The question to be determined was, it will be observed, not in the first instance military, but political. Lord Wolseley did not state that an advance was strategically desirable or requisite. The military resolves were to be governed by political considerations, not the reverse. If the Government determined to overthrow the Mahdi, he should take certain measures; if not, his course would be different. Hence it is clear that his present action is not that which he would have taken if his instructions had been to provide for the safety of Egypt and of our troops.

On the contrary, the Government, in reply to Lord Wolseley, instructed him "to frame his military measures upon the policy of proceeding to overthrow the power of the Mahdi at Khartoum." This momentous resolve is clearly therefore political, and not military.

The question is one of the utmost importance; the course on which we are entering seems to me to involve ruinous expenditure, and the sacrifice of thousands of lives without any corresponding advantage; while it would carry "war, ravage and misery " into the Soudan, for no permanent object; it would, less directly perhaps, but not less surely, lead to almost equal suffering and distress in our own country.

I recognise the difficulty of the problem, and no one feel more fully than I do that the Government are most anxious to take the wise and right course under all the circumstances. At the same time I am most anxious, if possible, to induce them and the country not to embark on an enterprise which I feel sure that ere long we shall bitterly repent. If indeed it were considered desirable to extend the frontiers of Egypt so as to include Khartoum, the case would of course be different. Khartoum stands in a very different position from the rest of the Soudan. It is a new city, the creation of commerce. It has not been under native Sultans, and from its position on the Nile it occupies a position of great importance with reference to the irrigation of Egypt. It is true that the Romans preferred the limit of Wady Halfa, but since their time the conditions of the problem have greatly altered. If they had had railways and telegraphs, it is very probable that they would have extended their dominions further south. Thothmes III., whose proud boast it was that during his reign Egypt placed her frontiers where she pleased, certainly did so.

If, then, the Government determine to hold Khartoum and the country round, that would be a policy for which much might be said. It would indeed involve great sacrifices on our part: we should spend some millions and lose hundreds of valuable lives; but at least we should open out the interior of Africa, and civilize a vast country. The distress involved would no doubt for a while be great, but we might hope that the permanent advantages would outweigh present

sufferings, and that material benefits would eventually reconcile the natives of the Soudan to our rule.

On the other hand, to overthrow the Soudanese without any such intention is to incur great sacrifices, and to involve the Soudanese in terrible sufferings, without any national object or prospect of ultimate advantage either to ourselves or to them.

Moreover, to advance on Khartoum, announcing at the same time that we do not intend to occupy it permanently, increases immensely the difficulty of taking it at all. Such a statement

one will side with

naturally unites all the tribes against us, for no us, knowing full well that he would be put to death the moment our backs were turned. On the contrary, if we were advancing with the opposite determination, we might reasonably hope that from motives of self-interest, if for no other reason, some at least of the natives would aid us, while many no doubt under such circumstances would prudently remain neutral. The course we are taking, therefore, seems to unite the minimum of good with the maximum of difficulty.

But whatever may be the case with reference to Khartoum, the Southern and Western Soudan occupy a very different position. To hold them would be a task beyond the strength or power of Egypt. The attempt would be ruinous to Egypt, and unjust to the people of the Soudan. For my own part, I acquit the authorities at Cairo of any intention to plunder and oppress the Soudanese. We may admit that they honestly desired to confer on them a just and good government. But they could not control their own officials; no one can read the late lamented Colonel Stewart's able and interesting report on the Soudan without being convinced that the attempt had hopelessly broken down. One Governor to whom he expressed his dissatisfaction naïvely excused himself by saying that he only robbed the poor, and never interfered with the rich.

Nor

Colonel Stewart did not appear to accept the limitation, and observed generally that: "He thought there could be no doubt that the whole local government was in league to rob and plunder. were the Egyptian officials even loyal to their own employers. General Hicks stated that, in his opinion, more than half of the Government employés were partisans of the Mahdi, and that in the event of any reverse, the dangers would begin with the Government officials."

"I am firmly convinced," he adds, "that the Egyptians are quite unfit in every way to undertake such a task as the government of so vast a country, with a view to its welfare, and that, both for their own sake and that of the people they tried to rule, it would be advisable to abandon large portions of it. The fact of their general incomnce to rule is so generally acknowledged, that it is unnecessary uss the question.”

would, I think, be difficult for any one who has looked into the

evidence to come to any other conclusion. Moreover, it is unnecessary to dwell on this part of the question, because on this point the declarations of Ministers are quite clear. "I need only remind the House," said Mr. Gladstone on the first night of the Session, "that the policy declared by Her Majesty's Government with respect to the Soudan, has always been the evacuation of the Soudan by Egypt and its restoration. That policy has undergone no change. I am not about to argue it or to defend it, but merely to state the fact, which is the point on which I set out, that it has undergone no change."

Nay, the Egyptian Government themselves came, though reluctantly, to that conclusion. Sir Evelyn Baring, writing on January 8 in last year, said: "The Khedive now accepts cordially the policy of the abandonment of the whole of the Soudan, which he believes, on mature reflection, to be the best in the interests of the country." Nubar Pasha, the present Prime Minister, entirely concurred in the wisdom of that course. Nay, Cherif himself had greatly modified his views; he said that his Government found itself compelled to apply either to us or to the Porte for a contingent of 10,000 men to be sent to Suakin. And if that was not done at once, he and his colleagues had determined to retire from the shores of the Red Sea and the Eastern Soudan.

