holy and good (as creatures depending upon and worshiping God, and practifing juftice and equity in their dealings with each other, and the like) is not therefore holy and good, because it is commanded to be done; but is therefore commanded by God, because it is holy and good. The exiftence indeed of the things themfelves, whofe proportions and relations we confider, depend entirely on the mere arbitrary, will and good pleasure of God, who can create things when he pleafes, and deftroy them again whenever he thinks fit. But when things are created, and fo long as it pleafes God to continue them in being, their proportions, which are al tractly of eternal neceffity, are alfo in the things themfelves abfolutely unalterable. Hence God himself, though he has no fuperior, from whofe will to receive any law of his actions, yet difdains not to obferve the rule of equity and goodnefs as the law of all his actions in the government of the world, Ezek. xviii. and condefcends to ap peal even to men for the equity and righteousness of his judgements. To this law, the infinite perfections of his divine nature make it neceffary for him (as has been before proved +) to have conftant regard; and (as a learned prelate of our own has excellently shown), not barely his infinite power, but the rules of this eternal law, are the true foundation and the measure of his dominion over his crea Now for the fame reafon that God, who hath no fuperior to determine him, yet conftantly directs all his own actions by the eternal rule of juftice and goodnefs; it is evident all intelligent creatures, in their feveral fpheres and proportions, ought to obey the fame rule according to the law of their nature; even though it could be fuppofed feparate from that additional obligation of its being the pofitive will and command of God. And doubtlefs there have been many men in all ages in many parts of the heathen world, who not having philofophy enough to collect from mere nature any tolerably just and explicit apprehenfions concerning the attribute of God, much lefs having been able to deduce from thence any clear and certain knowledge of his will, have yet had a very great fenfe of right and truth, and been fully perfuaded in their * Καθ' ἡμᾶς γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ ἐς, τῶν μακαρίων πάντων ὥσε καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρθὴ ἀνθρώπων καὶ Θεῖο Origen. adverí. Celfum. ilb. IV. + Pag, 13a. "Dictamina divini intellectus fanciuntur in leges apud ipfum valituras, per immutabi litatem fuarum perfectionum." Cumberland, de Leg. Naturæ, p. 343. "Solebam ipfe quidem, cum aliis plurimis, antequam domisi jurifque omnis originem ❝ univerfaliter & diftincte confideraffem; dominium Dei, in creationem velut integram "ejus originem, refolvere. Verum quoniam, &c.-in hanc tandem conceffi fententiam, "dominium Dei effe jus vel poteftatem ei a fua fapientia & bonitate, velut a lege, datam "ad regimen eorum omnium quæ ab ipfo unquam creata fuerint vel creabuntur.-Nec po ❝terit quifquam merito conqueri, dominium dei intra nimis anguftos limites hac explica"tione coerceri; qua hoc unum dicitur, illius nullam partem confißere in poteftate quic"quam faciendi contra finem optimum, bonum commune." Idem. p. 345, 345. "Contrà autem, Hobbiana refolutio dominii divini in potentiam ejus irrefittibilem adeo "apertè ducit ad, &c ut mihi dubium non fit, illud ab eo fi&tum fuille, Deoque attribu "tum, in eum tantam finem, ut juri fuo omnium in omnia patrocinaretur." Id. p. 344. "Nos e contrario, fontem indicavimus, e quo demonftrari poteft, justitiam univertalem, omnemque adeo virtutem moralem, quæ in rectore requiritur, in Deo præ cæteris reful64 gere, eadem planè methodo, qua homines ad eas excolendas obligari oftendemus." Id. P. 347. own minds of many unalterable obligations of morality. But this fpeculation, though neceffary to be taken notice of in the diftinct order and method of difcourfe, is in itself too dry, and not of great use to us, who are abundantly affured that all moral obligations are moreover the plain and declared will of God; as fhall be shown particularly in its proper place. 