One thing we may confidently assert, that all those things which the great Creator produces in different periods of time, were perfectly known to Him, and, as it were, present with Him, from eternity; and that every thing that happens, throughout the several ages of the world, proceeds in the same order, and same precise manner, as the Eternal Mind at first intended it should; that none of His counsels can be disappointed or rendered ineffectual, or in the least changed or altered by any event whatsoever. Known to God are all His works, says the Apostle in the council of Jerusalem. Acts xv. 18. And the son of Sirach, God sees from everlasting to everlasting, and nothing is wonderful in His sight. Nothing is new or unexpected to Him; nothing can come to pass that He has not foreseen. And His first thoughts are so wise, that they admit no second ones that can be supposed wiser. And this stability and immutability of the Divine decrees, is asserted even by the Roman philosopher: "It is necessary," says he, "that the same things be always pleasing to Him, who can never be pleased but with what is best."

Every artist, to be sure, as you also well know, works according to some pattern, which is the immediate object of his mind; and this pattern, in the all-wise Creator, must necessarily be entirely perfect, and every way complete. And if this is what Plato intended by his ideas, (which, not a few, and these by no means unlearned, think very likely) his own scholar, the great Stagyrite, and your favourite philosopher, had, surely, no rea son so often and so bitterly to inveigh against them. Be this as it may, all who acknowledge God to be the author of this wonderful fabric, and all these things in it, which succeed one another in their turns, cannot possibly doubt, that He has brought, and continues to bring them all about, according to that most perfect pattern subsisting in His eternal councils; and that these things that we call casual, are all unalterably fixed and determined to Him. For according to that of the

Necesse est illi eadem semper placere, cui nisi optima placere non possunt.

philosopher," Where there is most wisdom, there is least chance*," and therefore, surely, where there is infinite wisdom, there is nothing left to chance at all.

This maxim, concerning the eternal councils of the supreme Sovereign of the world, besides that it every where shines clearly in the books of the sacred Scriptures, is also, in itself, so evident and consistent with reason, that we meet with it in almost all the works of the philosophers, and often, also, in those of the poets. Nor does it appear, that they mean any thing else, at least, for the most part, by the term fate; though you may meet with some things in their works, which, I own, sound a little harsh, and can scarcely be sufficiently softened by any, even the most favourable interpretation.

But, whatever else may seem to be comprehended under the term fate, whether taken in the mathematical or physical sense, as some are pleased to distinguish, it must at last of necessity be resolved into the appointment and good pleasure of the supreme Governor of the world. If even the blundering astrologers and fortune-tellers acknowledge, that the wise man has dominion over the stars; how much more evident is it, that all these things, and all their power and influence, are subject and subservient to the decrees of the all-wise God! Whence the saying of the Hebrews," There is no planet to Israel+.”

And according as all these things in the heavens above and the earth beneath, are daily regulated and directed by the Eternal King, in the same precise manner were they all from eternity ordered and disposed by Him, who worketh all things according to the counsel of his own will, Eph. i. 11, who is more ancient than the sea and the mountains, or even the heavens themselves.

t

These things we are warranted and it is safe to believe. But what perverseness, or rather madness, is it, to endeavour to break into the sacred repositories of Heaven, and pretend to accommodate those secrets of the Divine kingdom to the mea

* Ubi plus est sapientiæ, ibi minus est casus.

+ Non esse planetam Israeli.

sures and methods of our weak capacities! To say the truth, I acknowledge that I am astonished and greatly at a loss, when I hear learned men, and professors of Theology, talking presumptuously about the order of the Divine decrees, and when I read such things in their works. "Paul," says St. Chrysostom, “considering this awful subject as an immense sea, was astonished at it, and viewing the vast abyss, started back, and cried out with a loud voice, Oh! the depth!*" Nor is there much more sobriety or moderation in the many notions that are entertained, and the disputes that are commonly raised about reconciling these Divine decrees with the liberty and free-will of man.

It is indeed true, that neither religion nor right reason will suffer the actions and designs of men, and consequently, even the very motions of the will, to be exempted from the empire of the counsel and good pleasure of God. Even the books of the heathens are filled with most express testimonies of the most absolute sovereignty of God, even with regard to these. The sentiments of Homer are well known†; and with him agrees the tragic poet, Euripides; "O! Jupiter," says he, "why are we wretched mortals called wise? For we depend entirely upon thee, and we do whatever thou intendest we should‡."

