards most effectually against mistakes.

In addition to these helps for removing difficulties, a knowledge of history, geography, chronology, antiquities, &c. is of high importance.

§ 8. Exercises and habits adapted to overcome the difficulties of interpretation. First, we should attend the instructions of a good interpreter; next, we should read those works where exegetical knowledge is displayed in the best manner, and reflect much upon them, for in this way we may be led to the imitation of them; and lastly, those books which we desire to interpret must be assiduously and constantly perused. (Morus, p. 19. IV.)

In the two first exercises, example serves both to excite and to guide our efforts. The habit of reading, often and assiduously, the book which we desire to interpret, is of more importance than any, or perhaps than all, other means within our power. Every new perusal will suggest to an intelligent and inquisitive mind many ideas, frequently very important ones, which he had not before entertained. This practice cannot, therefore, be too strongly recommended to the student.