In fact, the Government has stated over and over again that the re-establishment of Egyptian authority over the Soudan is no part of their intentions. What then is their policy? I have already quoted Mr. Gladstone's declaration, that there had been no change in consequence of recent events. Now the policy of the Government certainly was non-interference in the affairs of the Soudan. I have just quoted Mr. Gladstone's statement to that effect. Lord Hartington, speaking last February, said: "I am prepared to maintain that the policy of Her Majesty's Government with regard to the Soudan is a right policy. I hold that our policy of non-interference in the affairs of the Soudan is a right policy."

And why did he consider that this was the right policy for us to adopt? Because, he went on to say, "we have no British interests in the Soudan; there are no European interests in the Soudan, at least no adequate British or European interests which would justify the employment of British forces or the expenditure of British resources."

But are we not interfering in the affairs of the Soudan? Are we not employing British forces and British resources in a country where there are no British interests, to overthrow a leader whom the Soudanese have chosen for themselves, in order to replace him by some one whom we shall set up to rule over them?

Mr. Gladstone himself told us in the same

bate that

"The Soudan is a vast country, equal in size to France, Germany, and Spain-a desert country-with a deadly climate, inhabited thinly by sparse and warlike tribes; but still it is the country of those tribes. They love it as their country. . . .

"We have refused-and I believe the House will approve our refusing to have anything to do with the reconquest of the Soudan..

"I look upon the possession of the Soudan-I will not say as a crime, because that would be going a great deal too far; but I look upon it as the calamity of Egypt. It has been a drain on her treasury; it has been a drain on her men. I believe it is estimated that 100,000 Egyptians have laid down their lives in endeavouring to maintain that barren conquest.'

If the conquest-the barren-Mr. Gladstone might have said, worse than barren-conquest of the Soudan cost the lives of 100,000 Egyptians, of men themselves natives of a hot country, accustomed to the dry and torrid climate of Africa; what number of Englishmen may we not sacrifice, of men accustomed to the cool, moist, and comparatively equable climate of these islands?

Perhaps it may be objected that this statement was made last year. But in resisting Sir Stafford Northcote's vote of censure a few days ago, Mr. Gladstone stated that he did so "because it means committing your gallant army to a struggle from year to year in a tropical country with a people who are courageous by birth and reckless by fanaticism. It means a despotic Government to be established and upheld by British hands against those who hate it.” But does not that description apply also to our present policy? Are we not committing our gallant army to a prolonged struggle in a tropical country with a people courageous by birth and reckless by fanaticism? Are we not going to establish a Government to be upheld by British hands against a people who will hate it? The French Consul at Khartoum, writing on July 29 last,† says that though the force in arms round Khartoum was not large, the whole people were with the Mahdi, and the " very stones were against us. But if Gordon, who had done so much for them and loved them so warmly, had failed utterly to conciliate the natives, how can we hope that any one else would succeed? We must be prepared therefore to meet the bitter, gallant, and determined opposition of the Soudanese. If indeed we were going to hold Khartoum and the country round, the case might be different; we should at least give the people peace and security: moreover, in that case some no doubt would bow to necessity, and join us, if not from love, at least from self-interest. But the Prime Minister has declared against this. He has expressed his conviction "that it was impossible to hold the Soudan in any manner tolerably satisfactory, and that consequently it was our duty to speak frankly and boldly upon the matter, because the Soudan had become a question not of £100,000 a year, as was the old story, but it had assumed a character such as * Mr. Gladstone: Hansard, cclxxxiv. p. 715. + Blue Book: Egypt, No. 1, 1885, p. 22.

to make it evident that if the struggle were to be continued, it would suck the life-blood from the heart of Egypt.'

Yes, and it has assumed such a character now that if we engage in this reckless enterprise it will, I fear, "suck the life-blood from the heart" of England.

What did General Gordon himself think on this subject? Just before he started for Khartoum he placed his opinions solemnly on record. Speaking of good government in the Soudan, he said,

"it is evident that this we cannot secure them without an inordinate expenditure of men and money. The Soudan is a useless possession. It ever was so and ever will be so. It is larger than Germany, France and Spain together. It cannot be governed except by a dictator, who may be good or bad, and if bad he will cause constant revolt. No one who has ever lived in the Soudan can escape the reflection what a useless possession is this land. Few men, also, can stand its fearful monotony and its deadly climate. Therefore I think that the Government are fully justified in recommending its evacuation. The sacrifices necessary towards securing good government are far too onerous to admit of such an attempt being made. Indeed, one may say it is impracticable at any cost."†

On this attempt, however, which General Gordon said could not be made "without an inordinate expenditure of men and money," which "might indeed be said to be impracticable at any cost," we are now, it seems, about to embark.

Mr. Stanley indeed, in an able letter to the Times, maintains that the construction of a railway from Suakin to Berber would have entirely changed General Gordon's opinion. But General Gordon had contemplated such an event. In 1882 he advocated the forma-. tion of a railway as a great advantage to the Soudan, which no doubt it would be; but it was a year subsequent to this that he used the language I have quoted, without any qualification, not moreover in a letter which might have been hastily written, but in a weighty memorandum submitted to Government, and intended for presentation to Parliament.

Perhaps, however, I shall be told that since these opinions were expressed, circumstances have altered. Yes, that is true; they have altered indeed, But how? At that time Gordon was still alive; at that time the tribes of the Soudan were disorganized; at that time they had no single leader; at that time they were but ill supplied with arms; at that time the fortifications and arsenals of Khartoum were at our disposal. That is all changed now; Gordon is no more; the tribes are united; they have an able leader; they occupy the fortifications of Khartoum; and have secured the immense stores of arms and ammunition which it contained.

Is this enterprise then any easier now? will it be any less costly? is it likely to involve any smaller sacrifice of life?

* Mr. Gladstone: Hansard, cclxxxiv. p. 718.

+ Egypt, No. 4, 1884, p. 7.