own language, and are not adapted to express, with simplicity and logical accuracy, principles of any doctrine. A right understanding of these he must by all means attain; so that he may not be impeded in his inquiries, or thrown into embarrassment by them. E. g. many things are affirmed simply and without any limitation, which however are to be understood as having only a particular and partial application. Especially is this the case in moral propositions. In like manner, active verbs do not always indicate action or efficacy properly considered; which Glass in his Philol. Sacra, Calovius de persona Christi, p. 527, and Turretine de interp. Sac. Literarum, have already noted. (Morus, p. 256. I. II.)

§ 34. Difficult forms in profane writers to be studied. It will be very useful also to attend to such forms of speech in common books, or classics; for there is scarcely any form of speech in the sacred books, which is not found in other writings. Nor can there be any doubt that an interpreter will understand the Scriptures with much more facility, if he be familiar and well acquainted with the difficulties and obscure forms of speech in other books. Those things which appear to be somewhat hard or clogged in the writings of Paul, will not be wondered at, nor give offence, if one goes from the study of Thucydides to the interpretation of the apostle. Nor will such an one be alarmed at faults, which seem hardly to be compatible with the dignity and sanctity of the Scriptures; nor at transpositions, apparent want of consistency in construction, enallages, and the like things. This has indeed often happened to some good men; but they were not well skilled in the languages, Such an alarm is rather the result of unlearned super

stition than of a judicious reverence for the word of God; as Melancthon has justly observed. Dedic. Epist. ad Romanos.

CHAPTER V.

RULES IN RESPECT TO TROPICAL LANGUAGE. [Keil, pp. 115-128. Beck, pp. 129–136. Seiler, § § 50—78.]

§ 1. Design of this chapter. Having explained the method of finding the sense of the New Testament by the usus loquendi, or other artificial aids, we come now to treat separately of certain things which usually are not enough explained, nor made sufficiently explicit in regard to theory or practice. The first of these respects tropes; the second, emphasis; the third, apparent contradictions or discrepancies. Of these in their order.

§2. Duty of an interpreter in respect to tropical language. In respect to tropical language the office of the interpreter is two-fold. First, he must rightly distinguish it from language not tropical, so as not to mistake the one for the other (as formerly the disciples of Jesus and the Jews did, in respect to some of the Saviour's discourses), (a) and so as not to pervert the proper sense of words by a tropical interpretation. Secondly, he must rightly interpret tropes, and give their true sense. For it often happens that men think they have attained the tropical sense of words, when they understand only the literal one; and they are deluded by an empty shadow, or pervert the trope by an etymological interpretation. To avoid these faults,

it is proper to give rules drawn from the nature of tropical diction as learned from use and observation, by which the interpreter may be guided in the judging and in the interpreting of figurative language. (Morus, p. 274. IX.)

(a) E. g. John vi. 52. John iv. 11. Matt. xvi. 6-12.

§ 3. Certain rules respecting tropical diction examined. In order to judge of diction whether it should be taken in a literal or tropical sense, the vulgar maxim is, not readily to depart from the literal sense. But this maxim is neither strictly true, nor perspicuous, nor adapted to use. (Morus, p. 320.)

Not easily (non facile) if you rightly understand the phrase, means almost never, very rarely. This is erroneous; for tropes in the sacred writings are very common; so much so that Glass has filled a large volume with them. It is ambiguous; for it describes no certain mark or characteristic by which tropical language may be distinguished from that which is to be "literally understood; which is certainly a great fault in a rule.

Danhauer, Tarnoff, and Calovius have stated the principle in question with more distinctness, when they aver that the literal meaning is not to be deserted without evident reason or necessity. No one will deny that where there is plain and necessary reason for departure from the literal sense, we may admit the tropical. But some apparent repugnance of things or facts, is not hastily to lead us to reject the literal sense. The older writers regard the phrase proper sense as of the same meaning with literal or historical sense; and rightly teach that we should not depart from the customary signification of a word, without a weighty and sufficient reason. That we may sometimes depart from it is

evident, from the fact that the sacred writers themselves do, beyond all doubt, sometimes depart from it. And indeed, in respect to many words, the tropical sense is the customary or usual one. (Morus, p. 320.)

§ 4. How to examine whether language is tropical. We may commonly understand, at once, whether a word is to be taken tropically or not, by simply examining the object spoken of, either by the external or internal senses, or by renewing the perception of the object. To judge of figurative language, in such cases, is very easy; and in uninspired writings, it very rarely happens that there is any doubt about it, because the objects spoken of are such as may be examined by our senses, external or internal, and therefore it may be easily understood. (a)

In the Scriptures, however, doubts have frequently arisen from the nature of the subjects there treated; which are such as cannot be subjected to the examination of our senses. E. g. the divine nature, (b) divine operations, &c. are subjects beyond the scrutiny of our senses: and the question whether the language that respects such things is to be understood literally or tropically, has given rise to fierce controversies, which are still continued. (c) In these, the parties have often disputed about tropical diction, in a way which savoured more of metaphysical or dialectical subtilty than of truth. (Morus, p. 275. XI.)

(a) E. g. Inflamed mind we understand tropically, by repeating the perception of the idea of mind, and taking notice that the literal meaning of inflamed is incongruous with it. In interpreting the phrase snowy locks, we appeal to the external senses, which determine that the meaning of snowy here must be tropical.

(b) To the language which respects God and his operations,

may be added all that respects the invisible things of a future state, i. e. heaven, hell, &c. The controversy whether descriptions of this nature are to be literally or tropically understood, is by no means at an end. One of the things which the human mind learns very slowly, is to detach itself from conceptions that arise from material objects, and to perceive that in all the descriptions of a future state, words are of absolute necessity employed which originally have a literal sense, because language affords no other. Even the internal operations of our own mind, we are obliged, for the same reason, to describe in language that of necessity must be tropically understood. Almost all men, indeed, now allow that most of the language employed to describe God and his operations, is necessarily to be understood as tropical. Most men will allow that the language which respects the heavenly world may be so considered; but what regards the day of judgment, or the world of woe, they would strenuously contend, must be literally understood. There is indeed sufficient inconsistency in this, and it betrays no small degree of unacquaintance with the nature and principles of interpretation; but as it is productive of no consequences especially bad, the error is hardly worth combating. The motive no doubt may be good, which leads to the adoption of this error. The apprehension is, that if you construe the language that respects the day of judgment or the world of woe figuratively, you take away the reality of them. Just as if reality did not, of course, lie at the basis of all figurative language, which would be wholly devoid of meaning without it. But how inconsistent too is this objection! The very person who makes it, admits that the language employed to describe God and his operations, and also to describe the heavenly world, is tropical; that it must of necessity be construed So. But does this destroy the reality of a God and of his operations, and of the heavenly world?

(c) Who is ignorant of the innumerable controversies that have arisen, about the tropical and literal sense of a multitude of passages in the sacred writings? Almost all the enthusiasm and extravagance that have been exhibited in respect to religion, have had no better support than gross material conceptions of figurative language; or, not unfrequently, language that should be properly understood has been tropically construed. There is no end to the mistakes on this ground. Nor are they limited to enthusiasts and fanatics. They develope themselves not unfre