And it would be easy to bring together a vast collection of such sayings, but these are sufficient for our present purpose. They always seemed to me to act a very ridiculous part, who contend, that the effect of the Divine decrees is absolutely irreconcilable with human liberty, because the natural and necessary liberty of a rational creature is, to act or choose from a rational motive, or spontaneously, and of purpose. But who sees not, that, on the supposition of the most absolute decree, this liberty is not taken away, but rather established and con

* Ο Πᾶυλος ὥσπερ πρὸς πέλαγος ἄπειρον ὀλιγγιάσας καὶ βαθὺς ἴδων ἀχανές, ἁπιπήδησεν ευθέως καὶ μεγαλα ανεβόησεν, εἶπων, ὦ βαθος, &c.

Δρῶμεν, τε τοιαῦτ, ἂν σὲ τογχανης θέλων. ΙΚΕΤ. 1. 734.

firmed? For the decree is, that such an one shall make choice of, or do some particular thing, freely; and whoever pretends to deny, that whatever is done or chosen, whether good or indifferent, is so done or chosen, or, at least, may be so, espouses an absurdity. But, in a word, the great difficulty in all this dispute, is that with regard to the origin of evil. Some distinguish, and justly, the substance of the action, as you call it, or that which is physical in the action, from the morality of it. This is of some weight, but whether it takes away the whole difficulty, I will not pretend to say. Believe me, young gentlemen, it is an abyss, it is an abyss never to be perfectly sounded by any plummet of human understanding. Should any one say, "I am not to be blamed, but Jove and Fate*," he will not get off so, but may be nonplussed by turning his own wit against him. The servant of Zeno, the Stoic philosopher, being catched in an act of theft, either with á design to ridicule his master's doctrine, or to avail himself of it in order to evade punishment, said, "It was my fate to be a thief." "And to be punished for it," said Zenot. Wherefore, if you will take my advice, withdraw your minds from a curious search into this mystery, and turn them directly to the study of piety, and a due reverence to the awful majesty of God. Think and speak of God and His secrets with fear and trembling, but dispute very little about them; and, if you would not undo yourselves, beware of disputing with Him. If you transgress in any thing, blame yourselves: if you do any good, or repent of evil, offer thanksgiving to God. This is what I earnestly recommend to you; in this I acquiesce myself; and to this, when much tossed and distressed with doubt and difficulties, I had recourse, as to a safe harbour. If any of you think proper, he may apply to men of greater learning; but let him take care he meet not with such as have more forwardness and presumption.

* Ουκ ἐγώ ἄιτιος ειμί, αλλα ζεῦς καὶ μοῖρα.

* In fatis mihi, inquit, fuit furari. Et cædi, inquit Zeno,

LECTURE XI.

Of the CREATION of the World.

WHOEVER looks upon this great system of the universe, of which he himself is but a very small part, with a little more than ordinary attention, unless his mind is become quite brutish within him, it will, of necessity, put him upon considering whence this beautiful frame of things proceeded, and what was its first original; or, in the words of the poet, "From what principles all the elements were formed, and how the various parts of the world at first came together*.”

Now, as we have already observed in our dissertation concerning God, that the mind rises directly from the consideration of this visible world, to that of its invisible Creator; so, from the contemplation of the First and Infinite Mind, it descends to this visible fabric; and again, the contemplation of this latter determines it to return, with the greatest pleasure and satisfaction, to that Eternal Fountain of goodness and of every thing that exists. Nor is this a vicious and faulty circle, but the constant course of a pious soul, travelling, as it were, backwards and forwards from earth to heaven, and from heaven to earth: a notion quite similar to that of the angels ascending and descending upon the ladder which Jacob saw in his vision. But this contemplation by all means requires a pure and divine temper of mind, according to the maxims of the philosopher: "He that would see God and goodness, must first be himself good, and like the Deity +." And those who have the eyes of their mind pure and bright, will sooner be able to read in those objects that are exposed to the outward eye, the great and evident characters of His eternal Power and Godhead.

We shall, therefore, now advance some thoughts upon the

Quibusque exordia primis

Omnia, et ipse tener mundi concreverit orbis.

VIR. Ecl. vi.

* Γενέσθω δε πρῶτον θεοειδής τᾶς καὶ καλὸς εἰ μέλλει θεάσασθαι θεόντε καὶ καλον. PLOT,