Hume: the Relation of the Treatise of Human Nature--: Book I, to the Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding ...Cornell university., 1904 - 171 من الصفحات |
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abstract according to Hume argument arises arithmetic and algebra Brede Burton causation cause and effect cause of perceptions certainty concerning conclusion conjoined constant conjunction contiguity custom David Hume Der Unterschied d derived distinct ence epistemological existence experience explained faculties geometry Gesch Hence Henry Home Human Nature Hume's doctrine Hume's Enquiries Ibid ical idea of cause idea of necessary idea of space imagination implied impressions and ideas impressions of reflection impressions of sensation inference infinitely divisible instinct intuitive intuitive knowledge Kant later laws of association Lehren H logical manner mathematics means memory metaphysics metic mind moral natural relations necessary connection objects observation omitted particular perfectly exact philosophical relations philosophy of human position priori psychological quiry reason regarded relations of ideas Scottish Phil senses Skepsis skepticism statement theory of knowledge thought tion Treatise and Inquiry Treatise of Human treatment Unterschied
مقاطع مشهورة
الصفحة 106 - But there is nothing in a number of instances, different from every single instance, which is supposed to be exactly similar; except only, that after a repetition of similar instances, the mind is carried by habit, upon the appearance of one event, to expect its usual attendant, and to believe that it will exist.
الصفحة 104 - ... exist, and will discover itself upon a nearer approach. This belief is the necessary result of placing the mind in such circumstances. It is an operation of the soul, when we are so situated, as unavoidable as to feel the passion of love, when we receive benefits; or hatred, when we meet with injuries. All these operations are a species of natural instincts, which no reasoning or process of the thought and understanding is able, either to produce, or to prevent.
الصفحة 31 - The only method of freeing learning at once from these abstruse questions, is to inquire seriously into the nature of human understanding, and show, from an exact analysis of its powers and capacity, that it is by no means fitted for such remote and abstruse subjects.
الصفحة 47 - To begin with clear and self-evident principles, to advance by timorous and sure steps, to review frequently our conclusions, and examine accurately all their consequences; though by these means we shall make both a slow and a short progress in our systems; are the only methods, by which we can ever hope to reach truth, and attain a proper stability and certainty in our determinations.
الصفحة 66 - As to those impressions, which arise from the senses, their ultimate cause is, in my opinion, perfectly inexplicable by human reason, and 'twill always be impossible to decide with certainty, whether they arise immediately from the object, or are produc'd by the creative power of the mind, or are deriv'd from the author of our being.
الصفحة 164 - ... connexion with a present impression, than we can hinder ourselves from thinking as long as we are awake, or seeing the surrounding bodies when we turn our eyes towards them in broad sunshine.
الصفحة 155 - Tis a common observation, that the mind has a great propensity to spread itself on external objects, and to conjoin with them any internal impressions, which they occasion, and which always make their appearance at the same time that these objects discover themselves to the senses.
الصفحة 131 - ... part carries truth with it: the man on whose testimony he receives it not being wont to affirm...
الصفحة 158 - ... objects or events to be constantly conjoined together— what is the consequence of this experience? He immediately infers the existence of one object from the appearance of the other.
الصفحة 28 - There is no question of importance whose decision is not comprised in the science of man ; and there is none which can be decided with any certainty before we become acquainted with that science. In pretending, therefore, to explain the principles of human nature, we in effect propose a complete system of the sciences, built on a foundation almost entirely new, and the only one upon which they can stand with any security.