7. THE LAW OF NATURE OBLIGATORY, ANTECEDENT TO . ALL CONSIDERATION OF PARTICULAR REWARDS AND PU NISHMENTS. Laftly, this law of nature has its full obligatory power, antecedent to all confideration of any particular private and perfonal reward or punishment, annexed either by natural confequence, or by pofitive appointment, to the obfervance or neglect of it. This alfo is very evident: because, if good and evil, right and wrong, fitnefs and unfitnefs of being practifed, be (as has been fhown) originally, etcrnally, and neceffarily, in the nature of the things themfelves; it is plain that the view of particular rewards or punishments, which is only an after-confideration, and does not at all alter the nature of things, cannot be the original caufe of the obligation of the law, but is only an additional weight to enforce the practice of what men were before obliged to by right reafon. There is no man, who has any juft fenfe of the difference between good and evil, but must needs acknowledge, that virtue and goodneis are truly amiable, and to be chofen for their own fakes and intrinfic worth, though a man had no profpect of gaining any particular advantage to himself by the practice of them; and that, on the contrary, cruelty, violence, and oppreffion, fraud, injuftice, and all manner of wickednefs, are of themselves hateful, and by all means to be avoided, even + though a man had abfolute affurance, that he fhould bring no manner of inconvenience upon himself by the commiffion of any or all of thefe crimes. This likewife is excellently and admirably expreffed by Cicero: "Virtue," faith he ‡, "is that, which, though no profit "or advantage whatfoever was to be expected to a man's felf from the practice of it, yet muft without all controverfy be acknowledged to be truly defirable for its own fake alone. And accordingly $ all "good 66 *Digne itaque funt, quæ propter intrinfecam fibi perfectionem appetantur, etiam fi ❝ nulla effet naturæ lex, quæ illas imperaret." Cumberland, de Leg. Nat. p. 281. Ανὴς είκαιός ἐσιν, εχ ὁ μὴ ἀδικῶν, Ἀλλ' ὅεις ἀδικεῖν δυνάμενον μὴ βέλεαι. Philemonis Fragmenta. "Honeftum id intelligimus, quod tale eft, ut detracta omni utilitate, fine ullis præmiis "fructibufque, per feipfum poffit jure laudari." Cic. de Finib. II. "Atque hæc omnia propter fe folum, ut nihil adjungatur emolumenti, petenda funt." Id. de Inventione, lib. II. "Nihil eft de quo minus dub'tari poffit, quam & honefta expetenda per fe, & eodem ❝modo turpia per fe effe fugienda." Id. de Finib. lib. III. "Jus & omne honeftum, fua fponte eft expetendum. Etenim omnes viri boni, ipfam “ æquitatem & jus ipfum amant." Id. de Legib, lib. I. "Optimi "good men love right and equity; and do many things without any profpect of advantage at all, merely because they are just and * right, and fit to be done." On the contrary, "Vice is fo odious "in its own nature, and fo fit to be avoided, even though no pu"nishment was to enfue; that * no man, who has made any toler*able proficiency in moral philofophy, can in the least doubt, but, 66 if he was fure the thing could be for ever concealed entirely both ❝ from God and men, so that there should not be the leaft fufpicion "of its being ever difcovered; yet he ought not to do any thing "unjustly, covetoufly, wilfully, paffionately, licentioufly, or any way "wickedly. Nay, t if a good man had it in his power to gain all "his neighbour's wealth by the leaft motion of his finger, and was "fure it would never be at all fufpected either by God or man; unquestionably he would think, he ought not to do it. And "whoever wonders at this has no notion what it is to be really a good man." Not ‡ that any fuch thing is poffible in nature, that any wickedness can be indeed concealed from God; but only, upon fuch a fuppofition, the natural and neceffary difference between juftice and injuftice is made to appear more clearly and undeniably. YET IT DOES NOT FROM THENCE AT ALL FOLLOW, EITHER THAT A GOOD MAN OUGHT TO HAVE NO RESPECT TO REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS, OR THAT REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS ARE NOT ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN THE PRACTICE OF VIRTUE IN THIS PRESENT WORLD. ¦ Thus far is clear. But now from hence it does not at all follow, either that a good man ought to have no refpect to rewards and punishments, or that rewards and punishments are not abfolutely neceffary to maintain the practice of virtue and righteousness in this prefent world. It is certain, indeed, that virtue and vice are 'eter-nally and neceffarily different; and that the one truly deferves to be chofen for its own fake, and the other ought by all means to be avoided, though a man was fure for his own particular, neither to gain nor lofe any thing by the practice of either. And, if this was traly the state of things in the world, certainly that man muft have a very corrupt mind, indeed, who could in the leaft doubt, or fo much as once deliberate with himself, which he would choose. But the cafe does not ftand thus. The queftion now in the general "Optimi quique permulta ob eam unam caufam faciunt, quia decet, quia rectum, "quia honeftum eft; etfi nullum confecuturum emolumentum vident." 1d. de Finib. Jib. II. Satis enim nobis (fi modo aliquid in philofophia profecimus) perfuafum effe del et, "fi omnes deos hominelque celare poffimus, nihil tamen avare, nihil injuste, nihil 1 bi❝dinofe, nihil incontinenter effe faciendum." 1d. de Offic, lib. III. "Si nemo fciturus, nemo ne fufpicaturus quidem fit, quum aliquid divitiarum, potentiæ, "dominationis, libidinis caufa feceris; fi id diis hominibufque futurum fit femper ignotum, fifne facturus?" Id. ibid. + Itaque fi vir bonus habeat hanc vim; ut, fi digitis concrepuerit, poffit in locupletum "teftamenta nomen ejus irrepere; hac vi non utatur, ne fi exploratum quidem habeat id omn no neminem unquam fufpicaturum.-Hoc qui admiratur, is fe, quis fit vir bonus, "nefcire fatetur.' Idem, de offic. lib. III. † καὶ εἰ μὴ δυνῷ ἐν εἴη ταῦτα λανθάνειν καὶ θεὸς καὶ ἀνθρώπως, ὅμως δοτέον εἶναι, τα λίγα ἔνεκα· κα αὐτὴ δικαιοσύνη πρῖς ἀδικίαν αὐτὴν κριθείη. Plato de Republ. lib, X. practice practice of the world, fuppofing all expectation of rewards and punifhments fet afide, will not be, whether a man would choofe virtue for its own fake, and avoid vice; but the practice of vice is accompanied with great temptations and allurements of pleasure and profit; and the practice of virtue is often threatened with great calamities, loffes, and fometimes even with death itself. And this alters the queftion, and deftroys the practice of that which appears fo reasonable in the whole fpeculation, and introduces a neceffity of rewards and punishments. For though virtue is unquestionably worthy to be chofen for its own fake, even without any expectation of reward; yet it does not follow that it is therefore entirely. felffufficient, and able to fupport a man under all kinds of fufferings, and even death itself, for its fake, without any profpect of future recompence. Here therefore began the error of the Stoicks; who taught that the bare practice of virtue was itself the chief good, and able of itself to make a man, happy under all the calamities in the world. Their defence indeed of the caufe of virtue was very brave they faw well that its excellency was intrinfic, and founded in the nature of the things themfelves, and could not be altered by any outward circumstances; that therefore virtue must needs be defirable for its own fake, and not merely for the advantage it might bring along with it; and, if fo, then confequently neither could any external difadvantage, which it might happen to be attended with, change the intrinfic worth of the thing itself, or ever make it cease to be truly defirable. Wherefore, in the cafe of fufferings and death for the fake of virtue; not having any certain knowledge of a future ftate of reward (though the wifeft of them did indeed hope for it, and think it highly probable), they were forced, that they might be confiftent with their own principles, to fuppofe the practice of virtue a fufficient reward to itfelf in all cafes, and a full compenfation for all the fufferings in the world. And accordingly they very bravely indeed taught, that the practice of virtue was not only infinitely to be preferred before all the finful pleasures in the world; but alfo + that a man ought without fcruple to chufe, if the cafe was proposed to him, rather to undergo all poffible fufferings with virtue, than to obtain all poffible worldly happiness by fin; and the fuitable practice of fome few of them, as of Regulus for inftance, who chofe to die the cruelleft death that could be invented, rather than break his faith with an enemy, is indeed very wonder. *"Eft autem unus dies bene & ex præceptis tuis actus, peccanti immortalitati ante"ponendus." Cic. Tufc. Quæf. lib. V. "Quæro fi duo fint, quorum alter optimus vir, æquiffimus, fumma juftitia, fingulari “fide; alter infigni fcelere & audacia: et fi in eo fit errore civitas, ut bonum illum virum, fceleratum, facinorofum, nefarium putet; contra autem qui fit improbiffimus, exiftimet effe fumma probitate ac fide: proque hac opinione omnium civium, bonus ille vir vexetur, “ rapiatur, manus ei denique auferantur, effodiantur oculi, damnetur, vinciatur, uratur, exterminetur, egeat; poftremo, jure etiam optimo omnibus miferrimus effe videatur; contra autem ille improbus laudetur, colatur, ab omnibus diligatur, omnes ad eum honores, omnia imperia, omnes opes, omnes denique copiæ conferantur, vir denique optimus om"nium æftimatione, & digniffimus omni fortuna judicetur: quis tandem erit tam demens, qui dubitet utrum fe effe malit ?" Idem, de Republ. lib. III. fragment. ful ful and to be admired. But yet, after all this, it is plain that the general practice of virtue in the world can never be fupported upon this foot. The difcourfe is admirable, but it feldom goes further than meer words: and the practice of those few, who have acted accordingly, has not been imitated by the reft of the world. Men never will generally, and indeed it is not very reasonably to be expected they should, part with all the comforts of life, and even life itfelf, without expectation of any future recompence. So that, if we fuppofe no future ftate of rewards, it will follow, that God has endued men with fuch faculties as put them under a neceffity of approving and chufing virtue in the judgement of their own minds; and yet has not given them wherewith to fupport themselves in the fuitable and conftant practice of it. The confideration of which inexplicable difficulty ought to have led the philofophers to a firm belief and expectation of a future ftate of rewards and punishments, without which their whole fcheme of morality cannot be fupported. And, becaufe a thing of fuch neceffity and importance to mankind was not more clearly and directly and univerfally made known, it might naturally have led them to fome farther confequences alfo, which I fhall have occafion particularly to deduce hereafter. THE MANIFOLD ABSURDITIES OF MR. HOBBES'S DOCTRINES, CONCERNING THE ORIGINAL OF RIGHT, SHOWN IN PARTICULAR. And now, from what has been faid upon this head, it is easy to fee the falfity and weakness of Mr. Hobbes's doctrines; that there is no fuch thing as just and unjuft, right and wrong, originally in the nature of things; that men in their natural state, antecedent to all compacts, are not obliged to univerfal benevolence, nor to any moral duty whatsoever; but are in a state of war, and have every one a right to do whatever he has power to do; and that, in civil focieties, it depends wholly upon pofitive laws, or the will of governors, to define what fhall be juft or unjuft. The contrary to all which having been already fully demonftrated, there is no need of being large in further difproving and confuting particularly thefe affertions themfelves. I fhall therefore only mention a few obfervations, from which fome of the greatest and most obvious abfurdities of the chief principles upon which Mr. Hobbes builds his whole doctrine in this matter, may moft eafily appear. 1. First then; the ground and foundation of Mr. Hobbes's scheme is this; that all men, being equal by nature, and naturally defiring the fame things, have † every one a right to every thing, are every one defirous to have abfolute dominion over all others, and may every one juftly do whatever at any time is in *«Ab æqualitate naturæ oritur unicuique ea, quæ cupit, acquirendi fpes." Leviath. сар. 13. + Natura dedit unicuique jus in omnia. Hoc eft; in ftatu merè naturali, five antequam homines ullis pactis fefe invicem obftrinxiffent, unicuique liceba fac re quæcunque & in quofcunque libebat; & poffidere, uti, frui omnibus, quæ vole at & terat De Cive, c. 1. § 10. his |